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This thesis explores human–dog relations and knowledge production at the nexus of dog-
training and scientific research, when dogs are trained to detect the odour of human disease 
via biological samples. Based on twelve months of fieldwork at two dog-training and 
research organisations, in the UK and USA, this thesis explores the practices through 
which bio-detection dogs are produced and how knowledge is produced about, and with, 
them.  
Whilst a growing body of scholarship exists across and beyond the social sciences, 
on both human–animal relations and the role of animals in laboratory practices, the 
relatively recent emergence of research practices involving bio-detection dogs illustrates 
a novel mode of incorporating animals into scientific practice that has, until now, evaded 
theoretical analysis. By focusing on this practice, this thesis contributes original insights 
to the literature regarding both multispecies relationships and science studies.  
Consistent with the intellectual commitment of multispecies ethnographers to 
bring nonhuman beings into the ethnographic foreground, the analysis presented in this 
thesis pays attention not only to the dog-trainers’ perceptions of the dogs, nor solely to 
what the dogs might be (i.e., as a species) but also to what the dogs are observed as doing 
themselves. 
Developing an analysis of how interconnectedness between human and dog is 
shaped among my informants, this thesis explores how the boundary between human and 
animal, that is often assumed to be rigid in sites of scientific practice, is called into question 
through the engagements between humans and dogs in the realm of bio-detection. The 
notion of ‘response-ability’ (Haraway 2008) emerges as an important analytic for 
understanding the practices and processes of bio-detection dog-training and research, as 
the capacity of both partners to respond and be affected by the other is revealed to be 





Despite their relatively high prevalence, certain forms of cancer (e.g., prostate or ovarian 
cancer) and other diseases remain difficult and dangerous to diagnose. This project 
explores human–dog relationships and the production of scientific knowledge where dogs 
are trained to detect the odour of human diseases including cancer. This project also 
explores the conditions under which this relatively recent practice has developed. The 
impact of this thesis can be assessed both within and beyond academia. 
 
Inside academia 
Within the discipline of anthropology, this thesis contributes particularly to scholarship 
regarding the ‘animal turn’, with the work presented complementing research that has 
illustrated the entanglement of human lives with the lives and deaths of myriad other 
species. This research also adds to the body of social scientific literature exploring the 
place of animals in spaces of scientific inquiry, by considering a case study previously 
unexplored from a social science perspective. Thus, this work contributes original insights 
to interdisciplinary conversations—among the humanities, social sciences and sciences—
about the spaces and practices of animal-dependent research. The insights developed in 
this thesis also benefit the nonhuman animals in my research by promoting discussion 
about the ways in which they are enrolled in research activities and how more responsible 
practices in science might be facilitated.  
I have presented papers based on this research at several interdisciplinary academic 
conferences including the British Animal Studies Network meeting ‘Working with 
Animals’ in October 2017 and more recently, a conference entitled ‘Rendering the 
Invisible Visible’ hosted by artists at University College London in May 2018. 
 
Outside academia  
Outside the academic arena, this thesis provokes reflections on our contemporary 
relationships with dogs and our responsibility towards nonhuman animals more broadly. 
Through the lens of bio-detection dogs, this project helps the wider public to consider the 
diverse ways in which people form associations with nonhuman animals in order to 
improve human health.  
This impact has been advanced through public engagement activities. Most 
notably, I contributed stories and objects from my research to the exhibition ‘The Museum 
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of Ordinary Animals’ which ran from 21st September to 22nd December 2017 at the Grant 
Museum of Zoology, UCL. This exhibition aimed to put ‘ordinary animals’ at the center 
and explored their contributions to human culture and medicine. The total number of 
visitors to the exhibition was 15,850. Furthermore, as part of the exhibition’s associated 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
It is the bi-monthly ‘demonstration-day’ at the headquarters of Medical Detection Dogs: a 
British charity that conducts research around the dog’s ability to detect the odour of human 
diseases such as cancer. Alongside a group of visitors sat on white plastic chairs in the 
informal viewing gallery, I watch through the transparent glass wall into the training room 
as Sadie, a black Labrador, and her trainer Ed, an Englishman in his thirties, demonstrate 
what these dogs are trained to do: detect the odour of human disease. One of the bio-
detection trainers who is watching with us explains that Sadie is a prostate cancer detection 
dog, trained to sit at cancerous samples of urine, presented in plastic pots on a carousel 
structure. 
Inside the training room, Kelly raises three of her fingers to let us know in which 
position on the carousel the target odour has been placed. Ed enters the training room with 
Sadie at his side. The pair make their way to their starting point, around a metre back from 
the first position. Ed stands behind a one-way-screen, with Sadie to his left side. Sadie sits 
for a few moments before Ed points his hand to the first position and tells Sadie to search. 
She sniffs the first and then second samples, neither prompting an alert response. With her 
nose over the pot containing the third sample, she immediately bends her hind legs and 
adjusts herself into a sitting position. Sadie’s neat indication prompts applause from the 
visitors and comments of “Wow!” and “So clever!” As they clap, Ed walks over to where 
Sadie is sat and feeds her some kibble (dried dog food) treats. Ed and Sadie then leave the 
room whilst Kelly switches the position of the target. The group watch Sadie search and 
indicate in this way four more times.  
 
This thesis focuses on the training and research practices involving ‘bio-detection’ dogs 
like Sadie, and the humans who train them and interpret the individual dog’s behaviour 
during their search activities. Bio-detection dogs are trained to detect the particular odour 
of volatile organic compounds (VOCs) originating in disease cells (e.g., prostate cancer, 
Parkinson’s disease) and excreted in human biological substances (e.g., urine, sweat, and 
breath). A positive detection is communicated to the dog’s handler via a trained ‘alert’ 
response, usually in the form of the dog sitting next to the positive sample. Conversely, 
the ideal bio-detection dog ought to ignore non-cancer-specific odours (e.g., odours 
associated with bleeding and inflammation that are common effects of a variety of other 
health conditions). The training methods used to produce these dogs prioritize a positive 
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reinforcement approach, whereby the dog is rewarded with something considered to be 
meaningful to the individual dog (usually food) when he makes a correct alert in response 
to the salient odor. 
Despite their relatively high prevalence, certain forms of cancer and other diseases 
remain difficult and dangerous to diagnose. For instance, the Prostate Specific Antigen 
blood test—the current gold standard—used to diagnose prostate cancer has false-positive 
rates of up to 75% (Slatkoff et al. 2011). In addition, the more invasive test of needle 
biopsies also used to diagnose prostate cancer can have severe side effects associated with 
the risk of the needle contaminating tissue with bacteria and cancer cells. Another of the 
diseases bio-detection dogs are being trained to detect, Parkinson’s, currently lacks a 
diagnostic test, meaning that many sufferers unknowingly experience the disease for many 
years before their symptoms become progressively more detrimental. Thus, Medical 
Detection Dogs are responding to a need to develop accurate, non-invasive tests for the 
early diagnosis of cancers and other diseases. With around two hundred million olfactory 
receptors, compared to the average human’s five million, dogs are obvious candidates for 
this kind of work. 
 
This thesis focuses on the work of two organisations that produce such bio-detection dogs. 
Currently, bio-detection dogs are not utilized operationally in the diagnostic process of 
any disease. Instead, at the time of this fieldwork being undertaken, the work is exclusively 
focused towards conducting proof-of-principle studies under double-blind conditions to 
generate a ‘scientific’ evidence-base of these dogs’ detection abilities. Thus, alongside the 
cultivation of bio-detection dogs, a second product that is generated by these organisations 
is the data used to inform scientific knowledge. A primary aim of both organisations is to 
explore the potential of dogs as diagnostic tools through the training, testing and peer-
reviewed publication of their work. As such, they hope to provide the scientific community 
with quantifiable evidence regarding the dog’s ability to detect the odour of human 
disease.  
Although the disease-detection capacities of these dogs are not currently being 
employed for diagnostic purposes in practice, through the production of bio-detection 
dogs—and that of the knowledge about their potential—both organisations imagine their 
work will improve diagnosis for future patients, or potential patients, hoping to make the 
diagnostic process both less invasive and more accurate. How this goal is conceptualized 
as being accomplished varies slightly in accordance with the specificities of the different 
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conditions and how they present or are manifest. For instance, my dog-trainer informants 
speculated that malaria-detection dogs might in the future be utilized at entry ports to 
identify travelers carrying malaria to prevent the spread of disease across borders and 
ensure potential patients receive antimalarial treatment. Meanwhile, dogs trained to detect 
cancer are not themselves anticipated to become a feature of the clinic at the clinician’s 
disposal. Instead, through collaborations with physicists and chemists, the dog’s skills are 
being investigated in an effort to identify the chemical composition of such odours and 
develop more sophisticated ‘electronic-noses’ that effectively mimic the dog’s nose; 
imagined diagnostic tools of the future that, as envisaged, will enable greater efficiency 
than the dog. 
 
It is thus possible to consider the work of these organisations as combining two 
fundamental dimensions of practice: (1) training dogs and (2) scientific investigation, or 
testing. Observations detailed in this thesis highlight a tension in the structure of relations 
between human and dog that are fashioned in order to achieve both of these related goals. 
In particular, the shape of human–dog engagement is found to oscillate in this work in 
order to accommodate both the needs of trainers working with dogs using methods of 
positive reinforcement, and the aims of scientific investigation. 
When working with the dogs, the trainers perceive the animals as beings who ‘look 
back’ (Haraway 2008, 21) to their trainer, read his body language and adjust their own 
behavior in response. During the earlier stages of training, such intersubjectivity between 
the partners is actively encouraged and an emphasis is placed on the individual handler-
dog relationship as a fundamental element in promoting a dog’s desire to participate in the 
work. However, in order to conduct scientific studies investigating the reliability of the 
dog as a diagnostic tool, there is a requirement for such cross-species intersubjectivity to 
be productively managed—to guarantee that a dog’s search behavior, or diagnostic 
reliability, is a function of the odor stimulus alone and not dependent on any unconscious 
cues from his handler.  
Ideally then, the ideal bio-detection dog, under scientific investigation, would be 
reliable working under the guidance of an interchangeable handler. However, the 
reliability of the dog’s detection is understood to be dependent on both the dog’s olfactory 
sensitivity and the interpretation of the individual dog’s behavior by his handler. 
Fundamentally, the data yielded is generated through a handler’s interpretation of a dog’s 
behavioral response to an odor stimulus. Thus, throughout the training and testing phases 
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of their work, bio-detection dogs are paired with a specific trainer who, it is understood, 
will gradually develop a more refined ability to read that individual dog’s nuances. As 
such, the organisations can be understood as producing interspecies detection teams, 
comprised of human and dog whose engagement is characterized by a tension between 
moments of attachment and detachment.  
Focusing predominantly on the training of bio-detection dogs in this thesis affords 
a set of practices through which to ethnographically explore themes of interspecies 
relating, nonhuman agency, responsibility, and knowledge production. 
 
i. The Animal Turn  
 
From ‘Thinking With’ to ‘Living With’: The Emergence of Multispecies Ethnography 
 
It is extremely important that we recognize the involvement of 
nonhumans in the creation of cultures (human or otherwise), that we 
understand that they are not only ‘good to think with’ but also crucially 
partners in the making of our world. (Birke 2011, xix) 
 
The discipline of anthropology has been subject to a long tradition in which human life 
has been considered apart from, and above, the lives of nonhuman animals. Indeed, by 
definition, anthropology is the study of man-kind,1 and the roots of the subject are 
entrenched in western science, religion, and moral philosophy that has, since antiquity, 
insisted on rigid lines purported to separate man from animal and, correspondingly, culture 
from nature. This is not to deny that animals have long featured in important works of 
anthropological literature, but in the instances where early-mid twentieth-century 
anthropologists referred to nonhuman animals in their writing, those animals were 
traditionally considered ‘on the margins of anthropology—as part of the landscape, as food 
for humans, as symbols’ (Kirksey and Helmreich 2010, 545).  
For example, in his now infamous essay on the Balinese cockfight, Clifford Geertz 
(1973) suggests that the cocks represent the men themselves and express the tensions and 
conflicts among them. For Geertz, the human–animal relationships he observed were not 
                                                 
1 Anthrōpos is the Greek word for ‘human being,’ and the suffix -logy means ‘the study 
of.’ 
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important in their own right. Rather, the cockfight offered a window through which to 
observe and analyse Balinese culture. As suggested in Claude Levi-Strauss’ (1963, 89) 
much cited remark, that animals are ‘good to think’ with, animals were classically 
perceived as simple vehicles with which to understand a particular social group or process 
(for examples, see Evans-Pritchard 1950; Geertz 1973; Levi-Strauss 1963). With an 
anthropocentric focus that reproduced a stark human/animal binary, human–animal 
interactions were thus documented from a solely human perspective throughout the 
twentieth century. 
 
Particularly over the last two decades, as part of the ‘animal turn’ gaining traction in the 
humanities and social sciences, anthropologists have begun to reconsider the way in which 
the human is theorized in relation to other animals, and subsequently, how the animals 
themselves are considered. Adrian Franklin (1999, 3) suggests that a radical shift has 
occurred in late modern society whereby ‘the categorical boundary between humans and 
animals, so fiercely defended as a tenet of modernity, has been seriously challenged, if not 
dismantled in places’. Today, within the discipline, it is increasingly recognized that the 
human experience is not somehow abstracted and distinct from other forms of life, but 
fundamentally constituted through relations with other species. The dominant discourse 
that is challenged by such an approach is identified by Donna Haraway (2008, 11) as 
‘human exceptionalism’, or ‘the premise that humanity alone is not a spatial and temporal 
web of interspecies dependencies’ (Ibid.). In its place, has emerged an approach to 
understanding interspecies connections where animals and indeed plants are no longer 
mere ‘windows and mirrors’ (Mullin 1999) into and of symbolic inquiry. Not an 
exclusively zoological concern, anthropologists have revealed how plants (Archambault 
2016) and other living agents, such as the herpes virus (Lowe and Münster 2016), are 
fundamentally entangled with human life. These kinds of inquiries, in the ‘contact zone’ 
(Haraway 2008) between human and nonhuman, have come to be known under the rubric 
‘multispecies ethnography’ (Kirksey and Helmreich 2010). Despite studying the 
engagement of humans with a diversity of other living things and at varying scales, from 
mushrooms (Tsing 2009; 2015) to entire forests (Kohn 2013), multispecies ethnographers 
are united in their attempt to ‘bring the animal in’ to their work, de-centering the assumed 
centrality of the human and paying attention to the fundamental role of nonhuman animals 
in shaping society.  
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 Particularly influential for this thesis is Haraway’s (2008) insistence on the 
importance of animals as not merely vehicles ‘to think’ with (Levi-Strauss 1963), but as 
agents ‘to live with’. For Haraway, this ‘living with’ is articulated through her notion of 
‘companion species’ (2003) which she illustrates with a focus on the relational practice of 
agility training which she is herself a participant in. Though she does focus on dogs in a 
great deal of her work, her decision to eschew ‘animal’ for ‘species’ in this term indicates 
an acknowledgment that her arguments extend to the many species engaged with human 
life that do not necessarily fall inside the animal category (e.g., bacteria). Through her 
notion of companion species, Haraway argues for the recognition that, ‘We make each 
other up, in the flesh. Significantly other to each other, in specific difference, we signify 
in the flesh a nasty developmental infection called love’ (Ibid., 2-3). At stake is thus a 
challenge towards the supposedly fixed categorical boundaries of nature and culture that 
separate human and other animals, as well as a renewed understanding of what it is to be 
an agent in the world. Considering the world as comprised of meetings between 
companion species, ‘reaching into each other’ (Ibid., 6), Haraway considers beings—
human or nonhuman—as subjects that constitute each other and themselves ‘through their 
‘prehensions’ or ‘graspings’ (Ibid.). In short, for Haraway, ‘Beings do not preexist their 
relatings’ (Ibid.).  
 
The development of the animal turn, with its fundamental concerns for the entanglements 
of human and nonhuman lives, has been remarkably rapid within anthropology and is 
linked to a growing academic interest surrounding the Anthropocene: the term used to 
delineate the present geological epoch, in which human activity is significantly impacting 
global landscapes and climates.2 Described by Eduardo Kohn (2015) as ‘an epoch in which 
human and nonhuman kinds and futures have become so increasingly entangled that 
ethical and political problems can no longer be treated as exclusively human problems’, 
many scholars engaged in work centered around the anthropocene call for a move away 
from the ideology that humans are detached from ecosystems and the animals within them 
and a move toward an understanding of human, animal, plant, and environmental system 
as inherently symbiotic (e.g., Colombi 2009; Fuentes 2010; Vitebsky 2005). The 
increasing recognition of human connectedness with other forms of life is consequentially 
                                                 
2 At the 2014 American Anthropological Association conference, the term Anthropocene 
featured in 64 abstract or paper or panel titles, compared with zero the previous year. 
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prompting a reconsideration of the place of humans in the world; arguably, an essential 
project to ensuring the survival of the planet’s ecosystems. Thus, the animal turn can be 
understood, at least in part, as a response to the discipline’s heightened engagement with 
the social, cultural, economic, and political issues surrounding climate change.  
 
In this thesis, while I hope to bring the dog in, I emphasize that ‘bringing in’ the animal 
does not necessarily mean ‘putting out’ the human (Hurn 2012, 219). Thus, while making 
space for canine-centered perspectives in my ethnography and analysis, I remain 
committed to the disciplinary orientation of anthropology (i.e., the human) by considering 
the dog’s perspectives and actions predominantly in their engagement with the human 
trainers with whom they work alongside. This is in keeping with the theoretical framework 
with which I approach this project: an approach that acknowledges that human life is 
constituted not in opposition to, or apart from, but through relations with animal others 
(Lestel and Taylor 2013, 183).  
 
The Affective Turn 
Inspired by the rise in multispecies ethnography as outlined above, this thesis is informed 
by a conceptual framework that places emphasis on multispecies mutuality, becoming, and 
entanglement. In recent years, the ‘affective turn’ in the humanities and social sciences 
has helped to highlight these aspects of more-than-human relations, as they relate to the 
capacity of beings of human and nonhuman kind alike ‘to affect and be affected’ (Massumi 
2015): a capacity that emerges through particular encounters (Stewart 2007). Central to 
much of the social scientific literature on affect have been the works of Gilles Deleuze and 
Félix Guattari (2004) who argue that ‘we know nothing about a body until we know what 
it can do, in other words what its affects are, how they can or cannot enter into composition 
with other affects, with the affects of another body’ (Ibid., 284).  
While affect theorists, largely influenced by Baruch Spinoza’s Ethics (1992) often 
through Deleuze (1988), offer diverse understandings of affect, many share some common 
assumptions noted by historian Ruth Leys (2011, 437) in her assertion that, ‘affects are 
‘inhuman’, ‘pre-subjective’, ‘visceral’ forces and intensities that influence our thinking 
and judgments but are separate from these…the affects must be non-cognitive, corporeal 
processes or states’. Affect is thus pre-emotional with the consequence that one may be 
affected yet be unable to explain why or put into words the affect experienced. 
Nevertheless, these are considered simultaneously mundane and formative everyday 
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experiences (Stewart 2007). In addition, affect is widely considered not to be located 
within the interiority of a subject. Rather, ‘intensity’, to use Brian Massumi’s (2002, 25) 
words, ‘is embodied…at its interface with things’. 
An emphasis on affect offers anthropologists novel ways to observe and analyse 
their subjects. For instance, it provides a challenge to the notion of the self-contained 
individual (Brennan 2004) and can help anthropologists conceptualize beings in modes 
that are more permeable than traditional categories might allow. Especially for researchers 
engaged in multispecies work, with beings who do not share a verbal language, affect is 
particularly useful with regards to the focus on the senses it can afford (Hayward 2010).  
 
My own understanding of affect follows, in particular, its use by Vinciane Despret (2004; 
2013) and Bruno Latour (2004) who both employ affect as a verb, highlighting affective 
encounters as active processes through corporeal relations. Juno Parreñas (2012, 674) is 
also inspired by these scholars and offers a succinct definition of affect as ‘a dynamic 
process occurring at the interface of all kinds of bodies’.  
Despret’s (2004) work in particular has been formative in my engagement with 
affect theory. Exploring the relationships between scientists and the animals of their study, 
Despret claims that in a ‘practice of domestication’ (Ibid., 122) affect comes to produce 
the nonhuman animals and people who encounter each other. Thus, for Despret, in an 
argument similar to that made by Haraway (2003), it is through their affective relating that 
each subject is constituted. What emerges as central to affective encounters, in the work 
of both Despret (2004) and Latour (2004), are the experiencing, physical bodies of all 
kinds.  
Latour (2004) is also interested in how bodies engage with the world and are 
transformed in the process. As he notes, ‘to have a body is to learn to be affected’ (Ibid., 
205). He uses the example of the practice of training ‘noses’ within the perfume industry, 
describing and analyzing how noses are trained to discriminate the subtle differences of 
odours using odour kits. Through the systematic presentation of subtly contrasting odours, 
Latour notes that the trainer renders his inattentive pupils attentive to increasingly subtle 
levels of differences in the chemicals. In Latour’s words, ‘He has taught them to be 






The recognition—implicit to both the animal and affective turns—that multiple beings of 
diverse species are in the process of becoming in their meetings with others, has prompted 
Haraway (2008, 71) to suggest that multispecies relationships demand ‘response-able’ 
relationships. For Haraway, response-ability is defined as ‘a relationship crafted in intra-
action through which entities, subjects and objects, come into being’ (Ibid.). According to 
her, response-ability is the obligation to develop one’s competency in sensing and 
attending to the needs of the other, that follows an acknowledgment of the entangled 
subjectivities and possibility for shared pain and mortality of humans and animals alike 
(Ibid., 83). Crucially, she insists that response-ability is not an obligation exclusive to 
humans but one that is required of nonhumans too: ‘animals as workers in labs, animals in 
all their worlds, are response-able in the same sense as people are’ (Ibid., 71). 
Haraway’s concept of ‘response-ability’ has been particularly helpful for scholars 
attempting to understand how scientists engage with the animals of their study, with a 
specific focus directed towards the ethical aspects of scientific practice (e.g., Davies 2012; 
Despret 2013; Greenhough and Roe 2011). Building on Haraway, Beth Greenhough and 
Emma Roe (2011) argue that response-able relations can be enabled, in encounters 
between scientists and animal subjects in scientific research, when scientists consider the 
animals’ intention towards them by embodying a heightened attentiveness to bodily 
responses, or ‘somatic sensibilities’.  
 
In this thesis, I will consider how an exploration of response-ability can help theorize 
relations between the humans and dogs involved in bio-detection research. Considering 
response-ability, in this case, as an obligation between beings of different kinds, I will pay 
attention to how the dogs themselves might be understood as response-able in their 
relations with their humans, asking whether and how the conditions and spaces of training 
and research either enable or preclude the possibility for the dogs to become beings who 
are themselves able to respond, and beings to whom it is possible for the humans to 
respond to. Thus, aligned with Tim Ingold’s approach (2013, 8), proposed in his critique 
of human exceptionalism, I attempt to offer an understanding of both the dogs and humans 
at my field sites that goes beyond what they are (i.e., as a species), to consider what they 




The Rise of Pet-Keeping and Retheorizing Kinship 
Studies of human-animal relationships have contributed to some of anthropology’s 
foundational topics, including kinship. One of the most influential anthropologists to 
contribute to the study of kinship, Marilyn Strathern (1992) has argued that emergent 
reproductive technologies, such as in vitro fertilization, have reshaped contemporary ideas 
concerning kinship and nature. In particular, Strathern notes that ideas of kin and 
connection are becoming increasingly distinct from relationships of blood or direct 
descent. Referring in particular to the United Kingdom, she also notes a growing emphasis 
on individualism and the disintegration of extended families. A recent body of literature 
has linked ideas about kinship with human–animal relationships, with many scholars 
observing that the close affinities between humans and pet animals are commonly 
understood in terms of kinship, with pets deeply embedded in family relations (e.g., 
Charles and Davies 2008; Hansen 2013).  
Whilst several studies have found humans to identify their pets as family members 
(Beck & Katcher 1983; Charles 2014; Franklin 2006; Harris 2011), it is important to note 
that this does not necessarily suggest a straightforward equivalence (Charles 2014). 
Although dogs are often incorporated into families as dependents for whom adults are 
responsible in a way akin to children, many of the dog owners surveyed emphasized that 
their dogs are prized for their dog-ness (Ibid.). Nevertheless, this expansion of the kinship 
category to include nonhumans, specifically pet animals, is notable and is associated with 
a transformation in human–animal relations across European and American contexts over 
the last century.3 Certainly, with the rise of pet-keeping in the UK and USA since the 
                                                 
3 Despite the overt displays of affection people show toward their pet dogs and the wealth 
of resources bestowed upon them, particularly within Euro-American contexts, just two 
centuries ago the position occupied by dogs in British culture, for instance, was very 
different (Ritvo 1987; Thomas 1983; Howell 2015). While some early examples of 
affective relationships between humans and their canine companions certainly do exist, 
albeit predominantly anecdotally or fictionally (for instance, Chaucer’s fourteenth century 
Canterbury Tales), these occurred principally among people of privileged financial status 
and rank (Thomas 1983). Indeed, up until the early nineteenth century many Britons still 
enjoyed the ‘sport’ of dog fighting (Ritvo 1987). Throughout the Victorian age, however, 
pet keeping was on the rise and Philip Howell (2015) explores this trend, noting that ‘the 
place of the dog in British society was a “live” question’ (3), as the dog was gradually 
moved out of public space and into its now familiar place at the center of the middle-class 
home. Howell explains that this redefinition of the dog’s place was not without 
complications however. Rather, it was ‘proposed, debated, challenged, confronted—and 
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Victorian era (Fudge 2008), there have been shifts in attitudes towards animals (e.g., Grier 
2006; Ritvo 1987; Thomas 1984; Howell 2015). These transformations in human–animal 
relations have been associated with a shift in the basis of human–animal relations from 
function to affect (Berger 2009; Thomas 1984). James Serpell (2005, 131) notes, human–
pet relationships ‘are based primarily on the transfer or exchange of social rather than 
economic or utilitarian provisions’. In addition to their being without a ‘proper’ function, 
and thus distinct from animals bred for food or other utilitarian purposes, pets are further 
distinguishable by virtue of living inside the home and by being named by their humans. 
The naming process, a ubiquitous feature of human societies that transforms ‘anybodies’ 
into ‘somebodies’ (Geertz, 1973, 363), is a means of individualization that sets pets apart 
from most other animals. If, as Alan Beck and Aaron Katcher (1996 [1983], 11) point out, 
having a name is considered ‘the essence of being an individual and being a person’ it 
follows that extending the practice of naming to nonhuman animals asserts the animal’s 
individuality and personhood. For animals, names arguably provide ‘the vehicle for 
crossing boundaries’ (Bodenhorn and vom Bruck 2009, 4) between the categories of 
human and nonhuman, enabling them to be considered as subjects within human society. 
The rise in pet keeping has been theorized in various ways. One suggestion is that 
it is a response to ontological insecurity (Franklin 1999): an argument based on the notion 
that ‘relationships with animals can be experienced as providing more stability and 
consistency than those with human family members’ (Charles 2014, 12). Its popularity has 
also been associated with the emergence of a post-humanist orientation which rejects both 
a firm species barrier and the exceptionalism of humans over other animals (Cudworth 
2011). While some scholars claim that we are witnessing the emergence of hybrid families 
(Franklin, 2007) or post-humanist households (Power 2008; Smith 2003) accompanied by 
the progressive destruction of the species barrier, sociologist Nickie Charles (2014) 
advocates for a more cautious analysis. Although Charles acknowledges a shift in the 
context of intimate relationships with pets, she challenges claims regarding the novelty of 
the advent of post-human families. Rather, she argues that multi-species households, with 
close emotional bonds between people and pets, are not new to the postmodern period. 
                                                 
ultimately accepted, albeit conditionally’ (Ibid. 11). Harriet Ritvo (1987) associates the 
increase in pet-keeping during this period with the industrial revolution’s ‘taming of 
nature’ that resulted in a shift in how the natural world was perceived; in short, nature was 
no longer considered a threat to human existence.  
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Indeed, domestic dogs have been a part of many households since Saxon and Celtic times 
(Ritvo 1987). According to Charles (2014, 12), this phenomenon is the ‘continuation of a 
long-standing trend towards an increasingly widespread experience of affective human–
animal connectedness’. 
 Certainly, the everyday acts of kinship people engage in with their pets—or indeed 
other categories of animals4—raise questions about the ‘sharp divisions of nature and 
culture’ (Haraway 2003, 30), illustrating the ‘connectedness of humans and other animals 
and the permeability of the categorical barriers that separate them’ (Charles and Davies 
2014, 9.6).  
 
 
ii. A Turn Towards Dogs 
 
Dogs in Anthropology 
While animals in general have long been considered outside the intellectual remit of a 
study of mankind, it is arguable that a further obstacle has prevented anthropologists from 
taking the dog, in particular, seriously as a subject worthy of inquiry in this animals’ 
relations with humans. The ubiquity of the dog in western culture, their mundane presence 
within households and status as ‘honorary humans’ (Donaldson 2005, 8) has arguably 
contributed to the, until recent, scarcity of scholarship exploring human–dog relations. As 
Charles (2014) argues, although multi-species households have existed for a long time, the 
so-called ‘species barrier’ has effectively concealed them from inquiry within the social 
sciences.  
However, as noted in the above discussion on the animal turn, animals, including 
dogs, have not been absent in earlier anthropological work. For instance, Caroline 
Humphreys (1976) has paid attention to the role of dogs in Mongolia, where she proposes 
the term ‘intimate others’ (1976) to encapsulate the particular position of the dog in 
relation to human beings. More recently, Baasanjav Terbish (2015) has built on 
                                                 
4 Simone Dennis (2009) has explored how notions of kinship are tied to relationships 
between scientists and laboratory rodents in Australian laboratories. Dennis notes how a 
variety of kinship is established between the researchers and their animal subjects: a 
kinship established and enacted in the thickness of the encounters between the researchers 
and rodents, and formed by a recognition that both human and rodent bodies are sensing 
and sensible beings. 
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Humphrey’s work, utilizing her notion of Mongolian dogs as ‘intimate others’ in his 
exploration of the apparently contradictory treatment of dogs in Mongolian nomadic 
society. Terbish illustrates how on the one hand, the status of dogs is elevated in this 
society given their cosmological proximity to humans. Among Buddhist Mongols, the dog 
is understood to be the closest being to humans in the circle of reincarnation and this 
intimacy is reflected in the practice of naming individual dogs: a custom not extended to 
other animals. At the same time however, there is a recognition that dogs are not equal to 
humans. Due to concerns about the dog’s polluting state, dogs are prohibited from entering 
the ger [felt tent and home], people refrain from close physical contact with the dogs, and 
items are thought to be polluted if a dog steps over them. Furthermore, dogs are typically 
only provided with leftovers to eat. Drawing on Victor Turner (1979), Terbish proposes 
that the Mongolian dog is not only an ‘intimate other’, but can also be considered a 
‘transitional being’, for it is neither a total beast nor a full human, instead it has elements 
of the two. During the socialist period however, when occult specialists were quelled and 
the cosmological realm was derided as superstition, the dog lost its status as a transitional 
being and was instead split into ‘good’ (domesticated) and ‘bad’ (stray). Pets and working 
dogs were invited to share living space and food with people, while stray dogs were hunted 
and killed as a matter of public health. Thus, Terbish argues that the Mongolian dog 
functions as a mirror of human society. 
Humphreys’ and Terbish’s scholarship arguably maintains an overtly 
anthropocentric approach, with an emphasis on the human cultural and historical contexts 
for such relationships, rather than on the nuances of the relationship itself and how these 
nuances are tied to factors beyond the human. Significant exceptions to such 
anthropocentric scholarship on human–animal relationships where dogs are concerned 
include the aforementioned works of Haraway (2003; 2008) as well as that of Smuts (2001) 
and Kohn (2007): literature that recognizes the fundamental entanglement of dogs with 
everyday human life and illustrates the porous quality of the ‘species barrier’ within 
anthropology. For instance, Barbara Smuts (2001) draws on her personal experiences with 
her dog, Safi, in whom she encounters the presence of a ‘self’, in order to theorize the 
variety of cross-species intersubjective relations. 
Despite being heavily focused on Euro-American contexts, the burgeoning 
scholarly interest on human–dog relations is not wholly restricted to such locales. Work 
has been undertaken across the world in an effort to understand the myriad and diverse 
ways in which people live and work alongside dogs. For example, Kohn (2007) has 
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conducted ethnographic work among the Amazonian Runa, in which he explores Runa 
ways of communicating with and knowing dogs in a ‘perspectivist’ (cf., Viveiros de Castro 
1998) universe. Acknowledging the interconnectedness of human–dog relations in this 
context, Kohn (2007, 7) claims that ‘in their mutual attempts to live together and make 
sense of each other, dogs and people increasingly come to partake in a shared constellation 
of attributes and dispositions’.  
Elsewhere, in urban Japan, Paul Hansen (2013) has studied the recent boom in pet 
dog ownership, linking the phenomenon to his informants’ desire for touch—both bodily 
and affective. Dogs are considered as family members here, Hansen argues, because they 
are individual agents with unique characteristics enabling them to impact us both 
physically and affectively. Largely bred to be companions, dogs in Japan ‘fill an affect-
oriented void; be it as family or friend’ (Ibid., 92). 
 
Domestication Reconsidered 
Dogs share a unique relationship with mankind, as archaeological records suggest the dog 
was the first species of animal to be domesticated (Perri 2016). Consequentially, studies 
concerning the process and timing of dog domestication are closely tied to research 
exploring human evolution. However, despite having lived with humans for tens of 
thousands of years, the details regarding the dog’s geographic and temporal origins are a 
continued topic of debate among scholars in this field. Amidst this lack of consensus 
though, one fact is widely undisputed: despite the great variety of dog breeds observable 
today, representing a broad spectrum of sizes and shapes, all domestic dogs are 
descendants of the grey wolf (Canis lupus) (Vila et al. 1997). 
For some time, there have been two main schools of thought about dog 
domestication. Some scholars claim dogs split from wolves in Europe around 16,000 years 
ago (Clutton-Brock 1995; Freedman et al. 2014; Morey 1992), while others suggest dog 
domestication happened in Central Asia or China more recently (Ding et al. 2012; 
Savolainen et al. 2002). A recent study (Frantz et al. 2016) however, suggests that the 
explanation for these contrasting theories could be that all these claims might in fact be 
correct. Based on DNA analysis of ancient and modern dogs, the results of this study show 
a genetic split between modern dog populations living in East Asia and Europe. Dated to 
between ~14,000 and 6,400 years ago, this split appears to have occurred after the earliest 
archaeological known appearance of dogs in Europe (<15,000 years ago) and East Asia 
(<12,500 years ago) (Larson et al. 2012). The authors also suggest that there appears to 
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have been a population turnover in Europe, with the earliest domestic dog population there 
being largely replaced. Combined with archaeological evidence, Frantz et al. argue that 
the findings of this study suggest that dogs were domesticated independently from two 
geographically distinct wolf populations, one in Eastern Eurasia and the other in Western 
Eurasia. The researchers hypothesize that after some time, East Eurasian dogs may have 
then moved into Europe with migrating humans, where they mixed with and largely 
replaced the earliest European dogs. 
However, this dual-origin domestication hypothesis has been challenged by a 
recent study in which ancient genomic data sequences of Neolithic dog fossils were 
compared with genetic data from canids, including modern dogs and wolves (Botigué et 
al. 2017). The ancient dogs were found to share ancestry with modern European dogs, 
challenging the hypothesis of a Late Neolithic population replacement. The researchers of 
this latest work put dog domestication somewhere between 20,000 and 40,000 years ago. 
Nevertheless, the debate continues.  
Traditionally, the domestication process of plants and animals has been widely 
(though not unanimously) considered an act of human achievement encompassing notions 
of ownership, property, and control. This approach has been increasingly challenged in 
recent decades however, with some arguing that rather than illustrating the human species’ 
control over other beings, domestication instead highlights our significant lack of control.5 
Concerning the domestication of the dog in particular, it has even been hypothesized that 
the dog domesticated itself (Coppinger 2002). For instance, Ray Coppinger’s (Ibid.) theory 
proposes that wolves approached hunter-gatherer camps in search of food, with the 
friendlier wolves tolerated by humans and able to take advantage of human food waste. 
Certainly, the notion of dog domestication as a more mutually shaped endeavor between 
the species has been increasingly advanced in recent years, with Haraway (2003, 5) 
referring to humans and dogs as ‘Partners in the crime of human-evolution’. 
                                                 
5 As Helen Leach, quoted in Sarah Franklin’s Dolly Mixtures (2007, 31), claims: ‘However 
it is defined, domestication was a process initiated by people who had not the slightest idea 
that its alliance with agriculture would change the face of their planet almost as drastically 
as an ice age, lead to nearly as many extinctions as an asteroid impact, revolutionize the 
lives of all subsequent human generations, and cause a demographic explosion in the elite 
group of organisms caught up in the process. Such unforeseen consequences are seldom 
discussed in the literature of domestication, perhaps because it is not in the nature of the 
species that started the process to admit that it isn’t in control’. 
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This reconsideration of the process of domestication, as one that was probably a 
less active experience on the part of the humans than has often been thought, resembles a 
broader shift in approaches towards domestication that emphasize the interspecies 
mutuality of the process by reconfiguring the development of relationships between 
people, animals and plants. Such a shift in thinking has been greatly informed from the 
work of scholars outside of anthropology. In particular, Despret’s (2004) work has been 
important in reconceptualising approaches to domestication. Despret presents a review of 
Robert Rosenthal’s 1966 experiment with rats and biology students’ study of rats, intended 
to test the supposed ‘Clever Hans effect’, whereby scientists unconsciously influence 
results. In Rosenthal’s study, the students are each given a rat for whom they were 
responsible for working with. The rats’ task was to navigate a maze. Half the students were 
told that their rats had been selectively bred to be particularly intelligent, while the other 
half were told that their rats were particularly dull. In fact, both groups of rats had been 
bred under identical conditions. Matching Rosenthal’s expectations, the ‘bright’ rats 
outperformed the ‘dull’ rats. Despret argues that in this case the students and rats mutually 
participated in a process of attunement. She notes that the students ‘put their trust in their 
rats, emotional trust, trust that is conveyed in gestures, in students’ bodies, in all these rats’ 
bodies that were manipulated, caressed, handled, fed, and encouraged’. This led to ‘the 
students succeeding in attuning their rats to their beliefs’, and ‘these beliefs brought into 
existence new identities for the students and for the rats’ (2004, 122). For Despret, the 
emotional relations between the species in this case are elements of domestication as she 
perceives it, as an ‘anthropo-zoo-genetic practice’ through which human and animal are 
constructed. This example illustrates Despret’s contention that how questions are asked of 
animals intimately determines what the animal is allowed to become (e.g. ‘dull’ or 
‘intelligent’). 
According to Despret, what Rosenthal’s study demonstrated was ‘how an affected 
and affecting student makes himself available to the ‘becoming’ of the rat’ (2004, 123). 
However, Despret points out that her notion of ‘becoming available’ is not equivalent to 
‘being docile’ and the difference, she notes, rest on the possibility of ‘resistance’ that is 
not shared by both practices. Experimental methods that enable beings to ‘become 
available’ to each other enable resistance, whereas experiments that are designed to 
produce docility do not. It is precisely this process of becoming available that Despret 
terms as domestication. In my analysis of the training of bio-detection dogs I will draw on 
Despret’s work, particularly exploring the potential for resistance within this arena and 
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asking how this reconceptualization of domestication can help us to understand the shape 
of human–dog relationships.  
 
The Coevolution of Human–Dog Communication 
As a consequence of the thousands of years that humans and dogs have spent living 
alongside each other, dogs have evolved not only in the way they look, but how they 
behave too. Particularly interesting to note is the evidence that suggests dogs have 
developed an array of cognitive capabilities that enable them to effectively read and 
respond to human communicative behaviour (Cooper et al. 2003; Miklosi et al. 2004). The 
basic test used to demonstrate this is the ‘object-choice task’; a popular experiment in the 
field of dog-cognition. During the experiment, a human hides a piece of food under one of 
several opaque bowls or cups, controlling for factors such as smell, and then gives a 
specific communicative cue to the dog to indicate the ‘target’ cup. In the first study of this 
kind to be conducted with dogs (Miklosi et al. 1998), five gestures were used sequentially: 
pointing, bowing, nodding, head turning, and glancing with the eyes. Each gesture was 
offered to the dogs at least thirty times before the next was introduced and eighty per cent 
accuracy had to be shown for the present gesture before progressing to the next. All six 
dogs in this study proved competent in using these gestures to approach the correct bowl 
without prior training. Successive studies have confirmed the validity of these results 
(Agnetta et al. 2000; Hare et al. 1999). Human infants are capable of recognizing these 
communicative signals from around 14 months old (Behne, Carpenter, and Tomasello 
2005), whilst chimpanzees—despite their ability to solve many other cognitive tasks 
(Tomasello et al. 2003; Povinelli, and Vonk 2003)—display no skill in reading these 
communicative behaviours to find hidden food (Tomasello, Call, and Gluckman 1997).  
Given the difficulty that some of our closest relatives have with this task, it is 
significant that dogs show remarkable skill in reading human gestural cues to extract social 
information. Brian Hare and colleagues (2002) propose the term ‘phylogenetic 
enculturation’ to describe the process through which dogs have been selected for particular 
social-cognitive abilities, that enable them to surpass even chimpanzees in understanding 
human communication. Despite their capabilities communicating with humans however, 
it is worth noting that dogs are not better skilled in all communication tasks compared to 
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other animals.6 Nevertheless, as a whole, this body of research contributes to our 
understanding of why dogs, in particular, appear so well-suited to living and working 
alongside humans today, and accounts for their depictions as ‘students of human 
movement’ (Gladwell 2006), or ‘canine anthropologists’ (Horowitz 2010, 161).  
 
The flourishing of the field of dog-cognition over the past two decades has led to many 
more experiments being conducted, including a broader set of gestures tested among dogs 
in object-choice studies.7 This mode of incorporating dogs into scientific research 
represents a shift away from the mode in which they were typically studied throughout the 
twentieth century—as mere neural systems in the development of learning theory (e.g., 
Pavlov 1966a [1906]; 1966b [1936]—and towards a consideration of dogs as a species 
itself of curiosity, no longer solely of interest for what dogs can reveal about human 
physiology.  
However, Alexandra Horowitz and Julie Hecht (2014), researchers at the Dog 
Cognition Lab within Columbia University’s department of Psychology, highlight the 
anthropocentrism implicit in the methodological design of some of the studies in dog-
cognition. In particular, they question the salience of visual cues for the dog: ‘a species 
whose primary modality is olfactory’ (Ibid., 210). To counter this, they suggest that dog-
cognition studies ought to be designed with sensitivity towards the dog’s umwelt (von 
Uexküll, [1934] 1957), the subjective or ‘self-world’ of each individual and species. 
Regarding the area of dog-oriented research at the center of this thesis, whilst not itself a 
study of dog-cognition per se, I consider how my human informants engage with ideas 
about how dogs perceive the world.  
                                                 
6 Whilst dogs have proven more skilled than nonhuman primates in object-choice tasks, 
they are less able in other non-social tasks. For example, dogs are unable to make 
inferences about the whereabouts of hidden food based on non-social cues, such as seeing 
one board flat and another tilted up as though something were underneath (Bräueur et al. 
2006). In this task dogs do much worse relative to nonhuman great apes. These results are 
intriguing and suggest that the skills demonstrated by dogs in the object-choice task 
exemplify a precisely social specialization. 
7 In subsequent studies (e.g., Hare and Tomasello, 2005a; Udell et al. 2008), dogs have 
been found to infer the correct object from a human placing a marker on the object. Even 
when the marker is removed from the object prior to the dog making his choice, the dog 
still chooses the correct object, suggesting that the dog is not simply attracted to the marker 
but responding to the cue (Reidel et al. 2006). 
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Working Roles of Dogs Throughout History 
Given the evidence from developments in dog-cognition, regarding the dog’s 
communicative abilities with humans, it is perhaps not surprising that humans have 
utilized dogs to work alongside them throughout history. Even prior to the domestication 
of modern dogs, their canine ancestors are believed to have formed a significant alliance 
with humans, helping them to hunt more efficiently.8 Since these early human–dog 
encounters, labour has continued to remain highly significant in the relationship between 
humans and dogs. In addition to hunting however, dogs around the world have also been 
enrolled in tasks of transportation, hauling goods and people, as well as the herding and 
guarding of livestock.  
The more recent emphasis on breeding dogs for ‘jobs’ that are based on high-status 
skills—including guide dogs, hearing dogs, and detection-dogs—have been considered as 
contributing to the ‘professionalization’ of working dogs (Edminster 2011a; 2011b). 
Increasingly, these ‘careers’ warrant their own breeding programmes specifically designed 
to select for and produce dogs with the higher-status skills needed to conduct such work. 
As Avigdor Edminster (2011a) notes, such roles can be distinguished from many other 
types of ‘working dog’ categories, such as guarding or retrieving game, by virtue of the 
fact that these professional roles are based around tasks that their human partners, by 
definition, cannot do. This is certainly the case for bio-detection work, where dogs are 
unequally endowed with a superior olfactory capability, and I will consider how this 
difference is implicated in the practices involved in the training of bio-detection dogs. 
Building on Edminster’s (2011a; 2011b) ethnographic insights from his field experiences 
from within a north American assistance-dog agency, I will also examine the use of 




                                                 
8 This suggestion is based on Pat Shipman’s (2015) theory that as modern humans arrived 
in Europe some 45,000 years ago, Neanderthals abruptly disappeared. Shipman (2015) 
claims that the domestication of ‘wolf dogs’ by Homo Sapiens was key to the extinction 
of the Neanderthals, and the subsequent survival of Homo Sapiens, as these animals aided 





a. Making Scientific Facts 
 
To develop an understanding about the complexities of how knowledge is produced about 
and with dogs, in this thesis I will draw on conceptual tools from the field of science and 
technology studies (STS). The study of science—where science is considered as a 
particular way of knowing the world—gained pace during the 1970s and 1980s as several 
scholars began entering laboratories in order to study everyday scientific work. Inside the 
laboratories, the scientists became the anthropologists’ ‘tribe’ (Latour and Woolgar 1979). 
These early researchers, notably including Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar (1979), Karin 
Knorr-Cetina (1981) and Sharon Traweek (1988), sought to understand how facts are 
‘made’ in the space of the laboratory. To this end, these scholars have deconstructed the 
notion of scientific facts as ‘nature’ waiting to be uncovered by scientists. One of the first 
‘laboratory studies’ was conducted by Latour and Woolgar (1986 [1979]) who, through 
observations of the daily interactions and processes within a single laboratory, argued that 
rather than occupying a realm of truth and objectivity separate from the ‘social’, science 
is in fact a social activity and scientific facts ought to be understood as ‘constructed’ 
through long and laborious procedures, rather than conceived of as ‘out there’ in nature. 
This approach presents a significant challenge to the established epistemological division 
of labour that relegates the discovery of universal and objective truths to the natural 
sciences, and the exploration of social and cultural processes to the social sciences. It is 
this conceptual separation of nature and culture, and persons and things, that Latour 
identifies as the fundamental organizing principle of modernity in We Have Never Been 
Modern (1993). According to Latour, modern knowledge practices work to imbue 
phenomena with these binary categories in a process of ‘purification’ which effectively 
separates the social from the natural so each appear ‘pure’. Paradoxically, this work takes 
place in a world of increasingly blurred boundaries, in which ‘mixtures between entirely 
new types of beings, hybrids of nature and culture (1993, 10) are constantly produced. The 
proliferation of nature and culture hybrids, or ‘nature-cultures’, is described by Latour as 
‘the work of translation’ (1993, 11), whilst it is through modernity’s obsessive practices 
of purification that such hybrids are effectively concealed. 
Modernity’s blind opposition between nature and culture, and subject and object, 
is challenged by the actor-network-theory (ANT) approach developed by Latour and 
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colleagues (Callon and Latour 1981). However, rather than a programmatic theory, ANT 
emerged as a loose methodological ‘toolkit’ or ‘sensibility’ (Law 2004, 157) for mapping 
how each object or actor is shaped in its relations. For proponents of ANT, a-priori 
distinctions do not exist between actors of either human or nonhuman kind, and no actor 
has a reality or form outside the webs of relations within which they are located. Thus, in 
Latour’s historical ANT study of the work of Louis Pasteur, he demonstrates the mutual 
dependency of a variety of entities including Pasteur, microbes and microscopes, arguing 
that the emergence of modern microbiology, was as much a result of the agency of the 
microbes as it was a product of the individual ‘genius’ of Pasteur himself.  
For Latour and Woolgar (1979), central to the processes of purification and 
translation are ‘inscription devices’, or the various machines and technology of scientific 
experiments that produce simple written traces (e.g., diagrams, tables, pictures). The 
power of these devices, they argue, lies in their capability to remove the data from its 
original context, making it appear as ‘raw nature’, and to limit the number of potential 
counter-arguments to the data. Shifting an explanation from ‘it is probable that A equals 
B’ to ‘X has shown that A equals B’, is enough to achieve a scientific fact (Ibid.). 
Inscription devices are thus said to give science its authority and power (Ibid.). Birke (2007 
[1994]) notes the universality of this process within the scientific arena, stating that, 'It 
does not matter what is studied, all laboratories rely on devices that churn out written 
traces: graphs, tables of numbers, abstract symbols. It is these that create ‘data’, the facts 
of the scientific experiment, and help to create an air of authority about those data’ (328).  
In Birke’s work (2012), in which she notes her Latourian influence, she also adopts 
a broadly ANT-inspired perspective in identifying the laboratory animal as an actor within 
networks of people, animals and things which comprise experimental scientific practice. 
Whilst ANT can be a useful approach to help identify the various and often taken-for-
granted actors with whom humans live and operate, its insistence on a flat assessment of 
all actors within a network, reducing individuals to effects, is problematic. For Latour ‘no 
one lives in a ‘culture’, shares a ‘paradigm’ or belongs to a ‘society’ before he or she 
clashes with others’ (1987, 201). Thus, an ANT approach maintains that no actor exists 
independently outside the enactment of the webs of networks within which they are 
situated. Consequentially, the deficiency of an ANT-informed methodology is its 
ignorance of the role that power differences between beings—for instance race, gender or 
class—can have on who or what is permitted to form connections. Although I agree that 
encounters certainly constitute social actors, I maintain that creatures of many kinds are 
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simultaneously individuals with multifaceted qualities. In this thesis, I therefore adopt an 
approach more in line with that proposed by the sociologist Rhoda Wilkie (2015, 330), 
who advocates for building a more contextualized understanding of interspecies relations 
that accounts for ‘where species are located in a network and any power differentials that 
may exist between and amongst human and nonhuman animals’. As Erika Cudworth 
(2011, 77) recognizes, ‘Animals have more or less limited agency, depending on the kind 
of environment they are in’. 
 
Joan Fujimura (1988; 1992; 1996) also explores the production of scientific knowledge, 
asking how and why certain theories become facts. Fujimura is interested in understanding 
how scientific facts move across diverse social worlds. Using the case of the ‘molecular 
biological bandwagon’ (1988) in cancer research, she explains how and why this particular 
idea became fact across myriad different social worlds. The fundamental theory of the 
molecular biological bandwagon in cancer research was that of the ‘proto-oncogene’ 
theory, which claims that ‘normal’ genes can, when altered by mutation, become ‘cancer 
genes’. The technology, or method, that Fujimura recognizes as pivotal in enabling support 
for this genetic theory of cancer across different social worlds, is recombinant DNA 
technologies. Combined, Fujimura argues, this theory and set of methods—the proto-
oncogene theory and recombinant DNA technologies—illustrate an example of her notion 
of ‘standardized packages’ that are put in place to maintain the integrity of the interests of 
the diverse social worlds the theory was permeating, while simultaneously providing them 
with new standardized tools for conducting their work. She describes ‘standardized 
packages’ as consisting of ‘a scientific theory and a standardized set of technologies which 
succeeded in enrolling many members of multiple social worlds in constructing a new and 
at least temporarily stable definition of cancer’ (1992, 176-7). 
 
Considering what happens to a fact once it has been established, Annemarie Mol (2000) 
has, based on her ethnographically-informed analysis of the relations between medical 
knowledge and its objects, challenged the notion that facts simply sustain themselves. 
Instead, Mol argues, the reality of ‘thick vessel walls’ (the pathological enactment of 
atherosclerosis, a disease in which plaque builds up inside a person’s arteries) are at risk 
of becoming invisible if they are not routinely ‘performed’: ‘If the dust cover is left on the 
microscope, the pink and purple cross sections, however impressive they are now, will 
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fade away. It is this requirement of repetitive re-enactment that the theater metaphor 
performance gets across quite well’ (Ibid., 86).  
Drawing on Mol’s insights, I will explore how the scientific facts generated about 
and with detection dogs are re-enacted in everyday practices. I suggest that training and 
working with detection dogs are practices that must be repetitively performed, following 
certain ‘scripts’ and employing particular instruments and skills that will be elucidated in 
this thesis. Following Mol, it is my contention that these practices can be traced and made 
sense of ethnographically, particularly if the relation between detection-dogs, their trainers 
and the odours they are searching for is theorized in terms of performance.  
 
Rather than illustrating knowledge production as a straight forward process, science 
studies have highlighted the messiness of laboratory life and scientific practice more 
broadly, with the concept of ‘tinkering’ emerging as particularly useful in analyzing how 
scientific and medical advancements emerge (e.g., Knorr-Cetina 1981). The notion of 
tinkering draws on Francis Jacob’s (1977) use of the term, whereby he employs the image 
of bricolage, or tinkering, to describe the process of evolution by natural selection. Like 
natural selection, he suggests that a tinkerer works without a specific goal in mind, 
employing whatever materials are available to him, and shapes them into a workable 
object. Thus, he describes tinkerers as producing objects that represent ‘not a perfect 
product of engineering, but a patch work of odd sets pieced together’ (Ibid., 2). 
 
b. Animals in Science 
 
Many scientific advancements are tied to the lives (and deaths) of animals who have been 
enrolled, frequently as model organisms, to help develop understandings of the disease 
process and the viability of potential treatments. Such practices have garnered scholarly 
attention from social scientists, with questions focused particularly on the shape of human–
animal relationships in this field of research as well as the role(s) of the animals 
themselves.  
The research dimension of work with bio-detection dogs falls outside the remit of 
‘animal research’ as defined in UK and US law. Nevertheless, anthropological literature 
on animal research remains relevant for the questions explored in this thesis with regards 
to the production of a particular kind of lively diagnostic tool under scientific study. Work 
from anthropology and related social science disciplines have identified the various and 
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often conflicting ways in which relations between human and animal have been 
represented in order to facilitate experimental goals and produce scientific knowledge 
(e.g., Arluke 1988). Whilst there are ostensible contrasts between the experimental uses to 
which the bio-detection dogs and the animals of laboratory research are put—differences 
which are identified through engagement with this literature and which I acknowledge 
throughout this thesis—insights from this scholarship, especially regarding the structure 
of human–animal relations in science, are drawn on to help develop a critical analysis of 
the creation and study of the bio-detection dog. Thus, although the literature on animal 
research is not a perfect comparative for understanding the creation and study the bio-
detection dog, it is nevertheless a productive body of work from which contrasts can be 
made. 
In addition, an acknowledgment of the wider context(s) within which animals have 
been utilized and conceptualized by scientists, and how their use in biomedicine has 
provoked public reaction, helps to make clear the fundamental and contested role of 
animals within science and society. Whilst the bio-detection dog falls outside the scope of 
animal research, an awareness of this arena of study offers insight as to why, at least in 
part, the organisations training bio-detection dogs—both funded by public donations to 
varying degrees—are both observed to be invested in the portrayal of a particular image 
of the bio-detection dog. 
 
Considering how animals have been incorporated in the field of scientific and medical 
research returns us to questions of boundaries introduced in the above discussion of the 
animal turn. According to Lynda Birke and colleagues (2004, 173), the practice of science 
sustains a boundary between animal and human: ‘The long history of standardization, use 
of the passive voice, legal frameworks of animal experimentation, and ethical justifications 
for using nonhuman animals—all these operate to maintain a clear discontinuity between 
humans and other animals. They serve to separate humans from nonhumans, both in time 
and space, and conceptually’.  
Birke (2007 [1994]; 2003; Birke and Smith 1995; Birke et al. 2004) in particular 
has contributed significantly to science studies on the topic of animal research, with her 
work focusing especially on scientific practices involving laboratory rodents. Bred 
specifically for scientific research, rats and mice are undoubtedly the most well-known 
animals of scientific research and have garnered a considerable degree of scholarly focus 
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(e.g., Birke 2003; Birke and Smith 1995; Birke et al. 2004; Davies 2012; Davies 2013; 
Dennis 2009; Lynch 1988). 
Considering the iconic status of the laboratory rodent, Birke (2003, 211) notes, 
‘Laboratory rats and mice are now potent symbols of scientific endeavor; indeed, they 
stand alongside the ubiquitous double helix as icons of the laboratory in modern western 
culture’. Birke argues that from the early twentieth century, the laboratory rat was selected 
for and bred, materializing the demand for standardization that typified the mandate to be 
‘more scientific’ (Birke and Smith 1994). Birke’s (2007 [1994], 329) ethnographic 
research illustrates how, within the spaces of scientific practice, the work ‘must be fitted 
into the demands of the technology’. In effect, as Mary Midgley (2003, 211) writes, in the 
laboratory, the rat is ‘simply a standard object, a piece of laboratory equipment with the 
function of being used to test hypotheses, a kind of purpose-made-flesh-and-blood-robot’.  
 
Although animals used in research are in many instances shown to be objectified by de-
individualizing practices, Arnold Arluke (1988) has pointed out that laboratory personnel 
often simultaneously develop pet-like relationships with research animals. For instance, 
Arluke found that frequently, in biomedical research facilities, an individual animal would 
be singled out by laboratory staff and adopted as a kind of laboratory pet, removed from a 
fate of experimental use or euthanasia. Sometimes the animal would even be taken home 
by a member of laboratory personnel. Arluke notes that the more closely individuals work 
with animals, the more likely they are to form bonds with them. Thus, it is often the animal 
care staff who become most closely attached to the animals, rather than the senior 
scientists.  
Arluke’s insights illustrate the contradictions that exist in animal research staff’s 
perceptions about the animals they study. A sense of ambivalence is also reflected in the 
language used by laboratory personnel to describe what occurs in laboratories, where, for 
instance, animals are typically said to be ‘sacrificed’, rather than killed (Arluke 1988; 
Lynch 1988). Such observations reflect the notion that human relationships with animals 
are often complex, multi-layered and full of contradictions and ambivalences (Herzog 
2010). As Andrew Rowan is quoted to have said, ‘The only thing consistent about human–
animal interactions is paradox’ (Rowan quoted in Herzog et al., 1997: 236). 
This thesis asks how the bodies of bio-detection dogs are disciplined at the nexus 
of dog training and research, paying particular attention to the dog’s individuality and how 




iv. The Social and Political Context of Animal Research  
 
The use of animals in scientific and medical research is a topic of significant debate around 
the world. Attitudes towards the acceptability of laboratory animal research are 
complicated and vary depending on the extent to which there exist ‘no alternatives, 
minimization of harms to animals, and benefits for human and/or animal health’ (Davies 
et al. 2016, 3). Rather than remaining stable, opinions about experimental practices 
involving animals have shifted over time, reflecting changes in both scientific and social 
assumptions. Several scholars offer comprehensive overviews of the social and moral 
issues on the topic throughout history (e.g., Franco 2013; Guerrini 2003). Here, I will 
comment on several of the most relevant social, political and philosophical factors for the 
case study explored in this thesis, in order to provide the reader with a summary of the 
political and social context within which my informants’ work ought to be situated.  
 
Intelligence and Sentience 
The way animals have been incorporated into scientific practice has been largely 
associated with dominant philosophies about the purported similarities or differences 
between human and animal. Emphasizing a division between human and animal, in the 
seventeenth century, René Descartes promoted the notion that animals are without a mind 
and are thus incapable of thought, reason or rationality. Moreover, in describing the animal 
body ‘as a machine’ Descartes (1988 [1637]) is widely understood to have promoted the 
understanding of animals as ‘machine-like’. This Cartesian mechanism view of animals 
was used to defend animal experimentation, including attempts to justify vivisection in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (Boden 2006; Rupke 1987). 
The supposed absence of rationality is one of many factors that have been used to 
maintain a distinction between human and animal and thereby justify the animal’s pain 
and suffering in experimentation. Another aspect that has been important in shaping 
attitudes towards the use of animals in research has been the question of sentience, or the 
capacity to feel. As Jeremy Bentham (1789, 283) famously proposed, ‘The question is not, 
Can they reason? Nor, Can they talk? But, Can they suffer?’. Regarding the shift from a 
focus on animal intelligence to sentience, Nuno Franco (2013) notes, ‘these philosophers 
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proposed a shift from an anthropocentric justification for our duties of kindness to animals, 
to human obligations towards other animals for the sake of the animals themselves’ (245).  
Today, sentience remains central in debates about how animals ought to be 
understood and treated. Recently, in the UK there has been public outcry over the 
governmental vote to exclude provision to transfer the principle contained in Article 13 of 
the Lisbon Treaty, recognizing animals as sentient beings, into UK legislation on the UK’s 
exit from the European Union.9 Animal welfare campaigners have expressed concerns 
because UK law, under the Animal Welfare Act 2006 does not explicitly recognize the 
term ‘sentience’, although it does acknowledge that animals can experience suffering and 
pain.10 
 
An important turning point in public opinion concerning animal welfare was the 
publication of Ruth Harrison’s Animal Machines in 1964. Although this focused on farmed 
animals at the outset of the intensive farming movement, her argument that animals under 
conditions of intensive farming are reduced to mere units of productivity—or ‘animal 
machines’—applies too to the animals of laboratory research. Several years before this 
publication, the concept of the ‘3Rs’ approach to experimental research with laboratory 
animals was introduced by William Russell and Rex Burch (1959). In this, Russell and 
Burch introduced the terms ‘replacement’, ‘reduction’, and ‘refinement’ as alternative 
methods for minimizing the pain and distress experienced by animals in laboratory 
research. Both publications are concerned with animal welfare, or the physical and mental 
state of an animal, related to the absence of negative emotions. These works sparked a 
shift towards a culture of greater compassion and respect for the nonhumans whose lives 
are entangled in scientific and farming practices. Regarding farmed animals, Matthew 
Cole (2011) notes that the ‘emotional turn’ in animal welfare discourse (Terluow et al. 
2008) has necessitated a reshaping of human relations with farmed animals. In the place 
of mechanistic discourses about these animals, a regard for the potential of empathetic 
knowledge between species has emerged.   
 






Dogs in Scientific Research 
Considering the position of dogs, in particular, in relation to scientific research is important 
given the privileged social status they occupy relative to most other animals within the 
Euro-American cultural context of my research. Indeed, the closest relationships many 
people have with nonhuman animals today is with their domestic pet, most commonly in 
the form of a dog (PFMA 2015). Furthermore, the dog occupies an intimate, liminal 
position within the household, on the boundaries between human and animal (Fox 2006), 
thus setting apart the human–dog relationship from human relationships with a majority 
of the animals widely used in laboratory research, such as mice and rats. Analysing the 
strength of this implicit social contract between humans and dogs, Larry Carbone notes 
the symbiotic relationship between human and dog that began during the process of 
domestication: 
 
In the case of dogs, I suggest that it is not their sentience or their size so much as 
their long-standing symbiotic relationship with our own species that counts for so 
much…Dogs and humans have lived symbiotically for eons…Symbiosis does not 
mean equality, however…What moral implications does this long coevolution 
entail? Does it entail special obligations to dogs that other animals do not merit? It 
does not, in the eyes of many of the major philosophers writing about animals: it 
makes them no more or less sentient than other animals…But in the public eye, the 
symbiotic relationship of dogs with humans definitely calls for a special ethic. 
(2004, 83) 
 
However, the emotional bond widely felt between people and dogs has, at times, been used 
to justify the use of dogs in certain research programmes. For instance, Diane Paul (1991) 
notes why Alan Gregg of the Rockefeller Foundation enrolled dogs—rather than any other 
animal—in a post-war study of genetics and social behaviour. Although the heritability of 
behavioural traits had already been demonstrated in organisms such as fruit flies and rats, 
Gregg is understood to have believed that these animals were beings ‘to which few persons 
could relate to emotionally’ (Ibid., 273). The dog, in contrast, was becoming an 
increasingly popular pet in the USA: an animal with whom many people shared emotional 
bonds and experienced a sense of continuity with. 
While dogs do continue to be used in invasive experimental research today, there 
has been a recent rise in non-invasive modes of research using dogs, particularly in the 
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study of dog-cognition (e.g., Call et al. 2003; Hare and Tomasello 1999; Miklosi et al. 
1998; Racca et al. 2010). This kind of research is distinct from laboratory studies, most 
notably with regard to the kinds of animals used. As Horowitz and Hecht (2014, 202) point 
out, ‘the subjects are most often owned dogs, household pets, whose social group is as 
much humans as it is conspecifics. This fact distinguishes them from almost all other 
research subjects, in lab, farm, or field; either domesticated or not’.  
Furthermore, in the field of dog-cognition, the animals are not forcibly restrained 
or sedated but typically encouraged to participate with the researcher’s use of positive 
reinforcement training (e.g., Berns and Cook 2016). Describing their fMRI studies 
involving dogs, neuroscientists Gregory Berns and Peter Cook (Ibid.) refer to the dogs as 
‘cooperatively’ participating.  
 The recent upsurge in the field of dog-cognition reflects the broader shift in the 
methods and questions of some scientists that Despret (2004) notes has occurred during 
the latter three decades of the twentieth century: ‘These scientists aim to find new methods 
to focus, as some primatologists put it, on those behaviours that are most meaningful to 
the animals themselves’ (54). Whilst not a study of dog-cognition, the case study of bio-
detection dog training and research, explored in this thesis, is illustrative of this broader 
animal-centered approach to research with animals, whereby the training and research 
methods are designed to focus on what is important to the dogs themselves. By paying 
attention to the dog’s perspective, with the adoption of novel methods and questions, there 
is an opportunity for this kind of research to challenge notions of human exceptionalism.  
 
Situating the bio-detection dog 
Amidst the literature regarding animals in working roles and animals in science, the bio-
detection dog represents a curious being for analysis. Trained to perform a particular 
skilled role, these dogs are recognizable as working animals, akin to dogs used for a variety 
of purposes—from bomb-detection to search and rescue work. However, as animals whose 
purpose in this role is to enable the yielding of scientific data, the bio-detection dog 
embodies a dual character as a working animal whose skills are utilized for scientific 
purposes. Unlike model organisms, however, which Rachel Ankeny and Sabina Leonelli 
(2011) have argued represent a distinctive kind of research animal, set apart by their role 
to facilitate comparative modes of research via their wide representational scope, the bio-
detection dog does not function as a scientific model.  
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To help clarify what kind of being the bio-detection dog is, we can consider another 
mode, distinct from model systems of disease, in which animals have been utilized for 
scientific purposes: the use of animals as diagnostic tools (Kirk 2009). In his analysis of 
the use of diagnostic animals by the British Laboratory Animals Bureau during the mid-
twentieth century, Robert Kirk (2009) describes how these animals were utilized to 
measure the potency of drugs such as amphetamine, noting that this pharmaceutical use of 
animals differed from their use in physiology, with regards to the animal’s purpose and 
construction. Regarding the use of animals in physiology, the animal was both the subject 
and object of knowledge. In the pharmaceutical use however, ‘the subject of knowledge 
was biochemical substances and the animal served as no more than a purportedly objective 
diagnostic technology’ (516). Thus, Kirk argues that the pharmaceutical sciences utilized 
the animal as a measuring device that was required, and typically presumed to be, a 
mechanistically reliable tool’ (Ibid.). In contrast, bio-detection dogs are understood not 
only as a kind of diagnostic tool but as living, social beings, with individual personalities 
and social relations with their handler that are a source of potential variance.  
 
v. A Note on Terms 
 
Given the topic of this thesis, a brief note on language and categories is required to precede 
the main body. Firstly, where distinctions between humans and nonhuman animals are 
themselves at issue, I will now refer to the nonhuman animals simply as animals. Whilst I 
recognize that humans are of course animals as well, I use the terms humans and animals 
for the sake of brevity. 
 
Echoing how my human informants conceptualize the dogs with whom they work, I 
understand the dogs in this thesis to be sentient beings with consciousness and a capacity 
for thought and feeling. Thus, I use personal pronouns of ‘who’ and ‘he’/’she’ rather than 
‘which’ or ‘it’. When referring to specific dogs, whose sex I know, I use the relevant 
gender-specific pronoun ‘he’ or ‘she’. When discussing the dogs non-individually and 
more broadly, I adopt the masculine pronoun for linguistic consistency. This use of 




Finally, a subtle but important distinction concerning the roles of my informants, that I 
became aware of during my time in the field, is that between the categories of dog 
‘handler’ and dog ‘trainer’. While the terms are sometimes used interchangeably, because 
a trainer also handles dogs, handlers sometimes do not themselves play a role in the dog’s 
training process. Thus, dog trainers are considered to have greater expertise and 
knowledge in the skill of training, than handlers who might more modestly task the dog to 
carry out activities that he is already trained to do.  
To offer an example, sometimes in the world of ‘working dogs’, for instance 
typically in the context of police dogs, a dog is trained by a trainer and then sold on to a 
handler who, whilst performing maintenance training with the dog, is not considered a 
‘trainer’ per se. Except for the interns and volunteers, my informants are all trainers. Thus, 
for consistency, whilst making clear when the dog is being handled by an intern or 
volunteer, I use the term ‘trainer’ to refer to my informants throughout this thesis.  
Alongside training dogs however, my trainer informants also adopt the more 
informal role of researchers, collecting data regarding each search during training. To 
acknowledge the multiplicity of their role, where discussing the research aspect of their 
work, I refer to them as ‘trainer-come-researchers’. 
 
 
vi. Summary of Chapters 
 
Through the chapters presented in this thesis, four key research questions are explored: 
1. Through what practices are bio-detection dogs produced?  
2. How can we theorize the role of bio-detection dogs in these practices? Are they 
simply lab-tools whose bodies are merely worked on, or co-workers who actively 
shape the training and research processes? 
3. How is the information offered by a bio-detection dog transformed into evidence 
that is meaningful in human relations? 
4. Under what social, economic, political and historical conditions has this practice 
emerged? 
 
Chapter 2 addresses the question of methodology, covering the how, the where and the 
who of this study. This chapter also confronts the methodological challenges of conducting 
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research ‘beyond-the-human’, exploring how I accommodate the perspectives of the dogs 
into this thesis. 
 
Chapter 3 presents the reader with the vital context of the relatively novel practice of 
training dogs to detect the odour of human disease. Engaging with ethnographic vignettes 
tracing the emergence of this practice, this discussion considers how this practice has 
gradually shifted from a collection of anecdotal stories to scientific fact. Here, some of the 
key actors and spaces central to the bio-detection dog training process are also introduced. 
Outlining the particular kind of labour performed by detection dogs and their trainers, this 
chapter highlights several aspects of this practice that set it apart from other categories of 
working dogs in more conventional or familiar fields of scent-detection and medical 
assistance. As a whole, this chapter lays the groundwork for the subsequent chapters. 
 
Chapter 4 examines the particular shape of human–dog connectedness in the training 
practices of bio-detection dogs. Through an engagement with the particular pedagogy of 
dog-training that underpins the training practices employed by my informants, their 
implicit perceptions about dogs and their assumed relation to, or with, humans are 
revealed. By employing ‘positive’ methods of dog-training, that eschew a dependence on 
force, I interspecies ‘response-ability’ (Haraway 2008) is not only enabled by, but in fact 
imperative to the training approach. I propose that this is because successful training 
without recourse to force obliges the trainers to adopt a constant curiosity about the internal 
states of the individual dogs as beings with distinct personalities, as well as a recognition 
of the dog’s olfactory capabilities that exceed those of the trainers. This exploration of 
how trainers and dogs work together finds an attentiveness to the nonverbal to be a 
fundamental element of successful training, with trainers required to ‘listen’ to dogs—who 
‘speak back’—in order to facilitate the transmission of knowledge across the species. As 
well as the more ostensibly engaged modes of human–dog interaction that comprise the 
practice of listening to the dog’s body, I also highlight how, in certain moments, an 
affective distance between human and dog is enforced in order to shape dogs into good 
research subjects. 
 
Chapter 5 shifts the focus beyond a mere recognition that the dogs have the capacity to 
speak back, examining how the dog’s perspective is thus incorporated into everyday 
practices, considered through the lens of care. Here, the trainers’ propensity to become 
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available to the needs and desires of each individual dog is understood as a practice of 
care, illustrated through examples of dog-grooming and the ‘tinkering’ (Mol et al. 2010) 
of equipment. 
By considering the trainers’ attentiveness to the dog’s preferences and aversions, I 
demonstrate how more ‘care-full’ (Greenhough & Roe 2011) practices of training and 
research are fostered in this context. I argue that such an approach to care is sustained in 
part due to the research protocol in place in these spaces, that promotes ongoing encounters 
between individual humans and dogs. In this discussion, the agency of the dogs is 
highlighted, as their actions are revealed to be key in shaping the actions of their humans. 
 
Chapter 6 considers how, by attending to what is considered most meaningful to the dogs 
themselves, the trainers’ ethical impulse to help each dog fulfil his potential is realized. 
The chapter explores my informant’s usage of terminology that emphasizes notions of 
canine ‘choice’ and ‘careers’ in their articulations of the dogs’ labour. While 
acknowledging these organisations’ projections of particular notions of personhood onto 
the dogs, I illustrate how the specific careers of bio-detection dogs are, in practice, 
mutually negotiated by human and dog.  
 
Chapter 7 ties together many of the themes considered in the earlier chapters to assess 
how scientific knowledge is produced and communicated in the context of bio-detection 
dog training and research. I identify the practices that transform the dog from a behaving 
being into ‘data’, revealing the co-existence of multiple representations of the dog.  
Highlighting the importance of interpretation, as a key mode through which 
knowledge is produced in these spaces, I observe that the object under study in this arena 
is more fruitfully conceived not solely as the detection accuracy of the dog, as an isolated 
entity, but instead the collective detection accuracy of particular human–dog dyads who 
work interdependently to produce knowledge about odour, disease and its detection.  
Given this chapter’s focus on interpretations of animal behaviour, it is here that I 
offer reflections on the question of anthropomorphism in the practices of my informants. 
With attention to the handlers’ practices of ‘speaking for’ (Sanders and Arluke 1996) or 
speaking about, dogs, I argue that rather than pure, or conventional, anthropomorphism, 
their approach is more aligned with a ‘critical anthropomorphism’ (Morton et al. 1990) 
that acknowledges the dog’s specific umwelt (von Uexküll, [1934] 1957). Instead of 
attempting to project human qualities onto the dogs, I illustrate how the trainers attempt to 
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adopt the (inevitably) partial perspective of the dog. Thus, in their intersubjective 
engagements, the boundary between human and animal, often assumed to be rigid in the 
sites of scientific practice, is continuously negotiated.  
 
Throughout the chapters, two themes in particular emerge. Firstly, the work that my 
informants are engaged in is found to be a practice of ongoing boundary-navigation 
concerning multiple frontiers. Also developing throughout the ethnography is an 
illustration of the multiple meanings that the dogs embody for the various human social 





Chapter 2. An Anthropologist Goes to the Dogs: Methodology and Ethics in Field 
Sites Beyond-the-Human 
 
i. Field sites 
 
Medical Detection Dogs (Buckinghamshire, UK) 
Medical Detection Dogs (MDD) is a charity that trains dogs to detect the odor of human 
disease, for two similar but distinct roles. One branch of their work is the training of 
‘Medical Alert Assistance Dogs’: dogs that are trained to detect changes in an individual’s 
odor, triggered by their disease (e.g., Type 1 diabetes), and alert them to an impending 
medical event (e.g., a dangerous rise or drop in blood glucose levels). Once trained, the 
MAAD lives and works with the person they are paired with, much in the same way as a 
Guide Dog lives with a paired owner. Currently, the process of applying and being 
matched with a suitable MAAD takes a minimum of 18 months. During training, the 
MAAD lives with ‘foster families’ who socialize the dogs from a young age and bring 
them to training sessions both at the training center and at other sites in the community, 
such as retail centers or other places where a paired client might visit with the fully-trained 
dog. 
The other aspect of the charity’s work, and the area engaged with in this thesis, is 
the training of Bio-Detection Dogs (BDD) to detect the odor of diseases, such as cancer, 
in samples acquired from collaborating hospitals, brought into the training center and 
presented to the dog under controlled conditions. Thus, unlike the MAAD, the BDD is 
never trained to find the odour of diseases on a person. Throughout the course of a BDD’s 
career (variable but around five years), the dog lives with a local foster family who 
transports the dog to and from the training center around four days per week, dependent 
on the individual dog’s training program. 
MDD does not receive any government funding and is supported by donations 
from the public, and grants from charitable trusts, philanthropists and foundations. For 
instance, the charity’s research into the detection of malaria—conducted using socks worn 
by children infected with the malaria parasite —was funded by a grant awarded to the 




MDD is the only organisation in the UK where research surrounding canine detection of 
human disease is being conducted. Therefore, gaining access to this site was critical to the 
viability of this study. Through contact with her personal assistant, in 2016 I arranged to 
meet with Dr. Claire Guest, CEO and co-founder of the charity, on a spring morning at the 
charity’s offices in rural Buckinghamshire. Entering Claire’s office, through a child safety 
gate—one of many fitted throughout the office to prevent dogs from wandering—I was 
first greeted by Claire’s three dogs who rubbed their muzzles into the hand I offered to 
them. Pressing their noses onto my trousers as they sniffed, their saliva marked the smart 
slacks I had worn for the occasion. This feature of my clothing, adorned with the traces of 
inquisitive dogs, was something that I soon became accustomed to in the field. Claire stood 
up from behind her desk and reached out her hand to mine as she introduced herself. I sat 
on the sofa opposite her desk, joined by one of the dogs who, in keeping with the others, 
curled up and slept during our meeting. As we talked, my eyes were drawn to walls of the 
room that brimmed with pride and passion, featuring framed photographs of Claire’s dogs 
(past and present), photographs of the charity’s dogs posing in their official coats, a 
graduation photograph of Claire and various framed newspaper clippings documenting the 
charity’s work.  
 I explained the background to my research, the questions I wanted to explore 
through my project and how I would go about doing this at MDD. Claire seemed genuinely 
interested in my work: a psychologist by training, we shared a common interest in human–
animal relationships. She did however raise concern about how the charity might be 
represented in my work, as well as a worry about my presence being a potential distraction 
to the trainers. Owing to the largely open-ended nature of anthropological study, I was 
unable to give her what I felt would satisfy her: in short, any guarantees about the insights 
I would develop. However, I handed her an abridged copy of my master’s dissertation to 
give her a sense of what my previous work looks like. As an organisation that relies on 
public donations and has faced skepticisim surrounding its work11, image is critical and I 
could certainly appreciate her concerns. In most other field work situations, where the field 
site is anonymized, worries about representation are easier to appease. However, as the 
only organisation of its kind in the UK, offering full anonymity in this case would not be 
possible.12  
                                                 
11 See chapter 3. 
12 Informant anonymity is discussed in the final section of this chapter. 
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A few days after our meeting, I received an email confirming that the charity would permit 
me to conduct my research about and with them, subject to an agreement that I would 
share draft publications emerging from this work (where the charity’s actions are under 
analysis) with the charity’s scientific advisor, for her review, prior to publication. Given 
that I could not offer my participants anonymity, I agreed to this stipulation.  
 
Split over two periods between 2016 and 2017, I spent a total of eight months at MDD. 
During this time, I was on-site four days per week, shadowing and assisting in the everyday 
practices of the dog-trainers. Due to each testing phase of the charity’s research studies 
taking place after around six months of training, the vast majority of my observations were 
inevitably focused on the training process. I was however present for the testing period of 
a bacteria-detection study. The work conducted during this week of testing largely 
resembled everyday training at the centre and given the limited data that it was possible to 
collect during this timeframe, detailed analysis of this aspect of the work was not possible. 
However, this thesis focuses on the trainers’ everyday attempts to assess the subjectivity 
and reliability of individual bio-detection dogs: a reflexive process that largely 
characterises the shape of dog-training in this context. 
 
Whilst there were some changes to staff during my time in the field, for the most part the 
bio-detection department was comprised of four full-time dog trainers and two part-time 
trainers (four men and two women). During my first three-month stint, I cultivated a role 
for myself between laboratory-technician and dog-caretaker, helping to support the 
trainers in tasks that included: preparing samples, setting up equipment, recording training 
data, dog walking, and cleaning.  
During the morning dog ‘drop off’ period, whilst the trainers would accompany 
dogs outside on toilet-trips, I quickly learned that I could be helpful by manning the office 
and keeping everybody—humans and dogs—hydrated: 
 
Looking out from a window inside the office, across the green fields that surround the 
charity’s headquarters, I spot a flock of birds lined up along the electricity pylon wires 
and hear the faint sound of a tractor ploughing a field in the distance. I have just made 
tea for Alexa, Ed and Louise—the three dog-trainers here this morning—who are still 
outside walking dogs in the paddock. For the next couple of minutes, it is just myself, Meg 
and Maddie in the office: two black Cocker Spaniels. Meg doesn’t pay me much attention, 
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remaining curled up on a foam dog-bed underneath Alexa’s desk. Maddie however, 
appears keen to be close to me at all times, following me as I walk through the office and 
nuzzling her chin into my leg when I take a seat. Even when I am not looking at her, I sense 
her eyes fixed on me as I potter about the office trying to make myself useful, filling up 
bowls with fresh water for the dogs.  
 
Keen to get involved wherever possible, I also often helped with tasks that one might 
consider ‘dirty work’: 
 
Alexa returns from the paddock with Rolo and Ellie at the ends of the leashes in his hands. 
“Fox poo,” she exclaims, “Again!” I turn to face her and see Rolo, a nine-month-old 
yellow Labrador, brandishing a large brown patch on one of his sides. My nose quickly 
registers the stench and I tell Alexa that I will grab the shampoo and a towel and meet her 
outside by the tap. Although I have only been here a week, I already know the drill. As I 
make my way outside, I see Alexa using the hose to rinse Rolo. With surgical gloves on to 
protect my skin from the offending muck, I lather shampoo into Rolo’s dirty fur. After 
another rinse, Rolo shakes his entire body, showering myself and Alexa with water. Alexa 
wraps the towel over Rolo, rubbing his body from muzzle to paw.  
 
Gradually, I was entrusted with greater responsibility, as I was soon walking dogs 
unsupervised. Eventually, I was offered the chance to handle dogs during training 
searches, which I did routinely during the latter period of time spent here. Fulfilling this 
role enabled me to not only observe, but to meaningfully participate in the everyday 
training and care of the dogs. Outside of the MDD headquarters, I attended two working-
dog conferences with the trainers who were always willing and keen to share their 
knowledge and perspectives with me. 
 
As neither employee nor conventional volunteer, there were occasions where my 
liminality left me feeling betwixt and between roles. In many ways, my role as external 
researcher put me in a position of privilege, as I did not have the same responsibilities as 
an employee yet I was still able to enjoy the opportunity to work closely with the animals. 
However, enjoying being so involved with the training (i.e., the participatory aspect of my 
research) caused me to, on occasion, momentarily lose sight of what I was fundamentally 
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there to achieve. It is easy to account for those days in my field diary, as my notes are 
significantly scanter than usual.  
 
Penn Vet Working Dog Center (Philadelphia, USA)  
The city of Philadelphia in the United States of America, some 35,000 miles away from 
MDD, is home to my second field site, the Penn Vet Working Dog Center (PVWDC): a 
research and development facility that is part of the University of Pennsylvania’s School 
of Veterinary Medicine. The vet school is funded by a combination of state and federal 
funding, tuition fees and private donations. PVWDC train and conduct research with dogs 
in three primary areas: law enforcement (e.g., explosives, drugs, and apprehending human 
suspects), search and rescue (of both live and deceased persons), and cancer-detection. 
The organisation’s research is aimed at optimising the performance, health, and welfare of 
detection dogs. In addition to their formal training and participation in research studies, 
the dogs also take part in regular agility sessions, conducted to provide what the trainers 
conceptualize as the dog’s enjoyment, in addition to supporting their physical and mental 
health. Thus, whilst the everyday work and short- and long-term aims differ in some 
regards from MDD, the two organisations share a commitment to training detection dogs 
and conducting studies to develop research in this field.   
 This broad mutual endeavor, and the more specific common interest in training 
dogs to detect the odour of human disease fosters a degree of cooperation between the 
organisations. Opportunity for formal knowledge sharing includes the annual working dog 
conference hosted by PVWDC. At the 2016 event, for instance, the Directors of MDD and 
PVWDC each gave presentations detailing recent research findings not yet published. The 
organisations also assist each other through more informal means. For instance, whilst I 
was conducting fieldwork at PVWDC, I sat alongside Angela and Sue, the Training 
Director and Manager respectively, as they video-called Simon, senior trainer at MDD, to 
discuss equipment. Angela and Sue were curious to learn about MDD’s training set-up, 
with a view to upgrading PVWDC’s training apparatus—especially the steel carousel 
structure on which the odour samples are presented to the dogs. During the call, Simon 
filmed as a dog searched the carousel, and he highlighted the equipment’s specific design 
features, such as its detachable arms that make it highly portable for conducting off-site 
demonstrations. 
Negotiating access to this field site was relatively straight forward. In April 2016, 
I attended a working dog conference in Philadelphia hosted by PVWDC. In the months 
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leading to the event I had been in email contact with Dr. Cynthia Otto, PVWDC’s 
Executive Director, to express my interest in the center’s work and my desire to conduct 
research with them. She was quick to reply and suggested we meet at the conference. In 
between presentations—on topics ranging from search dog stress during helicopter 
transportation, to the use of sensory equipment to measure dog’s olfactory behaviour 
during cancer detection (presented by MDD CEO, Dr. Claire Guest)—I introduced myself 
to Cynthia at the table where she was sat, and I told her a little more about my research. 
She told me I would be welcome to conduct research at the center, where I could join the 
team as an intern for the duration of my fieldwork. Over the subsequent eight months, 
Cynthia provided immense practical support via email during the arduous process of 
arranging my visa. She also helped me to find accommodation in Philadelphia, with some 
veterinary students from Pennsylvania University where she lectures. 
 
In addition to the traditional paper presentations, the 2016 conference also offered 
delegates the opportunity for a guided tour of the working dog center. This was my first 
visit to what would be my US field site and provided me with a deeper understanding of 
the distinction between my two field sites, with this organisation’s roots and purpose being 
fundamentally entangled with to a drive to protect national security. This character of 
PVWDC is visible on entrance to the main training room, where an American flag is 
visible on the far wall. Next to this, is a framed portrait of a yellow Labrador wearing a 
police badge, with the twin towers and an American flag in the background. I have to get 
up close to the artwork to read that it is titled ‘Salute to Sirius’ and is accompanied with a 
handwritten note that reads, ‘Sirius, You gave your life so I may save others’. This portrait 
memorializes Sirius, a police dog who died in the attacks on the United States on 
September 11th, 2001.13  
                                                 
13 On the morning of September 11th, 2001, Port Authority Police Sergeant David Lim and 
Sirius, the yellow Labrador retriever in the painting, were in their South Tower basement 
office when the first plane hit the North Tower. Upon hearing the commotion, Officer Lim 
put Sirius in his kennel and told him ‘I’ll be back for you’ as he went to help at the damaged 
tower. Before Lim could return to Sirius however, the South Tower collapsed followed by 
the North Tower. Lim was safely rescued later that day. Several months later, in January 
2002, Sirius’ remains were uncovered in his kennel. At a memorial service held for Sirius, 
four-hundred people attended including one hundred service dog teams from across the 
country. 
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The events of 9/11 were a catalyst in the establishment of this facility. For ten days 
following the attacks, Cynthia—a university professor and veterinarian specializing in 
Emergency Medicine—was deployed to Ground Zero as a support specialist with the 
Pennsylvania Federal Emergency Management Agency Urban Search and Rescue Task 
Force. During the search and rescue operation, she was responsible for supervising the 
search dog’s care. Inspired by the courage and commitment of the dogs and their handlers, 
and concerned about the limits and gaps in the knowledge about working dogs among 
those in the veterinary community,14 Cynthia was keen to develop knowledge and skills 
among veterinarians and dog-handlers in this field.  
First, she conducted a study of the search and rescue dogs who were deployed at 
Ground Zero to examine whether the conditions they were exposed to had any long-term 
impacts on their health (Otto et al., 2012). Compared to a control group, the findings 
included mild changes in blood work and a higher incidence of radiographic cardiac 
abnormalities of deployed dogs. Keen to have a greater impact on the field however, 
Cynthia eventually secured the funding and premises from which to officially open the 
PVWDC on September 11th, 2012. As I later heard Cynthia herself assert, “We’re the 
legacy of 9/11.”  
In addition to items such as the portrait of Sirius, this legacy is also implicit in the 
center’s puppy naming process. Puppies who are enrolled in the training programme here 
are named after dogs who were deployed in the 9/11 search and rescue mission. This 
naming practice arguably helps their human caretakers to navigate the boundaries between 
past and future. Indeed, describing the immediate need, in the aftermath of 9/11, to compile 
a list of the names of the victims, Barbara Bodenhorn and Gabrielle vom Bruck (2009, 2) 
note the association between the recitation of names and the act of remembering, arguing 
that ‘the recitation of names is a crucial aspect of memory, an active not-forgetting, that 
validates the present order more often than not, bringing the political aspect into view’. 
 
                                                 
14 During an interview, Cynthia told me that her concerns included: the lack of guidelines 
in place for monitoring and optimizing the dogs’ health and welfare; the absence of 
personal protective equipment available for the dogs, despite this being worn by their 
handlers, and; the potential for the overworking of dogs due to their handlers’ desires to 
find survivors before it would be too late. 
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PVWDC’s dog-trainers—six women and one man15—are supported by a team of 
voluntary staff: a mixture of volunteers, who come to the center as and when they can in 
their spare time, and student interns with set hours. This unpaid workforce comprises the 
majority of the people who collect, organize, and sometimes also help to analyse the data 
that is gathered during training and research activities. Many of the interns are local 
university students who spend six months interning at the center as one of their 
‘cooperative’ work rotations that comprise part of their degree structure. Therefore, my 
presence akin to a student intern—of sorts—was not out of place. Furthermore, PVWDC 
collaborates on research projects with external individuals and institutions, both nationally 
and internationally, so they are experienced in having other researchers keen to learn with 
and about them and their work.  
I always felt warmly accepted into the PVWDC community as the team encourage 
and support all their voluntary workers to get involved in the various aspects of daily work. 
However, it was only when my time at the center was coming to an end that I got an insight 
into what my informants thought about my presence and the nature of my research.  On 
my last day, as I was saying goodbye to Sara, one of the trainers, she said to me:  
 
“You know, whilst driving into work this morning I was thinking back to your first 
day. When you first came in and told us you were here to do research, I thought 
‘Oh no, not another one’! But now I’ll be really sad to see you go. You’ve got so 
involved, I don’t know what we’ll do without you.” 
                                                 
15 Despite the high proportion of female to male dog trainers at PVWDC, the gender 
breakdown of animal trainers more broadly, across the USA, is not estimated to be as 
significant. In 2016 women comprised 54.5% of the workforce. What is significant 
however, is the rate at which the percentage of women in the occupation of animal training 
has grown in the USA. In 2000, women made up just 40.6% of animal trainers, whereas 
today they outnumber men in this profession (US Census Bureau: 
https://datausa.io/profile/soc/392011/#demographics).  
Although academic research exploring the recent increase of the share of women 
in animal training is scant, I propose that this may be associated with the shift in animal 
training methods, which I discuss in chapter 4. Whilst methods of force and relationships 
based on human dominance characterized animal training for much of the twentieth 
century, today the emphasis is on building empathetic relationships with the individual 
animal being trained. If women are more affectively empathetic than men, at least among 
Euro-Americans, as Claudia Strauss (2004) has argued, then this may help account for 
why contemporary practices of animal training are attracting a greater share of women. 
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At PVWDC, all interns and volunteers are assigned to work with one of the trainers. I was 
allocated to Jen, a woman in her early forties, dressed in cargo pants and walking boots, 
with long blonde hair which she would tie up just before working with a dog. While 
learning the ropes, most of the work tasked to interns and volunteers involves supporting 
the trainer by recording data. This involves either observing training and completing data 
sheets by hand, or video recording the session. In order to be assigned to more hands-on 
tasks, responsibility must be earned by the volunteers who have to prove their willingness 
to listen, learn and follow the center’s rules and processes.  
For example, one of the first activities all volunteers learn to participate in is ‘potty 
walking’ (i.e. taking dogs outside to go to the toilet). In their first few weeks, volunteers 
shadow other, more experienced, volunteers or trainers during frequent potty walks in 
order to learn the process that is followed for this activity. In order to take a dog out for a 
walk without supervision, every volunteer has to first shadow, then practice this activity 
with someone more experienced, before undergoing an assessment with their trainer. Only 
when Jen was satisfied with my ability to follow the center’s potty walk procedure, was I 
cleared to undertake this task alone. This process involves prompting the dog to sit in his 
kennel (using either a verbal “sit” command, or a hand gesture in which one raises an up-
facing palm), opening the kennel door and attaching a leash to the dog’s collar, giving the 
dog the command to walk out from his kennel and practising loose-leash walking 
(described in detail in chapter 4) whilst out with the dog. Maintaining consistency in 
mundane practices such as potty walking is considered fundamental to teaching the dogs 
how to behave and, thus, to developing the ideal detection dog. I was cleared to potty walk 
alone three weeks after my arrival. Being able to walk dogs unsupervised opened up a new 
arena in which I could participate in the everyday activities, without requiring the direction 
or supervision of Jen. This responsibility made me feel less of a spare part and more like 
I was able to contribute something, especially when Jen was busy or off-site. After all, 
with an excess of twenty dogs in the center each day, there was always a dog who could 
benefit from a toilet trip and some fresh air.  
From the outset, there was plenty of opportunity for me to get hands-on in a range 
of tasks besides potty-walking. Jen encouraged my participation, inviting me to film or 
record data for training sessions. She also guided me on how to handle dogs in the various 
components of the center’s canine fitness programme. For example, I learnt how to 
encourage dogs onto the treadmill, using positive reinforcement. Eventually, I was also 
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given the chance to handle dogs during scent-detection training sessions. Whilst no aspect 
of the center’s work was “off limits” to me, due to unforeseen logistical circumstances I 
was unable to observe any testing phases during my three months there. Throughout the 
duration of my fieldwork at the center, the team endured an unexpected delay in the 
procurement and delivery of samples (blood plasma) from their collaborating medical 
institution which rendered them unable to train with the target substance or conduct any 
research trials in this time. Thus, the cancer-detection dogs I observed in training at 
PVWDC were being trained to find an artificially-made training odour in order to “keep 
their brains going,” as it was put to me by Sebastian—the center’s Postdoctoral Fellow, 
who oversees the day-to-day running of the center’s research projects. 
Due to the aforementioned practicalities—the finite length of time I had to conduct 
fieldwork, combined with the working routine of my field sites and the unforeseen sample 
hold-up at PVWDC—the analysis presented in this thesis focuses predominantly on the 




a. Research Methods 
My primary research methods consisted of participant observation and semi-structured 
interviews.  
 
Participant observation  
At both sites, as alluded to above, I was very active in the day-to-day activities of training 
and caring for the dogs. Initially I was tasked with the more mundane tasks of walking and 
grooming dogs, but my responsibilities quickly developed as I became more embedded in 
the respective teams. Learning and practicing dog handling myself was invaluable in 
developing my understanding of the embodied nature of the communicative work being 
conducted between the species here.  
Throughout each day I jotted down observations and comments made by my 
informants in a small notebook, which I kept on my person. Each night I made these notes 
more detailed as I typed them up. With permission from my informants, I also used my 




I conducted interviews at both sites, drawing on pre-formulated semi-structured questions, 
split into several thematic areas. Each interview took between twenty-five and sixty 
minutes and with permission I made audio recordings of these conversations, enabling me 
to produce transcriptions. The interviews took place in research offices at the respective 
field sites. During my first period at MDD I conducted a group interview as well as one-
on-one interviews with individual trainers. During my second period there, I interviewed 
some of the same individuals again, in addition to interviewing the newer staff who had 
not been employed during my initial stint. At PVWDC I conducted interviews with nine 
people: the center’s Director, four trainers, the Post-Doctoral Fellow, and three student 
interns.  
 
b. Researching in Field Sites Beyond-the-Human: Incorporating Animals into 
Ethnography 
Throughout my research I have understood my informants as comprising not only the 
human trainers, research staff, and volunteers but also the detection dogs and those in 
training. Although incorporating dogs into my research has presented methodological 
challenges, these have not been insurmountable.  
 
As the study of ‘mankind’, anthropology has long restricted the subjects of its study to 
beings of the human category, setting humanity apart and above from nature (Ingold 1990). 
Where animals are present in twentieth-century anthropological research, they appear 
typically as raw material for human action or thoughts (Noske 1993), rather than as social 
actors in their own right. In the last two decades however, the role of animals in 
ethnography has rapidly shifted.  
In particular, there have been growing calls for the expansion of the discipline to 
incorporate nonhuman beings as participants in ethnographic research (e.g., Paxon 2008; 
Raffles 2010; Tsing 2009), where animals’ ‘lives and deaths are linked to human social 
worlds’ (Kirksey and Helmreich 2010, 545). Towards this end, Kohn (2007, 4), proposes 
an ‘anthropology of life’, that ‘questions the privileged ontological status of humans as 
knowers’ and epitomizes ‘an anthropology that is not just confined to the human but is 
concerned with the effects of our entanglements with other kinds of living selves’. The 
body of literature within which this position has advanced, consolidated with the term 
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‘multispecies ethnography’ (Kirksey and Helmreich 2010)16, raises methodological and 
epistemological questions that demand reflection from those conducting research under 
this rubric. Most fundamentally, can we achieve sufficient interspecific understanding 
with animals and incorporate them into our ethnographic practice, and if so, how? 
 
Arguably the most obvious challenge to consider concerns the fundamental differences in 
species-specific communication modalities. Of course, human and nonhuman animals do 
not communicate using a shared verbal language. Furthermore, anatomical differences 
make it physically impossible for humans to wholly adopt other animal’s modes of 
communication. Certainly then, it requires greater effort to attend to one’s nonhuman 
participants and, in the absence of a shared language, the possibility of conducting 
interviews to clarify our understandings of our informants is precluded, forcing us to 
rethink how we can reliably make sense of their experiences. 
However, whilst animals do not share the human capacity for verbal language, they 
are certainly not mute and I argue that is possible to achieve a reasonable degree of 
intersubjective understanding. To achieve this, requires paying attention to the somatic 
sensibilities of the individual animals whose experiences we seek to understand, made 
sense of alongside a basic zoological knowledge of the particular species in question. 
 
A brief look at some ethnography that incorporates animals can help to illustrate this 
position. David Goode (2007, 89) makes the point that ‘more can be and is communicated 
than can ever be codified into language’. This assertion is made in Goode’s 
autoethnography Playing with My Dog Katie (Ibid.), in which he illustrates that achieving 
intersubjectivity with his dog necessitates paying careful attention to mundane routines 
and tactile and embodied actions. Indeed, whilst dogs obviously cannot talk, ‘dogs are 
skilled intentional communicators…dogs are adept users of body language…through body 
postures, and movement of their eyes, ears, tails, and mouths’ (Arluke and Sanders 1993, 
133). Goode notes that such embodied communication is expressed by humans too, for in 
the company of Katie he experiences his body not only for himself, but also as a body for 
Katie. Goode’s ability to make sense of the play interactions between himself and Katie—
to read and develop an understanding of both bodies—emerges as a process of learning, 
                                                 
16 Refer to chapter 1 for an overview of ‘multispecies ethnography’. 
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dependent on his knowledge of the particular histories that their play has subsumed over 
time.  
To understand human–cat interactions, Janet and Steven Alger (2003) have 
focused on the nonlinguistic habitual routines that lead to an intersubjectivity that is 
achieved through shared communicative interpretations. In their study of the routine 
interactions between and among humans and cats in a New York cat shelter, they contend 
that cats communicate with humans through the same symbols used by humans. For 
instance, they note that cats often interpret a human slapping his leg when seated as an 
offer to sit in his lap.  
 
Despite the absence of a shared verbal language, it is clearly possible to communicate with 
animals in a way that enables the production of shared understanding that can be 
interpreted ethnographically. Attention to the nonverbal emerges as fundamental, and this 
is something anthropologists are trained to attend to; for even among humans, a significant 
proportion of communication is non-verbal (Mehrabian 1972). After all, participant 
observation—the method par excellence for most ethnographers—does not only demand 
the ethnographer focuses on the verbal, but also the somatic.  
It thus follows that the ethnographer’s body becomes her principal tool, which she 
employs to achieve an understanding of the group in question (LeCompte and Schensul 
1999, 1). Indeed, I not only considered non-verbal communication important among my 
canine informants, but also among the humans. Thus, in addition to penning down notes 
referring to conversations, I also watched and felt the kinesthetic elements that comprise 
the human–dog relations discussed in this thesis.  
Employing my body ‘as a tool’ in the field was critical to this project, especially 
given that the techniques of dog-training practiced by my informants17 are based on 
exercises performed at the interface of the bodies of human and dog. Gradually, as a result 
of watching other human–dog dyads and practicing myself with various dogs, I learned 
new skilled bodily practices—novel ways of moving and monitoring my body—that 
enabled me to communicate successfully with the dogs.  
Learning this new body knowledge was a messy process however, comprised of 
many failed attempts at communication. For instance, during an outdoor agility training 
session at PVWDC, with trainer Jen and Springer Spaniel Murphy, I was alerted to the 
                                                 
17 See chapter 4 for an outline of the training methods. 
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necessity of clear bodily gestures when attempting to foster a shared understanding with 
the dogs. Jen offered me the opportunity to guide Murphy through an agility routine that 
included climbing frames, ladders and tunnels. To begin, as is customary, I asked Murphy 
to sit. I then pointed an arm in the direction of the first obstacle, a tunnel, and called out, 
“tunnel.” Instead of running through the tunnel however, Murphy completed a different 
obstacle adjacent to the tunnel I thought I had been pointing to. Having watched our 
misunderstanding occur, Jen suggested that next time, before prompting Murphy to begin, 
I should direct Murphy closer to the start of the tunnel, as otherwise his vision is conflicted 
between the two obstacles in front of him. 
Skilled bodily practices, that involved me becoming increasingly attentive to the 
dog’s nonverbal utterances and needs, were thus an important element of my participant 
observation in my multispecies field sites. In this process, in keeping with the practices of 
many contemporary dog-trainers who demonstrate sensitivity towards the species-specific 
experience of an animal (Wlodarczyk 2017; 2018), I learned to become ‘more dog’ (Ibid.).  
 
The notion of one’s body as a tool is also explicit in Goode’s work (2007) and can help 
researchers foster an understanding of the world through the eyes of the animals. Building 
on Malinowski’s (1922) call to see the world through the eyes of the ‘natives’, both Marc 
Bekoff (2002) and Arluke and Sanders (1993) consider this mode of seeing the world a 
prerequisite for researchers of human–animal relations.  
For Arluke and Sanders (Ibid., 378), it is ‘the researcher’s disciplined attention to 
his or her emotional experience [that] can serve as an invaluable source of understanding’. 
According to Kirsten Hastrup (2004), it is this experience—namely, the performative 
mode of knowing—as opposed to ‘facts’ or ‘data’ that is central to the evidence that shapes 
anthropological knowledge. It is through ‘living the character’ (Hastrup 2004, 465), that 
the anthropologist comes to understand the ways in which particular modes of action come 
to be taken for granted. For example, in the Khangai Mountians of Mongolia, Natasha Fijn 
(2011) played her ‘part’ (Hastrup 2004) living with a group of herders and herd animals 
(yaks, cattle, horses, sheep, and goats) in their encampment, participating in the same 
tasks, and thus actively interacting with both herders and herd animals. As a result, Fijn 
gained a gradual accumulation of embodied knowledge that allowed her to communicate 
reciprocally with the animals and learn experientially about the relations between 
Mongolian herders and herd animals. When playing the role of milkmaid, it took several 
sessions before the cows became comfortable in Fijn’s presence, due to the novel scent 
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she carried. To help calm the cows, Fijn wore the same jacket during every milking 
session; this jacket was rarely washed and thus became imbued with the scent of the herd. 
Through such attention to the cows’ ‘umwelt’ (von Uexkull 1957 [1934]), or lifeworld, as 
well as actively playing the role of the herders, Fijn developed a perception of a 
‘multispecies universe’ (Fijn 2011, 39). Fijn’s training in ethology arguably places her in 
a privileged position from which to pay attention to the animals. However, the 
understanding she develops is clearly heavily dependent on the method of participant 
observation and points to the potential of such a process for enabling the researcher to see 
the world, at least to a greater extent than they had before, through the animal’s eyes. 
Meanwhile, other scholars are less optimistic about the suggestion that animal 
experience can be shared by humans. For instance, Thomas Nagel (1974) claims that 
humans can never know what it is like for a bat to be a bat, only what it might be like for 
a human to be a bat. Adopting a similar position, Gary Fine (2004, 642) argues that in the 
Alger’s (2003) study of humans and cats, the researchers ‘read volunteers from the inside 
out and cats from the outside in’. At the heart of such arguments are concerns regarding 
anthropomorphism: the attribution of human mental states (thoughts, feelings, motivations 
and beliefs) to nonhumans, condemned as ‘that worst of ethological sins’ (Masson and 
McCarthy 1996, 9). Described by Cary Wolfe (2003, xii) as ‘one of the central ironies of 
animal rights philosophy’, anthropomorphism is one of the key critiques to emerge from 
the expansion of ethnographic enquiry to include animal subjects. Critics condemn the use 
of human terms of representation to account for the experience and behaviour of animal 
subjects.  
An alternative mode of interpreting animals, that adopts a reflexive position in 
response to the critiques of anthropomorphism, is available in what some refer to as 
‘critical anthropomorphism’ (Morton et al. 1990). Proponents of critical 
anthropomorphism draw on a combination of their ‘intuitions about what is best for an 
animal, based on a knowledge of ourselves and other people’, but ‘tempered by objective 
knowledge of the particular species’ (or individual animal’s) life history, behaviour, and 
physiology (Morton et al. 1990, 1). The analysis offered in this thesis, is aligned with a 
critical anthropomorphism standpoint, as I develop my understanding of the dog’s actions 
and lives with reference to developments in the field of canine cognitive science. Adopting 
an approach that crosses disciplinary boundaries aligns my work with a body of 
multispecies scholarship that has attempted to transcend the discrete methodological and 
theoretical domains through which the social and natural sciences traditionally operate 
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(Fuentes 2012; Locke 2013). Such interdisciplinary research programs reflect sentiments 
about the inadequacies of ethnography as a methodology, underpinned by a humanist 
epistemology, for incorporating nonhuman life. Through Baynes-Rock’s (2015) work, that 
elucidates the relations between humans and hyenas in the Ethiopian city of Harar, where 
the bone scavenging hyenas dwell alongside urban human inhabitants, we see how a 
methodological approach that is informed by both human ethnography and animal 
ethology can advance understandings of human–animal relations. Similarly, though 
realized not at the outset of fieldwork but during the process of writing-up, Piers Locke 
(2013; 2017) recognized the relevance that developments in the fields of cognitive and 
behavioral animal sciences could have for aiding his understanding of elephant lives and 
interspecies relations in his ethnographic study of the intimacy of human–elephant 
encounters in Nepal. Arguing for the productive potential of such an approach, Locke 
(2015) notes, that although as anthropologists we ‘may theoretically recognize the hybrid 
entanglements of humans and other species, with few exceptions our framework and 
methodology remains thoroughly non-hybrid.’  
Nevertheless, while emphasizing the productive potential of integrating material 
and research practices from the cognitive and behavioral sciences to enrich an otherwise 
largely humanist ethnography, Locke (2015) remains mindful of the question of 
epistemological incommensurability that might be raised in response to research 
frameworks that depend on the integration of interdisciplinary research traditions. To allay 
such concerns, he highlights various cases in which ethnographic practice has been 
integrated with other methodological perspectives, particularly ethological approaches 
(e.g. Baynes-Rock 2015), with productive consequences. Illustrating how ethological 
methodologies have sometimes harnessed an approach akin to the ethnographic, he draws 
on Despret’s (2013) insight that ethological research has not necessarily been strictly 
observational as it is often claimed. For instance, Lorenz’s practice of becoming ‘parent’ 
to the baby jackdaw who had attached herself to him reveals how ethologists have 
permitted themselves to be incorporated into the social worlds of the animals they study. 
Emerging from such work are new syntheses that emphasize the subjectivity and 
agency of organisms whose lives are entangled with human existence (Kirksey and 
Helmreich 2010). The development of sub-disciplines in the multispecies body of 
scholarship, such as ethnoprimatology, have been recognized as affording potential for the 
‘reconciliation of biological and social anthropology’ (Riley 2006, 75). The work 
presented here does not attempt such a radical challenge to the methodological or 
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epistemological approach to anthropology as that of ethnoprimatologists (e.g. Fuentes 
2012). Nevertheless, incorporating insights from the domain of canine cognitive science 
(e.g. page 107), this work shares broad concerns and perspectives with the work of 
multispecies anthropologists exploring the productive possibilities of blurring the 
disciplinary practices of ethnography and ethology. 
The evidence I borrow from ethology, for instance with regards to how dogs have 
evolved to read the behaviour of humans, highlights biosocial preconditions for how dogs 
and humans ‘learn to pay attention to each other in a way that changes who and what they 
become together’ (2008, 208). This work thus mobilises anthropology by emphasizing 
entanglements across species. We learn that animals are not only looked at but they look 
back too; a recognition that demands a rethinking of how interspecies interactions might 
be explored within a traditionally humanist doctrine.  
In this thesis, incorporating recent developments from ethology is not only helpful 
for building a richer understanding of the dog’s actions and lives but also those of the 
trainers, as it is within this wider context of animal behaviour science that they approach 
their training practices. However, my perception of the evidence presented by ethologists 
is not of transparent truth, but of ‘situated knowledge’ (Haraway 1988; 1991) that is 
reflective of larger ideological projects. As Justyna Wlodarczyk (2018) notes, dog training 
practices throughout history have mirrored whatever the prevalent scientific discourse of 
the period tended to be. Over time, canine science has changed and will continue to change, 
shaping methods of dog training in the process. For Haraway, the contexts of interaction, 
the ideas, priorities and perceptions of the people involved in producing knowledge, as 
one possible interpretation of reality, matter. Thus, I remain cognizant to the partiality of 
knowledge from all epistemological approaches incorporated here. 
 
Incorporating animals into ethnographic research also obliges the researcher to make 
decisions with regards to the written representation of animals. In my writing, when I refer 
to a specific dog, I do so with reference to the individual dog’s name18, loyal to the 
practices within my field sites. Adopting such a practice reflects how the dogs are 
understood—by both my human and canine informants—as individuals with feelings and 
distinct personalities. The importance of preserving such individuality will become clear 
                                                 
18 Pseudonyms for dog names are used to maintain anonymity of dog trainers. See section 
below on informant anonymity. 
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throughout this thesis as an essential attribute of each dog and a notion that shapes human–
dog relations and how interspecies training and work is ‘done’ in these contexts.   
Such choices concerning representation bring me closer towards a non-
anthropocentric methodology, where the individuality and agency of the animals is 
acknowledged and incorporated into my analysis. Here, I follow other scholars including 
Fijn (2011) who, instead of trying to understand the Mongolian herding community from 
a perspective in which the herdsmen and women are strictly dominant over their animals, 
acknowledges the agency of the herd animals and the influence they have upon Mongolian 
herders’ lives, and incorporates them into her ethnography. This results in a representation 
of the community in which the herders themselves are central, but which paints human–
animal relationships as being co-dependent and characterized by a two-way flow of 
communication. 
 
In sum, the ethnographic method, with its attention to the more-than-verbal, offers 
potential for generating insight into the lives of animals and the intricacies of their relations 
with humans. Arguably, this is especially applicable for domesticated or ‘companion’ 
animals, who share a long history of interspecific communication with humans. Taken 
together, the literature reviewed in this section suggests that, alongside an ongoing 
reflexive standpoint, concerning animal interpretation and the potential dangers of naïve 
anthropomorphism, it is certainly possible to incorporate individual animals into the 
ethnographic endeavor.  
During my time in the field I made a considered effort to pay attention to both 
partners of the human–dog dyads I encountered, dedicating space in my field notes to 
exploring what the dogs were doing as well as the humans. In particular, this included 
individual dogs’, gestures, sounds, and interactions with humans or other dogs. Video-
recording routine activities, such as training sessions, enabled me to produce more detailed 
analyses of movements and interaction. The method of video-recording, used in 
conjunction with participant observation, has been employed by many multispecies 






a. Informant Anonymity 
Given the niche nature of the work my informants are engaged in, I was unable to 
guarantee my informants total anonymity within this thesis and associated publications. 
The crux of this difficulty lies in the fact that globally there are very few organisations 
conducting the specific field of work that my thesis explores.  
Although anonymity of the organisations was not possible, I have nevertheless 
taken steps to reduce the potential for individual informants to be easily identifiable. Most 
notably, I use pseudonyms throughout; not only for the humans but for the dogs too, given 
that dogs can easily be linked to individual trainers since each dog is assigned to a 
particular trainer with whom they interact most frequently. The only names that are not 
anonymized in this thesis are those of the organisations and their respective Chief 
Executive Officer and Director. This decision was made due to the ready availability with 
which this information is available in the public domain and my desire to include 
information about their respective publications in their fields of research.  
Despite being unable to assure full anonymity, I do not believe my work to put my 
informants at risk of harm. The work they are involved in is neither illegal nor socially 
problematic. Informants were made aware of this circumstance in information sheets and 
in personal discussion before making their decision of whether to consent to participate in 
this research. 
 
b. Researching in Field Sites Beyond-The-Human: The Invisibility of Animal 
Informants in the Ethics Review Process 
As I completed my department’s mandatory ethics review application before heading to 
the field, I did not consider my research to be of significant ethical concern. On reflection 
however, the ethical review process failed to account for the most vulnerable beings in my 
research: the dogs. Echoing Rosemary-Clare Collard (2015), this points to the human–
animal dualism implicit in the ethics review process: a process that demands critical re-
thinking. Given the rapid and continued surge of interest surrounding the animal turn 
across the social sciences and humanities, such discussion is pressing. 
 
In the process of seeking ethical approval for my research, the animals were notably 
absent. The list of ‘vulnerable populations’ to consider in my department’s ethics form 
includes only human categories: specifically, ‘children, prisoners, mental patients or any 
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other groups that would be considered at risk’. Under the imperative of the human–animal 
dualism, in which humans are considered separate from other animals, animals are deemed 
outside the scope of this ethics review process. Where, then, might there be space for 
ethical deliberation regarding animals? 
An obvious place to look to is the field of Animal Research: namely, the 
experimental research using animals, often in medical studies. As part of an initiative to 
ensure high levels of welfare and prevent ‘unnecessary’ harm to the animals involved, 
researchers intending to conduct experiments using animals must (rightly so) confront a 
whole host of bureaucratic hurdles in their ethical review process.19 Here, the ethical 
obligations towards the animal as research subject are clearly considered. Nevertheless, 
by framing the animal a distinct category in its own right, in this process the animal is 
reproduced as the normative subject of a particular mode of experimental research with 
rules and regulations that differ to those surrounding research with human subjects. Thus, 
the category of the animal as separate and subordinate to the human is reproduced in both 
ethics review processes outlined.  
Whilst I did not conduct experiments on animals—a fact which exempted me from 
the need for Animal Research ethics approval—my fieldwork nevertheless led me into 
direct and prolonged contact with animals. There were occasions when I was temporarily 
left alone with a dog or multiple dogs. In order to maintain their high standards of animal 
welfare, my human informants gave me training in their processes for husbandry and 
exercising practices. However, such high welfare standards and training for researchers 
are far from universal in other human–animal spaces, thus potentially leaving many 
animals at risk of harm. 
 
In sum, neither of the ethics review processes briefly outlined above are apt to 
meaningfully deliberate the ethical implications that can be associated with multispecies 
ethnographic fieldwork. While I do not suggest that the dogs with whom I worked 
alongside were at risk of harm from my presence, I do contend that with the continuing 
upsurge of interest in multispecies ethnography and increasing numbers of anthropologists 
likely to come into direct proximity with animals in the field, there is a critical need for 
                                                 
19 According to UCL’s Animal Research Ethics guidelines, researchers must work toward 
the principle of the ‘3Rs’: Replace, Reduce, and Refine. In the UK, ‘Animal Research’ is 
covered in legislation (The Animals (Scientific Procedures) Act 1986).  
 64 
discussion about the potential vulnerability of animals and how we can make space for 
these research practices to be effectively deliberated within the ethical review framework.  
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Chapter 3. Introducing Bio-Detection Dogs 
 
This chapter outlines several essential aspects of the practice of bio-detection dogs in order 
to equip the reader with the necessary context to frame the forthcoming discussions 
presented in this thesis. In particular, this chapter details how the notion of dogs detecting 
human disease transformed from a compilation of anecdotal stories into an area of 
scientific research. Here, I also introduce the spaces and methods through which this work 
is conducted and detail the particular manner in which bio-detection dogs are cared for. 
Taken together, these discussions highlight how bio-detection dogs are distinct from other 
categories of detection dogs and assistance dogs. 
 
i. The Emergence of Bio-Detection Dogs: From Anecdote to Fact 
Although the bio-detection dogs that this thesis focuses on are not currently being used 
operationally in the clinical diagnosis procedure, in several ways their work is nevertheless 
tied to the lives of many patients of the diseases they are trained to detect. Most 
significantly, we can consider those people who provide biological samples for the dogs’ 
training. Whilst strict data protection rules surrounding the patients who donate these 
samples mean the experiences and perspectives of these people are largely absent from my 
data, by turning to the anecdotal stories about pet dogs spontaneously alerting their owners 
to their cancer prior to a clinical diagnosis, it is possible to get a sense of how these dogs 
are perceived by those people who have experienced first-hand the dogs’ ability to detect 
the odour of disease. Exploring these anecdotes is also important in tracing the origins of 
this field of study. 
Since the late 1980s, several anecdotes have been reported in the medical journal 
The Lancet regarding pet dogs purportedly detecting cancer in their human companions 
(Williams and Pembroke 1989; Church and Williams 2001). These reports, written by 
clinicians, detail similar stories. In the more recent case (Church and Williams 2001), the 
authors describe how a pet Labrador was persistently sniffing at a lesion on the thigh of 
her owner. The dog’s constant interest in this area of the patient’s leg prompted him to 
seek medical advice, and when the lesion was eventually excized and studied, it was 
discovered to be a basal cell carcinoma.  
Prior to becoming aware of these reports in 2001, Claire Guest had been told an 
almost identical story by a friend, concerning her friend’s dog and a mole on her friend’s 
leg. As Claire recalls: 
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“A friend of mine told me that her pet Dalmatian dog had sniffed and licked a mole 
on her calf persistently, to the point where she said it was a nuisance. She said this 
wasn’t a passing interest; this was a dog that was fixed on this small mole on her 
calf. She said that if she walked past the dog, even if she had trousers or boots on, 
the dog’s nose would twitch and it would come and find this mole. She said that 
over time, she started to become concerned about why this dog was showing such 
interest. She went to her GP and as the mole wasn’t bleeding or itching the GP 
wasn’t at all concerned. But [after some tests] he called back to tell her she had a 
malignant melanoma, the most serious form of skin cancer. I was absolutely 
fascinated by this story.” 
 
In 2001, by chance, Claire happened to hear John Church, a retired orthopedic surgeon, 
talk about these anecdotes on the radio, pleading for collaborators to help gather scientific 
evidence of the dog’s ability to detect the odour of cancer. As a dog-trainer with over 
twenty years’ experience and equipped with a degree in behavioural psychology, Claire 
felt compelled to make contact with him immediately. In collaboration with a team of 
researchers, Claire and John subsequently conducted a ‘proof of principle’ study that was 
published in the British Medical Journal and provided evidence that dogs can ‘smell’ 
cancer (Willis et al. 2004). This marked the beginning of the charity and Claire’s career 
training dogs to detect cancers such as prostate and bladder cancer. However, it was not 
until several years later that Claire herself experienced first-hand the spontaneous disease-
detecting capability of one of her dogs, Daisy.20 In her memoir, Daisy’s Gift (2016), Claire 
writes:  
 
Daisy stood in the boot, nudging my chest with her nose and staring up into my 
face intently with her big, brown eyes, forcing me to pay attention to her. ‘Stop it, 
Daise’, I said, ‘C’mon, don’t you want a run?’…Daisy was refusing to leave the 
boot and was still pushing her nose into my chest. It was very odd: she was 
normally as keen and energetic as the others. (197-8) 
 
                                                 
20 Although Daisy had been trained by Claire and colleagues to detect the odours of bladder 
and prostate cancer, she had not undergone training to detect breast cancer. 
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In the above excerpt, Claire describes how, in a single moment, the ordinary activity of 
walking her dogs became extraordinary. After this encounter with Daisy, Claire noticed 
that her breast felt painful and she became aware of a small lump underneath her skin, 
prompting her to visit her doctor. Whilst this cyst was found to be harmless, a core biopsy 
revealed a small tumour, located deep in her breast. This required immediate surgery 
followed by a course of radiotherapy. Claire considers Daisy’s odd behaviour that day a 
spontaneous alert and an illustration of their close relationship that Claire perceives 
ultimately saved her life: ‘Daisy has always been one of my very special dogs. There is a 
deep understanding between us, and it is this bond that I believe saved my life’ (Ibid.). 
 
While the charity’s aforementioned first study (Willis et al. 2004) was small, both in terms 
of sample numbers21 and dogs tested (n = 6), they considered the results to be promising. 
The successful detection of urine samples from patients with bladder cancer was achieved 
41% of the time: significantly greater than the 14% expected by chance alone. Here, it can 
be noted that in the official publications reporting on these studies, the bio-detection dog 
figures as a statistical unit that can be represented in graphs and compared against other 
dogs or other detection technologies.  
 
Recalling the moment that these findings were published, during a talk to members of the 
public visiting the charity’s headquarters, Claire remarks with excitement about the media 
interest that the study attracted: “It was announced all over the world. We had a lorry with 
the satellite come and sit outside where the dogs were working for two days. It made a 
massive story: cancer has an odour, a unique odour, and dogs can be trained to find it.” As 
well as media interest, the publication sparked a burgeoning curiosity from scientists and 
dog-trainers around the world, with subsequent studies reporting on the detection of 
bladder (Leahy 2004; Welsh 2004), lung and breast (McCulloh et al. 2006), skin 
(Campbell et al. 2014) and ovarian (Hovarth et al. 2008; Hovarth et al. 2013) cancers, as 
well as infectious diseases (Bomers et al. 2012). 
                                                 
21 In training, 27 positive urine samples and 54 control urine samples were used. In testing, 
6 positive samples and 54 control samples were used. Positive urine samples were donated 
by patients presenting with new or recurrent transitional cell carcinoma of the bladder 
(Willis et al. 2004). 
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The significant media and public interest surrounding this research is in keeping 
with the attention routinely afforded to potential advances surrounding the diagnosis and 
treatment of cancer. Given its ubiquity and prominent place in public consciousness today, 
cancer is arguably the defining disease of modernity (Porter 1999 [1997] 574). Oncologist 
and author Siddhartha Mukherjee (2010, 241) has even identified cancer as ‘the 
quintessential product of modernity’. 
The public imagination regarding cancer research is largely framed by hope and 
hype and Margaret Lock (2008, 64) has illustrated that this is especially so surrounding 
potential breakthroughs in genetic medicine and the associated promises of predictive 
health care and ‘personal medicine’. Indeed, despite the promises of biomedical science—
the dominant imaginary of western medicine portrayed as the hero to win ‘the war on 
cancer’—it has not yet fulfilled the advances that were expected decades ago (Faguet 
2010). Correspondingly, Mary Good (2001) writes: 
 
Enthusiasm for medicine’s possibilities arises not necessarily from material 
products with therapeutic efficacy but through the production of ideas, with 
potential although not yet proven therapeutic efficacy. (397) 
 
Indeed, while there continues to be no cure for cancer, nor sufficiently reliable and 
safe diagnostic technologies for certain cancers, hope and interest in cancer research 
remains vast. 
 
When the results of the charity’s first study emerged, the notion of dogs detecting human 
disease was still in its infancy and presented a potential challenge to the status quo of 
clinical diagnosis that remains largely comprised of blood tests and imaging technologies. 
Recalling the moments when she first began to tell friends and colleagues about her interest 
in this field of research, Claire notes, “People thought I was mad. They thought I’d 
genuinely lost the plot.” At times during the testing stage of the initial study, she admits 
she even began to doubt herself: 
 
“I really had no idea what the result would be. I sometimes wake up at night and 
think, my God—what if I’ve made it all up. It genuinely frightens me sometimes. 




While this first proof of principle study and multiple subsequent studies thereafter have 
proved successful, there has been a substantial attitude of skepticism from some members 
of the scientific community directed towards the practice of training dogs to detect and 
alert to the odour of human disease. Some skepticism centers around the relatively low 
numbers of dogs and samples used in some of the studies, while other critics point to failed 
trials conducted by other teams of researchers (e.g., Hackner et al. 2016). Meanwhile, other 
commentators have raised concern about the changeable temperament of the dog, 
suggesting that something as unpredictable as ‘a bad day’ might negatively impact a dog’s 
detection accuracy, reducing the reliability of this mode of detection.22 
Furthermore, even if it is accepted that dogs can be trained to detect disease, 
questions have been raised about the utility of the potential application of bio-detection 
dogs. In 2015, in response to MDD’s announcement of their plans to conduct a large-scale 
clinical study of the canine detection of prostate cancer, Dr. Kat Arney, Cancer Research 
UK’s science information manager, made the following comment in a statement, 
questioning the practical value of this research:  
 
Any test for cancer must be shown to be reliable, specific and practical, and large-
scale clinical trials are an essential part of this process. It will be interesting to see 
whether this new trial shows that dogs can identify prostate cancer better than 
current tests, but it’s unlikely that canine cancer screening would be practical in 
the clinic on a wider scale. In the long term it would be useful to discover the 
identities of the molecules the dogs are sniffing, which could lead to more accurate 
lab tests to diagnose cancer.23 
 
While the use of dogs detecting the odour of human disease might one day be an 
operational adjunct in the diagnostic process, my informants are indeed also committed to 
working towards determining ‘the identities of the molecules the dogs are sniffing’, as 
Arney puts it. Both organisations are interested in helping to develop more sophisticated 
                                                 
22 https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/if-dogs-can-smell-cancer-why-dont-they-




diagnostic machines known as ‘electronic noses’ or ‘e-noses’: technologies that replicate 
the functions of human noses, but with greater sensitivity (Fox 2009). The potential scope 
of applications of such electronic systems is vast: for instance, they are already in use by 
perfume manufacturers seeking to defend their patented fragrances against counterfeits 
(Ibid.). In the area of medical diagnosis, early proof-of-principle studies have shown 
promising results for the accuracy of e-noses to detect ovarian cancer in breath samples 
(Kahn et al. 2015) and prostate cancer in urine (Roine et al. 2014). Thus, the future 
imaginary of disease diagnosis, as conceptualized by my informants who train these dogs, 
is not exclusively limited to a dependence on the physical presence of dogs. However, 
while the odour signatures that the dogs are alerting to continue to mystify scientists, the 
dogs will likely remain the starting point for such developments. 
 
To offer an analysis of the skepticisim surrounding this practice, I suggest that it is 
associated, at least in part, with the present status of smell in western culture: a status that 
has shifted over time. Within contemporary western culture, out of all the senses, smell is 
considered with the least regard (Fox 2009). From the commencement of the 
Enlightenment, smell has been progressively devalued in the practice of truth-seeking 
practices in the west (Classen, Howes and Synnott 1994, 84) as sight became valued over 
all other senses, especially in science and medicine. Alain Corbin (1986, 154) describes 
this sensory shift as ‘the great swing in attitudes that was to give uncontested supremacy 
to the visual’. This valorization of the visual is highlighted in Michel Foucault’s (1973) 
notion of the ‘medical gaze’ that asserts that the physician develops his understanding of 
the patient’s illness through observation, physical examination, and laboratory tests or 
imaging. Thus, the patient’s body is constructed as an object of visual examination within 
medical science. This practice, of finding the hidden ‘truth’ of the body, is especially 
pertinent for cancer diagnosis, since cancer can manifest in the body for years without any 
clear external symptoms, growing undetected until very late stages of the disease. 
While the visual has been at the center of empirical scientific thought post-
Enlightenment, from this time onwards smell has long been not only neglected, but largely 
banished from the western consciousness. Anthropologists have suggested that this is a 
consequence of the ‘deodorization’ of modern life (Classen et al. 1994, 84), in which smell 
has been disparaged because ‘it is felt to threaten the abstract and impersonal regime of 
modernity by virtue of its radical interiority, its boundary-transgressing propensities and 
its emotional potency’ (Classen et al. 1994, 5). One of the consequences of this demotion 
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of smell, noted by anthropologist Kate Fox (2009, 5), relates to academic research, ‘with 
the result that we know far less about our sense of smell than about more high-status senses 
such as vision and hearing’. Fox points out that the low status of smell is also reflected 
within the English language. For instance, while there exist many derogatory terms for 
‘nose’ (e.g., snout, hooter), there are no terms of approval for smelling ability as there are 
with other senses (e.g., ‘keen-eyed’ or ‘a good listener’). In fact, the only common 
expression which implies olfactory ability is ‘nosy’: a term of disapproval rather than 
honour. 
Certainly, smelling is as much a cultural practice as a physiological act. Indeed, in 
many non-western contexts smell is highly valued and spoken about with greater ease. For 
instance, a recent study (Majid and Kruspe 2018) found that hunter-gatherers in the Malay 
Peninsula find it as easy to talk about odours as they do colours. Furthermore, for some 
communities, smell is a highly valued sense that plays a key role in defining the individual 
self and also in shaping everyday encounters between individuals. For example, among 
the Ongee people of the Andaman Islands, the universe and everything in it is defined by 
smell. As Constance Classen and colleagues (1994, 113) note, ‘the identifying 
characteristic and life force of all living beings is thought to reside in their smell’. When 
greeting someone therefore, the Ongee do not ask ‘How are you?’, but ‘Konyune? 
onorange-tanka?’: ‘How is your nose?’ or literally, ‘When/why/where is the nose to be?’ 
(Ibid., 114). 
Meanwhile, in the western consciousness today, smell is largely repressed and 
considered of low status. However, this has not always been the case. Indeed, since 
antiquity, smell has played a role in the diagnosis of human disease. According to the 
Greek physician Galen, a foul-smelling urine or excrement was an indication of 
putrefaction of bodily humors (e.g., Galen, De differentiis febrium 1.8 (7.302 Kuhn)). It is 
often noted that the role of smell in disease detection was also discussed by Hippocrates, 
who is said to have advised his students to ‘smell your patient’s breath’ to search for signs 
of diseases including diabetes.24  
Of the association between smell and diagnosis, David Howes (1989, 91) notes 
that ‘In pre-Pasteurian times, most doctors and public health officials worked on the 
assumption that stench both signaled and communicated disease’. Thus, medical diagnoses 
involved a ‘calculation of degrees of internal decay based on the odor of bodily waste’ 
                                                 
24 https://www.economist.com/node/12001831  
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(Corbin 1986, 20). Despite this valorized function of smell in diagnosis throughout ancient 
and modern history, today smell remains the least significant of the senses in modern 
western cultures (Fox 2009; McGann 2017).  
Considering the temporally and culturally divergent status of smell builds an 
understanding of research practices involving the detection of human disease by dogs as a 
field of scientific study that, although appearing as novel, within a culture in which smell 
is widely undervalued, actually has roots in ideas that date back to antiquity. An 
acknowledgment of the contemporary relationship between knowledge and the senses in 
the west helps us to understand why a climate of skepticism might surround diagnostic 
practices that employ the sense of smell. Since the Enlightenment, sight has been integral 
to the method(s) par excellence involved in the diagnosis of cancer, in addition to other 
diseases. This is reflected in the routine visual technologies (e.g., Magnetic Resonance 
Imaging (MRI) and Computerized Tomography (CT)) used on the bodies of persons 
suspected of having cancer, in which a clinician’s skill is applied in ‘reading’ these images. 
Meanwhile, the personal and emotional potency of smell has been understood to threaten 
modernity’s impersonal truth-seeking practices (Classen et al. 1994, 5). 
 
While the evolving status of smell might help us to understand the climate of skepticism 
that surrounds the practice of bio-detection dog research in particular, concepts from 
science and technology studies (STS), on the topic of knowledge production, illustrate the 
ubiquity of resistance as a reaction motivated by all novel kinds of knowledge that 
challenge the status quo. 
In Dreamscapes of Modernity (2015), in which Sheila Jasanoff and Sang-Hyun 
Kim articulate and analyse their concept of ‘sociotechnical imaginaries’25, Jasanoff 
suggests that four phases characterize the processes through which visions of the future 
develop: origination, embedding, resistance, and extension. These four phases are well 
developed within the STS literature (e.g., Fujiumura 1992) and can be identified with 
regards to the future imaginary that involves the use of the dog’s olfactory capabilities to 
develop accurate, non-invasive and rapid cancer detection methods. In this context, I have 
                                                 
25 Sociotechnical imaginaries are ‘collectively held, institutionally stabilized, and publicly 
performed visions of desirable futures, animated by shared understandings of social life 
and social order attainable through, and supportive of, advances in science and technology’ 
(Jasanoff and Kim 2015, 4-5). 
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illustrated how the particular future imaginary of dogs detecting human disease originated 
with the visions of a small number of actors, including Guest and Church. Gradually, with 
the successful results of rigorous clinical trials, these ideas are becoming embedded as 
realities, with this imaginary becoming steadily entrenched in how both individuals and 
larger organisations speculate about the future. Indeed, the majority of people recently 
surveyed in the UK support the use of trained dogs in the detection of human diseases26 
and the National Health Service gave ethical approval to MDD’s proof-of-principle trial 
on prostate cancer and have also helped in the collection of samples on which the research 
relies. However, consistent with Jasanoff’s (2015) insight, resistance has also been a 
characteristic element of the development of this future imaginary, here in the form of 
skepticism about the viability of dogs in the diagnostic process. 
 
Now that the emergence of this area of research has been outlined, I turn to the training of 
bio-detection dogs to offer the reader a preliminary insight into the spaces and practices 
that comprise dog-training in this context. 
 
ii. Obtaining Dogs 
 
PVWDC obtain dogs through two main channels: breeder donations or in-house breeding. 
Regarding the first mode of dog supply—donations—the majority of the dogs are donated 
from professional dog breeders across the country. There are certain caveats for anyone 
wishing to donate a dog however. Most significantly, PVWDC only accepts purebred 
puppies from reputable breeders who are able to demonstrate the dog’s lineage of proven 
performance and health. Required health qualifications for the sire and dam (the puppy’s 
parents) include satisfactory results for tests related to the animal’s hips, elbows and eyes. 
DNA tests are also required of sires and dams of certain breeds, to prove they are not 
afflicted by conditions prone to affect specific breeds. Proof of sire and dam working 
ability is established in titles or qualifications that can be gained in a variety of fields 
                                                 
26 A recent YouGov (2018) poll of 2,047 British adults indicates that the public support 
the use of trained dogs in the detection of human diseases. More than four out of five 
respondents would be happy for doctors to use trained dogs to detect human disease in 




including police work, search and rescue, or advanced tracking events organized by the 
American Kennel Club.  
PVWDC never pays for a puppy; the dogs are donated to the organisation free of 
charge. If a breeder wants to donate a puppy but cannot afford to do so, a private donor 
might step in and pay the fee required by the breeder. The donations breeders make to 
PVWDC are publicly acknowledged by the organisation; for instance, when referring to a 
dog on their website or in social media posts, the breeder’s name frequently accompanies 
the dog’s name.  
The second mode through which dogs are acquired by PVWDC is through the 
organisation’s in-house breeding program—comparable, though on a smaller scale, to the 
breeding programs operated by many service or assistance dog organisations. Using dogs 
who have had successful working roles, PVWDC has bred eight litters of puppies since 
2014. 
In order to begin socialization and training from a young age, to control the dog’s 
environment and record the dog’s progress, PVWDC takes puppies from around eight 
weeks of age. The ability to monitor the dog’s performance throughout the training process 
is considered essential to PVWDC’s longer-term aim of developing tools for the 
assessment of behavioural traits which could reliably predict future success in training.  
Once trained with the skills needed to work operationally, the majority of the dogs 
at PVWDC ‘graduate’ in their specialist field (e.g., narcotics detection), at which point 
they are sold on to handlers (e.g., law enforcement dog handlers) with whom the dog will 
relocate to live and work. A dog’s age at graduation varies but typically falls between 
eight–12 months. Due to the current small-scale of the organisation’s studies in cancer-
detection, only a few dogs become specialists in this field. Whilst I was there, the center 
had three dogs assigned to this project. As this work takes place on-site at the center, these 
dogs continue to come in Monday–Friday, transported by their fosterers with whom they 
live. 
 
Meanwhile, at MDD, where research ambitions do not include the development of a tool 
to assess puppies for future working success, dogs do not typically begin coming in to the 
training center until they are around eight months old. Thus, it is not considered essential 
to obtain dogs as puppies. Here, dogs are sometimes donated by, or purchased from, 
breeders who specialize in producing dogs from ‘working lines’ (i.e., a lineage of 
successful working dogs). Unlike PVWDC, MDD does not have an established breeding 
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program of its own. Other sources from which their dogs are procured include other 
assistance dog programs, such as the Guide Dog training program, with whom the charity 
has contacts and is informed of dogs that may be suitable. In these instances, the dog has 
typically been rejected from the previous organisation because he displayed a preference 
for scent-focused engagement with the world, over the visually-oriented behaviours that 
are essential for the Guide Dog role. 
Additionally, the trainers occasionally receive tip-offs through friends in the 
working dog industry, including police dog handlers, who alert them to potentially suitable 
dogs. Occasionally, dogs are also donated by rescue centres and members of the public. 
Prior to taking on a dog, an initial assessment is carried out, usually at the center, in which 
a trainer observes the dog’s persistence and performance in a series of search games. For 
instance, the trainer will throw a tennis ball into a field of long grass and assess how long 
it takes the dog to find the item and how eager he is to engage with the ‘game’. While the 
dogs at MDD tend to be acquired at an older age than the puppies at PVWDC, if they are 
procured as puppies, the dog will stay at home with a foster family until he is deemed 
mature enough to begin coming in to the center and start training. 
 
iii. Training Noses 
Both organisations train female and male dogs alike and there are no significant 
differences between the numbers of each enrolled in the training programmes. Whilst I 
was in the field, MDD had an average of thirty dogs in their bio-detection training 
programme, spanning several different research projects. Meanwhile, at PVWDC, there 
was an average of twenty-five dogs in training. Of this cohort, only three were specializing 
in bio-detection. The others were in training for more traditional detection specialties of 
explosives, drugs, and search and rescue of missing people. 
 
The training of bio-detection dogs takes place in specific areas designed with particular 
materials and equipped with certain equipment. My informants refer to such space as the 
‘training room’, or sometimes the ‘bio-room’. At MDD, the training room is located at the 
center of the bio-detection department: sandwiched between the department’s office on 
one side, and the viewing gallery and sample preparation area on the other. The wall 
dividing the training room from the viewing area is made of transparent glass sheets, 
facilitating spectatorship. Trainers and dogs enter the room through a door from the bio-
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detection office: an entrance that is reinforced with a child safety gate between the office 
and door, used to prevent dogs from sneaking into the room when it is not their turn. The 
room itself is quite clinical in design with white walls and a vinyl flooring that is both non-
slip and easy to clean. Certain features of the room are explicitly geared towards the 
welfare of the dogs. For instance, on the floor by the door is a water bowl that is re-stocked 
with fresh water throughout the day. A temperature monitor sits on the workbench, with 
the temperature recorded at the outset of each training session. One of the trainers informed 
me that the optimum temperature for the dogs to work in is around nineteen degrees 
Celsius. Trainers routinely monitor the temperature at the outset of each training session 
and adjust the room’s air-conditioning system accordingly.  
The space is largely uncluttered, containing only what is deemed essential for 
training: a stainless-steel carousel with eight arms protruding from a central stand and four 
stainless-steel stands. The dogs at MDD are typically trained to navigate one of these two 
‘systems’. When not in use, this equipment is dismantled and pushed to one side of the 
room. The only other pieces of furniture in the room are a small desk, chair and a 
workbench that runs along one of the walls. The workbench comprises cupboards 
containing various additional items of training kit including: stainless-steel arms and pots 
to attach to the carousel or stands, multiple packets of kibble treats, tennis balls and plush 
toys, a portable steam cleaner, a bin for hazardous waste (e.g., urine samples), and stacks 
of boxes containing nitrile gloves. On top of the workbench sits a television screen linked 
up to the two closed-circuit television cameras positioned in opposite corners of the room 
to record training and testing sessions. A radio on the window sill, tuned into a popular 
British music station playing chart hits, provides background noise to the training sessions. 
The samples used for training—comprised of urine in vials, sweat-infused socks and gauze 
swabs—are stored in freezers outside the training room. Prior to training, the trainers must 
retrieve and prepare the required samples. With some of the freezers located in a corridor 
that extends from the office in which the dogs dwell when they are not working, the 
trainers are often watched by several interested canines as they collate samples: 
 
Stood next to the freezers, Ed helps Alexa to retrieve specific urine samples to use in this 
morning’s prostate cancer training sessions. Alexa reads out a list of sample numbers 
from a sheet, whilst Ed, wearing nitrile gloves, looks for and retrieves the samples from 
the freezer. For each number Alexa calls out, Ed finds the matching freezer bag, labelled 
with permanent marker, and takes one vial out from the bag. He places the vial in a 
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corresponding plastic pot, with the sample number already labelled in biro pen by Alexa. 
The pots sit on a tray on the windowsill until all samples are present. To reduce the risk 
of contamination, Ed takes out all eight of the control samples first, before opening a 
different freezer from which he retrieves the two target samples. On a separate tray, he 
places each target sample vial in a pot, again numbered but also marked with a large ‘X’ 
that distinguishes them as targets.  
Once all the samples are present on the trays, Alexa picks up both trays and makes 
her way towards the training room. Whilst walking through the office, Alexa spots Maddie 
sitting in her chair and the pair catch each other’s gaze. Alexa calls out “Maddie, off!” 
and after a moment’s reluctance, Maddie jumps down onto the ground. Then, resembling 
the Pied Piper, Alexa is followed into the training room by Maddie and several other dogs 
at her feet. Many of these dogs had been peacefully dozing throughout the office for the 
past thirty minutes but now, stirred by the noise and movement, appear keen to see what 
is happening. The dogs’ paws tap on the vinyl floor as they shadow Alexa, who carefully 
navigates her way around the carousel in the center of the room and places the trays down 
on the counter-top where the vials of urine are left to defrost over the next twenty minutes.  
 
PVWDC also has a space dedicated to the training of bio-detection dogs, contained within 
the organisation’s research office. In addition to training dogs working on the center’s 
study into cancer-detection, this room is also used as a space to teach young dogs the 
odour-detection ‘game’, using a training odour. This room is tucked away towards the 
back of the building, away from the kennel area. The room is accessed either through a 
door from an adjacent training room, used for conducting the dog’s exercise and strength-
training, or when the fitness room is in use the training room is accessed through an 
external door that opens onto the parking area.  
Consistent with the design and materials of MDD’s training room, vinyl floors and 
stainless-steel equipment are employed here for ease of cleaning. The training space is 
materially separated from the office by a temporary wall divider, with the training area 
featuring a carousel. In one corner of the training area, is a tripod holding a video camera. 
Beyond the training area is a door to a room that serves as a viewing area fitted with a one-
way tinted window that overlooks the carousel. Although members of the public do not 
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spectate from here27, given its limited space, this window enables several volunteers and 
interns to observe training sessions and record data, without overcrowding the training 
area. In the office, shelving units store the stainless-steel containers used to hold odour 
samples as well as boxes of nitrile gloves and cleaning equipment. One of the walls is 
decorated with photos of the center’s cancer-detection dogs, their names and sponsorship 
acknowledgments (Figure 1). Hand-drawn signs with the names of particular dogs are also 
stuck to the wall and when necessary, these are placed on the other side of the door to the 
research office, in the fitness room, to communicate to people that a specific dog is 
currently in the room (Figure 2). The signs help staff to prevent disruptions or particular 
interactions between certain dogs and people.  
 
 
Figure 1. Photos of the PVWDC cancer-detection dogs, their names and sponsorship 
details are stuck to a wall in the research office/training room. 
 
                                                 
27 While members of the public do not watch training from this area, PVWDC hosts bi-
monthly tours and demonstrations to members of the public and school groups. Typically, 
these tours take place in the center’s main training room and the outside rubble yard, where 
dogs are demonstrated taking part in various scent-detection and agility activities.  
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Figure 2. Hand-made signs to communicate the presence of particular dogs 
within the research office/training room stuck to a wall. 
 
Dogs being taught to detect the odour of human disease train between three and five days 
per week in the spaces described above. A training session lasts between twenty and thirty 
minutes and dogs take part in up to three sessions per day. It is through training that dogs 
learn the ‘game’ of scent-detection. This game has two main parts: firstly, the dog must 
learn to recognize the particular odour he is being trained to detect; secondly, he must learn 
to signal the presence of this salient odour to his trainer. To teach the dogs to recognize 
certain odours, trainers employ ‘clicker training’, using the sound of a clicker to 
communicate to the dog that they are demonstrating a desired behaviour. After a click, 
comes a reward (usually food). During the early stages of a dog’s training, a click might 
be offered for briefly looking at the odour source. Progressively, the trainers hold out for 
a longer stare at the source, and eventually they might ask a dog to ‘sit’ at source, if the 
dog has not himself already offered this behaviour. Gradually, through this process, the 
dog learns the behaviour he must exhibit in order to communicate to his trainer the 
presence of the target odour: the ‘operant response’, as it is referred to by dog-trainers. 
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Additionally, as training progresses, dogs must also learn to ignore control odours 
that might contain some volatile organic compounds (VOCs) that overlap with those 
present in the ‘background’ of the target odour, increasing the difficulty of the dog’s task. 
For instance, a ‘dirtier’ control sample—as my informants describe them—is typically one 
obtained from an individual who both matches the age of the target sample patient (e.g., 
usually an older individual when training for prostate cancer detection) and also shares 
some of the symptoms experienced by the target sample individual. Whilst certain aspects 
of the samples are thus matched, the control sample remains negative for the particular 
disease under study, according to hospital laboratory tests; the details of which accompany 
the samples provided to the trainers. 
 
Whilst dogs are inherently inquisitive of the odours that comprise their environment, the 
process of becoming a bio-detection dog—capable of reliably alerting to the presence of a 
particular combination of VOCs at very low sample concentration thresholds28—takes 
several months of dedicated training focused on their bodies and, in particular, their noses. 
Training dogs to indicate to the odour of human disease means training them to respond 
in specific ways to gradually subtler differences in odour. This practice can be considered 
a kind of ‘bodywork’ (Wolkowitz 2006; Twigg et al. 2011) performed in the human–dog-
training encounter, whereby bodywork is understood as ‘work that focuses directly on the 
bodies of others: assessing, diagnosing, handling, treating, manipulating and monitoring 
bodies, that thus become the object of the worker's labour’ (Twigg et al. 2011, 171). To 
provide an illustration of the bio-detection dog-training process, I turn to my field notes: 
 
I have only been in the field at MDD for two weeks and I am excited to be inside the 
training room to observe new recruit Meg’s first training session. Whilst I have already 
observed several training sessions with dogs that are more advanced in their training, this 
is the first time I will be watching a dog from the very beginning stages. Neil walks over 
to the door that opens to the office, opens it and calls out ‘Meg’. I watch through the 
window—between the training room and office—as Meg, a yellow Labrador pushes past 
                                                 
28 The concentration of the specific odours these dogs are being trained to detect is as low 
as parts per trillion. To put this into context, Horowitz (2010, 72) explains: ‘We might 
notice if our coffee’s been sweetened with a teaspoon of sugar; a dog can detect a teaspoon 
of sugar in a million gallons of water: two Olympic-sized pools full’. 
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the motley crew of dogs huddled at the door, eventually making her way into the training 
room through the door held ajar by Neil. With her nose low to the ground, Meg explores 
the room. Noticing her sniffing this new environment, Neil exclaims, “Good girly!” From 
the workbench, Neil picks up a plastic pot—the kind you might use to give a urine sample 
to your doctor—labelled with a black ‘X’, identifying it as containing a target odour, and 
unscrews the lid, placing it on the side. Inside the pot is a wad of white filter papers. He 
tells me the filter papers have been ‘soaked’ overnight with a ‘training odour’: an odour 
that is now ‘imprinted’ on the filter papers. “What does it smell like?”, I ask him. He holds 
out the pot towards me, offering me the chance to investigate the odour. I hover my nose 
about an inch from the pot and take a sharp inhale through my nostrils. I comment that it 
smells similar to marzipan. He tells me that the smell is ‘man-made’ and thus impossible 
for the dog to encounter anywhere else in the natural environment. This, he explains, is 
why dogs are first trained to search for odour using this artificial training odour. Since 
this will be Meg’s first introduction to this odour, Neil is using a large quantity of soaked 
filter papers in order to produce a strong odour. As Neil explains, by using this large 
volume of odour, he is “reducing the criteria because she is new.” 
While Neil and I have been chatting about the odour, Meg has been checking out 
the room. “Meg, do you want to do some work?”, Neil asks. Neil squats down on the floor 
and holds the pot out in front of him. With his other hand, he holds a clicker that is attached 
to a band around his wrist. His thumb and forefinger grip the clicker, poised ready to 
activate it. As he bends down to the ground—his head now at Meg’s eye level—Meg comes 
over to him. Suddenly, he has become interesting to her. She sniffs around his body and 
then sits and looks at him in the eyes. Neil shakes the pot gently in his hand to draw Meg’s 
attention to it. After a momentary stand-off, Meg moves towards the pot and hovers her 
nose over it for a moment. Neil clicks the clicker in his other hand, causing it to produce 
a quick sharp sound, ‘capturing’ this desired behaviour. Meg looks up into Neil’s eyes 
then follows his hand as he reaches for a piece of kibble from his pouch attached to his 
belt and feeds it to Meg. After she has finished chewing this—in less than two seconds—
Neil throws another piece of kibble a few feet away towards the back of the room to give 
Meg the chance to leave the odour and to come back to begin the same process again. It 
appears to take around five clicks of this behaviour before Meg seems to realize that the 
reward is a consequence of her nose being over the pot. Neil explains that he can gage 
this based on how quickly Meg is now going back to the pot. Whether she has connected 
the reward to the odour itself, or merely to her nose being over the pot, can only be put to 
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the test when a control odour is presented in the same lineup, thus giving Meg a choice. 
Because this environment and kind of work is new to Meg, Neil explains that today he does 
not want to “push her too quickly” through the training stages. He ends the session with 
her by playing with a plush tug toy he pulls out from a cupboard underneath the 
workbench. 
The next day however, I get to see Neil add the next step in to Meg’s training. After 
repeating the above exercise around five times, Neil moves the plastic pot onto the floor. 
He covers it with a stainless-steel container, double the size of a standard coffee mug and 
with a penny-sized hole in the middle of the top. Intrigued by the novel object on the floor, 
Meg walks over to it and sniffs around. When she moves her nose directly over the hole, 
Neil clicks and rewards Meg. He rewards her for repeating this behaviour around five 
more times before placing another steel pot on the floor, approximately two feet apart 
from the original. He leaves this pot ‘blank’. Meg walks over to the novel pot and sniffs it, 
her nose eventually protruding through the hole on the top. She moves her head away from 
the pot and looks up to Neil, whose face remains straight. “Now you’ve got to think about 
it,” he says. Indeed, if she is to succeed as a bio-detection dog, Meg must quickly learn 
that her reward does not come when she is merely sniffing any pot, but when she is sniffing 
the pot containing the ‘target’ odour. In short, by adding in a blank pot, Neil is attempting 
to accentuate, for Meg, the association between target odour and reward. Watching how 
Meg works with the blank pot added to the lineup, Neil can gage the extent to which Meg 
is beginning to understand the logic of the game.  
 
I note that parallels can be drawn between the practices illustrated in the above examples 
taken from my field notes and Latour’s (2004) analysis of a student learning to distinguish 
between subtly contrasting perfume scents. Latour emphasizes the notion of ‘affect’ to 
consider the body of the perfume student as an entity that, guided by a teacher, is 
undergoing ‘training to be affected’: 
 
Through his kit and his ability as a teacher, he has been able to render his 
indifferent pupils attentive to ever more subtle differences in the inner structure of 
the pure chemicals he has managed to assemble. He has not simply moved the 
trainees from inattention to attention, from semi-conscious to conscious appraisal. 
He has taught them to be affected, that is effected by the influence of the chemicals 
which, before the session, bombarded their nostrils to no avail…Before the session, 
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odours rained on the pupils without making them act, without making them speak, 
without rendering them attentive, without arousing them in precise ways: any 
group of odours would have produced the same general undifferentiated effect or 
affect on the pupil. After the session, it is not in vain that odours are different, and 
every atomic interpolation generates differences in the pupil who is slowly 
becoming a ‘nose’, that is someone for whom odours in the world are not producing 
contrasts without in some ways affecting her. The teacher, the kit and the session 
are what allow differences in the odours to make the trainees do something 
different every time instead of eliciting always the same crude behaviour. The kit 
(with all its associated elements) is part and parcel of what it is to have a body, that 
is to benefit from a richer odoriferous world. (Ibid., 207) 
 
Latour’s analysis can be employed to understand the experience that the dogs undergo as 
they progress towards becoming bio-detection dogs. Like the teacher Latour describes, the 
trainers in the case of bio-detection dog-training, also depend on a range of material items 
that can be considered ‘kit’. During the initial stages of the training process a trainer’s kit 
is typically comprised of the training odour, filter papers, plastic pots, stainless-steel pots, 
food rewards and their skill and experience as dog-trainers. As training progresses, this kit 
evolves and new odours and equipment are incorporated. For instance, the training odour 
is replaced with the odour of the human disease the dog is being trained to detect, presented 
in the form of a biological substance such as urine or sweat-imbued gauze swabs. Instead 
of pots on the floor, stands or a carousel are used to present samples.  
Drawing on Mol’s (2000) analysis of atherosclerosis, as an object of scientific 
inquiry that requires ongoing re-enactment through engagement with certain scripts and 
equipment, I propose that these items of the trainer’s kit enable the repetitive re-enactment, 
or performance, of the reality of bio-detection dogs. Thus, following Birke and colleagues’ 
(2004) exploration of the notion of the lab rat as a doing or becoming, bio-detection dogs 
ought to be understood not as a pre-existing category, but as emerging out of the 
encounters between the dog, people and the various associated technologies including the 
trainer’s kit. 
With these kits, the trainers teach the dogs to become affected in particular ways 
in their interactions with the odours, which prior to their training would not have caused 
them to act in such precise ways. As a reward for showing interest in the smell at this early 
stage in the training process, Meg is given food treats—something she is perceived as 
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desiring. Thus, by providing the dog with something she is understood to enjoy, the dog 
comes to understand how ‘she, through her own actions, can have an effect on what 
happens to her’ (Koski and Bäcklund 2017, 21).  
Here, training can be evaluated as successful if the target odour renders the dog 
attentive. Thus, in the same way as students learning the aromas of perfumes are described 
by Latour, the dogs can be understood as gradually learning to ‘have a nose’, or learning 
to ‘be a nose’. Fundamentally, the dogs are becoming beings for whom particular odours  
are affecting. 
 
However, whilst Latour focuses on subtle contrasts of aromas that become available to 
humans through training, the odours that bio-detection dogs like Meg will eventually learn 
to be affected by in their training process—the VOCs emanating from prostate cancer—
are comprised of such low concentration thresholds that they are elusive to the human 
olfactory system.29 Of course, this is why the dogs are required for this work, given their 
more sophisticated olfactory capabilities. Thus, one can observe a significant distinction 
between Latour’s case of the perfume students, in which humans are trained by other 
skilled conspecifics, more or less equally endowed in their olfactory capability, versus the 
case of bio-detection dogs, whereby dogs, as a species unequally endowed with regards to 
their olfactory capabilities, are trained by humans who fundamentally lack the ability to 
themselves be affected by such odours.30 
 
Furthermore, the composition of these odours are largely mysterious to scientists in ways 
that the odours of more conventional dog-training are not (e.g., drugs and explosives). To 
help articulate to me what this means to them and what its implications are for training, 
the trainers would often compare the odour of human disease with the odour of explosives 
                                                 
29 See note 28. 
30 Whilst most humans are unable to match the olfactory capability of the dog, there are 
some examples of rare human ‘super sniffers’. For example, a clinical test proved that Joy 
Milne, a retired nurse from Scotland, is able to identify people with Parkinson’s disease 
from those who do not have the condition by smelling clothing worn by the individuals. 
Milne is now working alongside the medical professionals and scientists who are working 
with Medical Detection Dogs to assess whether dogs can be trained to identify Parkinson’s 




or drugs. For instance, when training dogs to detect explosives, it is possible to train using 
a so-called ‘pure’ odour; in short, an odour that one can be certain of with regards to its 
composition, such as the particular chemicals emanating from explosives. The odour can 
be made gradually more challenging for a dog to find over time, for instance by reducing 
the quantity of the target odour presented to a dog and thereby decreasing its strength. 
Thus, it is possible to keep track of the odour’s consistency. The same is not true when 
training the detection of human disease however, where the precise odour associated with 
a disease is likely subject to variation between individuals. The ‘challenge’ with cancer—
and indeed disease detection training more broadly—reflects a gap of knowledge 
regarding these odours. As put by Claire, during filming for a television interview at the 
charity’s headquarters: 
 
“…we [i.e., the people guiding the training and research] don’t know if the odour 
is there or not, so we have to give the dog the ‘soup’, if you like, and we believe 
the ingredients that will be in that soup are associated with cancer. The only way 
we can do it is to put samples in front of the dog from people we know who have 
cancer against people who are healthy.” 
 
My trainer informants frequently employed analogies such as ‘the soup’ to talk about the 
uncertainties of odour in disease detection. For instance, Neil at MDD explained to me: 
“They [trainers of explosives-detection] can tell the dog what it's looking for, but we're 
telling the dog to find a needle in a haystack without having a needle to show them what 
they're looking for.” The uncertainty of the odour featured frequently in conversation 
among the trainers. During a discussion in MDD’s bio-detection office one day, one of the 
senior trainers, Simon, reflected on some of the mysteries associated with this particular 
field of training and research:  
 
“We don’t actually know what the dogs are responding to. Is it something that 
cancer produces? If it is something that cancer produces is it from the organ, is it 
from the cell, is it from the damage it does, or is it from the body’s response? 
They’re the things that we’re trying to work out.” 
 
Thus, in the specific context of bio-detection training, these dog-trainers-come-
researchers must navigate an ambiguity with regards to the odour.  
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Whilst the specific practices of training introduced in this section are fundamental to this 
thesis and discussed throughout in greater detail, before delving into further analysis of 
the training, I propose that it is important to preface the forthcoming chapters with a 
recognition of the multiple social worlds within which these dogs are embedded. This will 
help to offer a richer understanding of this work and the dogs. In addition to the above-
mentioned groups of people—trainers, patients and the scientific community—bio-
detection dogs are entangled with the lives of another social group: volunteers. It is the 
relationships between bio-detection dogs and volunteers, specifically fosterers and interns, 
that are explored in the following section. 
 
iv. Beyond the Nose: Kinship and Companionship with Bio-Detection Dogs 
 
“What they [the dogs] bring is so much more than the nose.” (Cynthia Otto, 
Executive Director of PVWDC) 
  
Although it is possible to situate the practice of using dogs to detect human disease within 
a broader social and medical landscape, in which the potential of animals to support human 
health in innovative ways is being increasingly recognized and utilized31, it is important 
to understand that the work of bio-detection dogs is distinct in several significant ways 
from the labour performed by dogs enrolled to support human health in various other ways. 
This is the case even when human odour remains central to the dog’s work. Notably, in 
contrast to ‘medical alert’ assistance dogs, who are trained to help individuals to manage 
their medical conditions, such as diabetes, bio-detection dogs are not trained to detect 
odour emanating directly from human bodies. Instead, I have illustrated that bio-detection 
dogs search for the odour of disease via biological samples, such as urine, that are 
presented in sterile containers. The ‘positive’ samples used to train and test bio-detection 
dogs are donated by patients with a confirmed diagnosis of the particular disease in 
question, while control samples are donated by ‘healthy’ individuals.32  
                                                 
31 For instance, the rise of pets as therapeutic adjuncts (e.g., Wells 2009), or the 
reintroduction of maggots into hospitals to clean patient’s wounds. 
32 In addition to human biological substances, I also observed bio-detection dogs being 
trained to detect the odour markers of laboratory-grown bacteria cultures. 
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Furthermore, medical alert assistance dogs are paired with one individual for the 
course of a dog’s lifetime and trained to alert that person to changes in their bodily odour 
that could indicate an imminent danger to the person’s health33, whereas bio-detection 
dogs work under controlled conditions, investigate samples from hundreds or thousands 
of individuals and never come into direct contact with those people. Moreover, in contrast 
to assistance dogs more broadly (e.g., guide dogs for blind people and hearing dogs for 
deaf people), who are partnered to support individuals twenty-four hours a day, bio-
detection dogs follow a balance of work and home life that resembles more closely the 
daily structure of the humans with whom they work alongside. At both organisations 
where the fieldwork informing this thesis was conducted the dogs come to ‘work’ or 
‘school’—both terms were used interchangeably by informants at both field sites—during 
the daytime between Monday and Friday.34 Each bio-detection dog lives within the home 
of a ‘foster parent/family’, whose role involves transporting the dog to and from the 
organisations’ respective facilities each day. 
 
Fosterers 
A car pulls up outside the office and the driver, a woman who I guess to be in her fifties, 
lifts the boot door. She grasps the end of a lead with one hand, as Dougie, a black 
Labrador, attached by his collar to the other end of the lead jumps out. Dougie rushes 
over to the door of the office, the lady doing her best to keep up with him. Striding through 
the door, he wags his tail and greets the other dogs with sniffs of their bodies. Tails wag 
and paws dance as Dougie and Maddie greet one another. I am the only person in the 
office whilst the trainers are busy walking dogs. Dougie’s human companion, Sue, asks if 
it would be possible for Dougie to miss a day of work soon, as she has a family trip planned 
to the beach and she would love to take him with her, since last time he joined them at the 
beach she tells me Dougie had “such fun.” I promise to ask Alexa, Dougie’s trainer, and 
get back to her. Sue, I instantly realize, is Dougie’s fosterer, caring for Dougie in her 
family home in the evenings and weekends when Dougie is not here at ‘work’.  
                                                 
33 Academic research that has explored the work of medical assistance dogs from a social 
science perspective include Fenella Eason’s (2017) unpublished doctoral thesis and 
Avigdor Edminster’s work (2011a; 2011b). 
34 Typically, the dogs are on site between 8.30am–5.00pm at MDD and 8.00am–6.00pm 
at PVWDC. 
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Shortly after Sue leaves, I see Alexa and mention Sue’s request. Alexa says it will 
be fine for Dougie to take a day off, as the testing phase for his assigned project 
(Parkinson’s disease detection) is many months away and at the moment he is receiving 
‘maintenance training’ to keep his nose and brain engaged. She tells me that as Dougie is 
currently on-site three days a week for training and progressing well, missing just one day 
will not hamper his progress. In fact, she suggests that a short break away “might even 
do him some good.” 
 
Dropping the dogs off in the morning and collecting them in the evening is an activity that 
both organisations liken to the ‘school run’. Such an analogy clearly implies notions of the 
dog as a substitute child: a theme returned to at the end of this section. At PVWDC, dogs 
have individually assigned indoor kennels in which they are housed during the day when 
not participating in training, exercise, grooming or toileting activities. When fosterers drop 
‘their’ dog off each day, they first weigh the dog on a set of scales just inside the door to 
the kennel area, noting the dog’s weight on a chart fixed to the wall above the scales. Then 
they open the door to their dog’s particular kennel, removing his or her leash and placing 
it in a basket attached to the kennel’s exterior. Whenever a dog is escorted to or from his 
kennel, barking can usually be heard from at least one other dog. Sometimes, after leaving 
their dog in his kennel, fosterers will stop and greet other dogs through the kennel bars, 
but often they simply drop their dog off and leave. 
At MDD however, the dogs are not housed in kennels but kept together in the bio-
detection office during the day, largely free to roam between the various beds scattered 
around the room. Such a set-up promotes social interactions between the dogs and the 
establishment of canine social relations. Dog play is monitored by the trainers who step in 
when dogs are getting too ‘hyped up’ or noisy in their play. Child safety gates are 
employed to divide the office space and manage the flow of dogs, with particular dogs 
grouped together according to which dogs are known to get on best with each other. This 
particular arrangement also presents fosterers with opportunities for interacting with other 
dogs besides the one they foster. Some fosterers develop particular greeting rituals with 
the dogs who they gradually come to know by name. For instance, one morning at around 
9am, towards the end of the daily drop-off period, Liz arrived with Sammy, a black 
Labrador, at the end of a leash. A woman in her seventies, Liz opened the door to the office 
and unclipped Sammy’s leash from his collar, hanging it up on the hooks by the door. All 
of the dogs present in the main part of the office got up from where they had been lying 
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down and made their way towards Liz. Most sat down in front of Liz, though she had to 
prompt a few of them to do so, before putting her hand into her pocket and pulling out 
some kibble treats. One by one, she uttered the name of each dog as she fed a treat to each 
of them. As she handed out the treats, Liz remarked, “I can feel Sammy’s eyeballs popping 
out his head when I give other dogs treats.” Once all the dogs had received a treat, Maddie, 
a small cocker spaniel, raised her front paws up on to Liz’s thighs. Liz rubbed her hands 
over Maddie’s ears and sides, as she said, “Oh Maddie, just a quick cuddle then.” I 
observed this same routine between Liz and the dogs happen many more times during my 
time at MDD. 
Fosterers undergo training sessions with the organisations to ensure their ability to 
care for one of the dogs and maintain consistency in the dog’s training at home. For 
instance, fosterers are obliged to adhere to their respective organisation’s particular set of 
commands used to communicate with the dogs. Officially ‘owned’ by the organisations, 
the costs associated with these dogs’ care (i.e., food, veterinary expenses, beds, crates, 
toys) are covered by these institutions. For many fosterers of bio-detection dogs (and also 
fosterers of detection dogs of drugs and explosives at PVWDC), the potentially life-saving 
nature of their dog’s ‘job’ gives them a great sense of pride. For instance, on the first day 
of double-blind testing35 for a proof-of-principle study focused on the detection of a 
particular bacterium, working through all the samples took longer than anticipated and one 
of the dogs involved in the project, Ziggy, still had several runs to complete before his 
testing was finished for the day. Lisa, Ziggy’s ‘mum’, arrived to collect him at 5pm and 
was told by his trainer that he would be needed for another thirty minutes. The trainer 
offered to arrange for Ziggy to be dropped home later by a member of staff, but Lisa replied 
that she was happy to wait for him, adding, “This is really important work. I don’t mind at 
all.” 
Instilled with a sense of importance about the kind of work these dogs do, fosterers 
often expressed a heightened feeling of responsibility for these dogs’ health and safety, in 
comparison with that towards their own pet dogs: a pressure that arguably stems from the 
recognition of the societal value of these dogs and an understanding that these dogs do not 
fully ‘belong’ to them. “I know to the core that this is not my dog,” were the words of 
Julie, a senior member of PVWDC’s administration, and fosterer to Zach, a dog in training 
                                                 
35 In double-blind conditions, nobody present (i.e., neither the dog-trainers nor any 
collaborating researchers) knows which samples are which.  
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to specialize in drugs detection. Julie and I chatted in the office she shares with the center’s 
Training Director and Training Manager, overlooking the center’s main training room 
through windows in the wall that divides the two rooms. Prompted by my questions, she 
mulled over the differences between how she perceives of and treats her family’s pet dog, 
Katy, versus the way in which she thinks about Zach. Some of the differences are explicit 
in Julie’s everyday routine that she talked me through. For instance, she told me that Zach 
always “rides in a crate” in the car, while Katy does not. In addition, Julie also explained 
the state of hypervigilance she often feels herself in when at home with Zach, telling me a 
story about Zach getting hold of and consuming a piece of garbage as her husband put the 
trash bag out: 
 
“As he [Julie’s husband] walked by a bush, it ripped open the trash bag, this thing 
came out that had all of this congealed, greasy stuff from something that we had 
cooked and that I had drained out and let solidify. Zach went right in and he ate it. 
So, it’s like, if that were Katy, I’d be like ‘ugh that’s gross’, but I’m like ‘I have to 
report this’. So I call Cindy and I’m like, ‘Cindy, hypothetically speaking, if Zach 
did this do I make him throw up or do I just deal with the incredible diarrhoea I’m 
sure he’s gonna have?’ And so he ate some toast and he actually didn’t have bad 
diarrhoea. But I wouldn’t do that for Katy. I feel like I report everything. It could 
be the tiniest thing but everything matters with these dogs.” 
 
This sense of care felt towards these dogs, as beings whose skills and labour are prized, is 
also implicit in more mundane practices. For instance, often during drop-off and pick-up, 
fosterers ask the staff how their dog has done in training during the day and enquire as to 
whether there is anything additional they could be doing at home with the dog in order to 
help them improve in certain areas. Most often, the dog and fosterer would be sent home 
without additional instruction for ‘homework’, marking a distinction between their work 
and home life.  
At the same time, however, the trainers maintain an interest in the dogs’ home lives 
and use this information to build a more complete understanding of a dog’s personal 
biography. For example, one day in the sample preparation area at MDD, Simon was 
chatting to Carla, a volunteer who comes in for a few hours once every week or two to 
‘break down’ the urine samples for the prostate cancer training. Using pipettes, Carla 
meticulously divides each sample donated to the charity into 1 milliliter quantities, stored 
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in glass vials. Carla is also a fosterer for the charity and her foster dog, eight-month old 
Labrador Charlie, who she has looked after since he was a ten-week old puppy, recently 
passed an initial assessment with the bio-detection team. He has since been coming in for 
training sessions several days per week. Having worked with Charlie earlier in the day, 
and been impressed by Charlie’s growing confidence, Simon asks Carla whether she has 
been doing any new activities at home with Charlie: “Have you been doing anything 
different since he came in for initial assessment?” Carla says she’s been playing a few 
more search games with Charlie in the garden, hiding a ball for him to find. She also says 
that when she watched Charlie during his assessment—which took place while she was 
doing her voluntary work, meaning she could catch glimpses of the session—she noticed 
that he seemed a bit fearful of the cardboard boxes. Cardboard boxes are often used by 
trainers as part of their assessment of potential bio-detection dogs, with kibble hidden 
underneath the boxes to help assess the dog’s willingness to search. Carla explained that 
she saw how Charlie appeared unsure of what to do with them, so she has started hiding 
food for him in boxes at home. Simon tells her that Charlie has worked really well today 
and Ed agrees, saying that he looks like a different dog from his initial assessment. The 
conversation ends with Simon telling Carla to keep doing what she has been doing. 
  
When dogs become older, usually around eight years old, or if they suffer ill-health, they 
are ‘retired’ from their roles and live out the rest of their lives as pets, often within the 
same family that has fostered them throughout their ‘career’. During my stint in the field, 
Sammy was retired due to a medical problem related to a disc in his back. While his 
medical care for this issue continued to be overseen by the charity, Liz was only too 
pleased to care for him full time within her home. One of the trainers told me how great 
he thought it was that Sammy was going to live with Liz permanently, explaining that a 
few years earlier, Liz’s husband had passed away. In discussion with other trainers, they 
all agreed that having Sammy enter Liz’s life when her world had been essentially thrown 
into chaos had given Liz a great sense of focus and joy.  
 
Given the deep bonds, care and responsibility that characterise the relationships with the 
dogs as experienced by fosterers, the trainers regularly frame these relations in kinship 
terms, often referring to the fosterers as a dog’s ‘mum’ or ‘dad’. The analogy drawn 
between pets and children has a long history, beginning in Britain at the end of the 
seventeenth century (Thomas 1984, 117–19) and in the United States in the eighteenth and 
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nineteenth centuries (Grier 2006, 198–9). However, whilst acts of care incorporate bio-
detection dogs into families as dependents, my observations lead me to conclude, 
following Charles (2016) that dogs are not necessarily regarded as surrogate children by 
their human caretakers. Rather, as Charles (Ibid.) proposes for many families, it is arguably 
the case that the dogs are valued precisely because they are dogs.  
 
Interns 
Fosterers comprise a significant proportion of the voluntary workforce at both 
organisations. However, at PVWDC, volunteers are also fundamental to the everyday 
running of the center’s training programme, including practices of training, research and 
care. Working regular shifts each week, the center had an average of thirty volunteers and 
interns during my time in the field. In addition to supporting trainers by handling dogs and 
collecting data, a large portion of the volunteer’s time is spent potty-walking, grooming 
dogs, and guiding dogs through ‘Fit to Work’ exercises.36 Interns work alongside a trainer, 
whose cohort of dogs (usually a group of around six per trainer) they develop an intimate 
knowledge of and close bonds with as a result of the frequent and mundane encounters 
afforded by activities such as grooming.37 Most interns confessed to having ‘favourites’ 
among the dogs and I would often catch sight of the same interns sat inside the kennels of 
particular dogs, with the dog sat on their lap or in front of them, as they stroked and talked 
to the dog. After their internships come to an end, some would occasionally return to visit 
particular dogs who they grew close to. For this unpaid work force, the dogs become 
companions: another aspect of the multiple identities these dogs embody.  
                                                 
36 The ‘Fit to Work’ programme, devised by PVWDC and a mandatory component of all 
their dogs’ training, consists of strengthening and conditioning exercises aimed at 
protecting against injury. The fit to work routine is considered especially pertinent for 
those dogs who will graduate and become operational in fields of detection such as search 
and rescue, where the risk of injury is especially a concern. As one of the PVWDC trainers 
explained to members of the public during another visitor demonstration: “Our working 
dogs are athletes and we wanna make sure, just like human athletes, we stretch and we 
make sure we’re ready to do the job we’re working, we wanna make sure our dogs are 
ready as well”. When the dogs who graduate in careers outside the domain of bio-detection 
are purchased by external organisations, their new handlers are given training in the Fit to 
Work programme. As Sue insisted, “it’s too important and we don’t want it to stop.” 
37 See chapter 5 for an ethnographic vignette of a grooming encounter between an intern 
and a dog. 
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For many interns, working closely with the dogs also had a transformative effect 
with regards to their own lives. One intern in particular, Joe, a reserved but diligent science 
student from a nearby university, stood out in this regard. Throughout my time at the center 
I had watched him grow in confidence as, over time, he was entrusted by trainer Jen to 
handle ‘her’ dogs during training, exercise, and grooming activities. Gradually he became 
less introverted when working with the dogs: for instance, altering the pitch and tone of 
his voice with confidence, to command a dog’s attention. Nevertheless, it was not easy to 
grasp how much Joe really enjoyed this work as he did not give much away. At the end of 
his university cohort’s six-month co-op placement at PVWDC, a pizza party was held at 
lunchtime, as a thank you from the center to the group for their efforts. Sue, the center’s 
Training Manager invited each student to reflect on and share their experiences at the 
center with the rest of the staff and volunteers. When it was Joe’s turn to speak, nobody 
expected him to reveal what he did. He informed that he had made the decision to apply 
for veterinary school, a prospect he had not even considered before spending time working 
with these dogs. 
Later in the week I spoke with Sue, about Joe’s revelation and she recalled her 
reaction, explaining, “My mouth dropped ‘cause he wasn’t the one I suspected who’d been 
impacted by us ‘cause he’s so quiet and just sort of steady as he goes, y’know?” Reflecting 
on how such personal change and growth can occur in this context, Sue emphasized the 
center’s ability to cultivate independence and confidence among its volunteers:  
 
“It [interning or volunteering at PVWDC] absolutely changes people’s lives. I 
think it’s so different of a work environment. I think it could change lives for a lot 
of reasons, not just career. But I think that if you can come in and adapt in here, it 
requires you to really be somewhat independent. Yes, you rely on us telling you 
what to do, but if you’re a wallflower, you will get nothing out of being here. And 
if you can be a little braver, I tell people when I see them, ‘If you don’t ask, if you 
don’t follow people around, if you’re quiet, this isn’t gonna work. You gotta speak 
up, you gotta come out of your shell.’” 
 
Significantly, at PVWDC, interns and volunteers do not merely watch the training 
sessions from the sidelines: gradually, they are offered the chance to handle dogs 
themselves. From the insights emerging from my observations as well as my personal 
experiences, as a researcher-come-volunteer, of handling bio-detection dogs in training, I 
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would suggest that the personal transformative potential of this work is also connected to 
one’s own sense of agency that is routinely re-confirmed in the flow of human–dog 
interactions. These interactions can range from the mundane to the extraordinary: from 
teaching a young dog to sit on command, to handling a dog as he successfully detects the 
odour of prostate cancer. In emphasizing the role that a recognition of one’s agency plays 
in affecting transformation among volunteers who learn to handle the dogs, I draw on Olga 
Solomon’s (2010) study of the role of dogs in mediating the social engagement of children 
with autism, to propose that the detection-dogs in training, as communicative partners, 
give the people working with them a sense of ‘aliveness’ (Ibid., 147) that is reflected in 
the dog’s actions. 
During an interview with me, PVWDC founder, Cynthia, contemplated this life-
altering capability that resides in encounters with the center’s dogs:  
 
“The dogs unlock some of the human capacity, I mean, I’ve seen people come here 
and it totally change their world. It’s really powerful. It’s really important what the 
dogs can do and working with the dogs can do to give people a new sense of 
meaning and direction and maturity…they know what they’re doing has such an 
impact. It’s a meaningful thing.” 
 
In this section, I have demonstrated that the relationships between volunteers and dogs 
involves practices of care and assumptions of responsibility that can promote relationships 
perceived in terms of kinship and companionship. Furthermore, I have argued that the 
transformative potential of bio-detection dogs extends beyond the lives of the unwitting 
cancer sufferers who have been alerted to their disease by their dog—whose stories are 
retold by those seeking to refine this practice—and indeed the future patients whose lives 
might be saved due to enhanced diagnostic technologies. In various ways and at different 




As a whole, through introducing the reader to the practice of training bio-detection dogs, 
this chapter has highlighted how the labour of bio-detection dogs and the particularities of 
the odour they are tasked to detect, sets them apart from that of other kinds of assistance 
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or detection dogs. Although the principles guiding their work overlap with the labour of 
detection dogs in the more familiar specialties of explosives or drugs detection, as well as 
assistance dogs trained to detect the odour of low blood sugar levels in persons with 
diabetes, in several significant ways the domain of bio-detection is distinct. Firstly, these 
dogs detect odour in controlled settings for short periods of time each day, living akin to 
pet dogs during evenings and weekends, and secondly, the odour they are trained to detect 
is surrounded by greater ambiguity than the majority of more conventional odours dogs 
are employed to detect.  
This chapter has also introduced several of the multiple and overlapping ways in 
which the dogs are understood, treated and represented by the various social groups with 
whom the dogs’ lives are embedded. These representations include life-saver, statistical 
unit, worker, pet, kin and companion, and will be further teased out throughout the 
subsequent chapters, becoming a focus of analysis later in the thesis. 
With the broader context of the practice of bio-detection dogs made familiar in this 
chapter, the ethnography proper begins in the next chapter which focuses on the shape of 
connectedness that is cultivated between humans and dogs in the specific training practices 
employed within my field sites. 
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Chapter 4. Cultivating ‘a Dialogue Not a Monologue’ in Bio-Detection Dog-
Training 
 
In this chapter, I examine the shape of human–dog connectedness in the context of training. 
After outlining the pedagogical approach adopted by my trainer informants, I examine 
how the dogs and humans are simultaneously engaged in affective relations that must be 
carefully cultivated in order to produce proficient bio-detection dogs, skilled handlers and 
‘good’ data. 
 
i. From Servants to Partners: A Paradigm Shift in Dog-Training Pedagogy 
In the main training room of PVWDC, a group of high-school students on a morning tour 
of the center watch as an intern guides a German Shepherd through his ‘Fit to Work’ 
exercises.38 The intern can be heard regularly praising the dog and seen feeding him kibble 
treats as he moves his body into bows and frog-like positions. Meanwhile, Sue, the 
Training Manager, gives the visiting students some information about the methods they 
use to train the dogs here, distinguishing their practices from earlier approaches to dog-
training: 
 
“In early dog-training, if you go back and look at some way old dog books, you’ll 
see that we [dog-trainers] used a lot more of what’s called ‘compulsion’, where we 
used choke chains and more force training dogs. And you really couldn’t do a lot 
with little puppies ‘cause you could shut a puppy down. You could break a puppy. 
But because we use positive reinforcement we can get very young dogs to do lots 
of great behaviours. And so, it’s all about building their confidence.” 
 
Across the world, and throughout history, there exist multiple, varied approaches towards 
training dogs. The specific methods adopted are intimately tied to perceptions of the dog, 
and both shape, and are shaped by, particular imaginations of human–dog relationships. 
While concepts of how to treat and teach dogs can be traced back to antiquity (Pregowski 
2015), the boom of contemporary dog-training began just over one century ago, led by 
Prussian police colonel Konrad Most (1910). Most’s approach to training illustrates his 
understanding of the principles of operant conditioning that were not popularized by 
                                                 
38 See note 36 for an outline of the Fit to Work programme. 
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Burrhus Skinner until almost thirty years later (discussed in greater detail below). The 
techniques Most advocated emphasized forcing obedience on dogs using corrections and 
punishment (e.g., sharp tugs on the choke collar). Such methods reflected his conception 
of the relationship between humans and dogs as one of master-servant. Throughout the 
twentieth century, discipline and dominance continued to characterize popular training 
methods.39 Whilst approaches that moved away from compulsion and submission were 
evolving at the same time40, these struggled to achieve significant popularity, especially 
following the end of the second World War as soldiers returned home equipped with the 
training methods developed by Most.  
This ostensibly human-centered approach to training has its roots in a now outdated 
assumption that the dog, perceived as a ‘wolf within the home’, must learn to obey his 
human master who is the pack leader. However, recent scientific research has debunked 
assumed ideas about the behavioural similarities between dogs and wolves, instead 
indicating fundamental differences between the species Canis familiaris (the domestic 
dog) and Canis lupus (the gray wolf) (e.g., Coppinger & Coppinger 2001; Miklosi 2007). 
Since the 1980s, scientific research in ethology and psychology has increasingly 
informed methods of dog-training, and the field has become progressively 
professionalized. For instance, today dog-training is largely dominated by individuals with 
scientific backgrounds, including Karen Pryor (behavioural biologist), Dr. Patricia 
McConnell (ethologist) and Dr. Roger Mugford (animal psychologist). Abandoning 
‘traditional’ human-centered methods that consider the dog as subordinate and rely on 
force and compulsion, this new era of dog-training is characterized by its emphasis on 
‘positive training’ through the reinforcement of desired behaviour using rewards that are 
considered desirable to the dog.41 Accompanying this pedagogical shift, has been a 
                                                 
39 For instance, see William Koehler’s (1962) manual, The Koehler Method of Dog-
Training, supposed by Gail Fisher (2009, 8) to be ‘the all-time best-selling dog-training 
manual’ in the United States. 
40 For instance, in the 1940s, Keller Breland, a graduate student of Skinner, pioneered the 
use of the clicker as a sound to mark the desired behaviour and bridge the time between 
the behaviour and the delivery of the reward, or reinforcement (Fisher 2009, 8). 
41 Notably, these changes in attitudes and thinking around approaches to dog-training 
resemble broader societal shifts in attitudes towards education and the treatment of 
children and persons with disabilities across western societies. In these contexts, physical 
punishment has increasingly been recognized as ineffective and cruel and is reflected in 
UK law, with corporal punishment against children outlawed in 1986 in British state 
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renegotiation of the role the dog is able to play in the training process, with training 
becoming more dog-centered (Koski and Bäcklund 2017, 14). 
 
In both of the dog-training pedagogies that I have outlined—the human–centered approach 
emphasizing punishment for unwanted behaviours, and the dog-centered, or reward-based, 
‘positive’ approach that prioritizes the positive reinforcement of desired behaviours—
Skinner’s (1938) behaviorist theory of ‘operant conditioning’ is fundamental. Briefly 
summarized, operant conditioning focuses on the consequences of a behaviour. Skinner 
notes that the consequences of a behaviour can be either punishment or reinforcement. 
Punishment is any consequence which reduces behaviour, whilst reinforcement is any 
consequence which increases behaviour. For each of these consequences, there exist two 
distinct categories: positive, whereby a consequence is added to the dog’s environment; 
and negative whereby a consequence is removed. Thus, there are a total of four quadrants 
of operant conditioning: positive reinforcement, negative reinforcement, positive 
punishment and negative punishment. Notably, the use of ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ refers 
to the mathematical definition, rather than value-judgments. The four quadrants of operant 
conditioning are summarized in a table (Figure 3) which featured on a handout I was given 
during my induction as an intern at PVWDC. 
                                                 
schools. The ban took longer to come into force in private schools, but by 2003 it was 
enforced throughout Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. Punishment was replaced with 
behavioural procedures focused on reinforcement. 
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Figure 3. ‘Learning Theory’ © 2014 Lili Chin, licensed under Creative Commons. 
This diagram that featured in my enrollment literature as an intern at PVWDC explains 
the four quadrants of operant conditioning. 
 
Consistent with the current trend for ‘positive training’, the dominant category or quadrant 
I observed among my informants in both organisations, and which I was taught to adhere 
to myself whilst handling dogs, was positive reinforcement. An emphasis on positive 
reinforcement confers certain obligations of ‘response-ability’ (Haraway 2008) on both 
partners (human and dog) of the training relationship. Following Haraway (Ibid.), 
‘response-ability’ refers simply to the ability to sense and respond to the needs of another: 
an essential sensibility for interspecies cohabiting. In this context, response-able relations 
are also essential to the production of a proficient detection dog–trainer dyad: comprised 
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of a dog who makes ‘good’ choices and a trainer who is able to read and communicate 
with the dog. 
‘Positive training’, or training that places an emphasis on positive reinforcement, 
is an approach that is characteristically ‘all about rewards’ (Pregowski 2015, 530). 
Rewards come in various forms, including edible titbits, verbal praise, toys, play, and 
physical touch (i.e., patting and stroking).42 As the dog performs a desirable behaviour, 
the trainer immediately ‘marks’ this behaviour as correct by generating a sound produced 
by a ‘clicker’: a small, hand-held tool activated by pressing one’s thumb down on the 
device to produce a short, sharp, repeatable sound. The sound is then followed by the 
provision of a reward. Thus, in the context of detection training, clicks and rewards are 
given following a dog’s indication of a positive sample, or an ‘all-clear’ response to a 
blank lineup.43 
It is notable that food, toys and affection (in the form of verbal praise and touch) 
are not restricted to training encounters, but are provided to dogs at other times throughout 
the day. Each dog is given the same portion of food per day—calculated in relation to his 
age and weight—regardless of whether he receives additional food as treats during work. 
Toys are played with during other times of the day too, both at work and at home. 
Furthermore, dog-directed speech and touch are frequently observed among the trainers 
and volunteers. Thus, it is not the case that these dogs are required to ‘earn’ fundamental 
resources that are otherwise withheld. Instead, conceptualizing their odour-detection 
                                                 
42 The type of reward used differs depending on the training activity. Typically, food (e.g., 
kibble, hot dog pieces, chunks of cheese) is used as a reward in bio-detection tasks, 
whereas toys are more commonly used when training to find missing people, explosives, 
or drugs. In the task of disease detection, dogs tend to be required to repeat the same task 
many times during one session, thus making multiple ‘finds’ throughout a single training 
period. Therefore, there is a need for the dog to remain focused after each find. The way 
toy rewards are given to dogs encourage excitement and play, therefore making this kind 
of reward unsuitable for bio-detection tasks. However, marking the end of a bio-detection 
training session, toys (and the associated play) are often used to reward dogs.  
43 Dogs at MDD are trained to clear lineups that contain no positive sample: referred to as 
a ‘blank’. Whereas, detection dogs in more traditional areas (e.g., police and military 
search dogs) tend to only get rewarded for making a find, MDD train dogs using what they 
call a ‘balanced reward system’. In this system, dogs are rewarded both for making 
indications at positive odour samples and also for giving an ‘all clear’ indication after 
searching a lineup of control samples. This is believed to reduce false positive bias, or 
instance of dogs indicating at control samples. 
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activities as a kind of labour, the rewards they receive might be better conceptualized as 
‘bonuses’. 
 
Despite its predominance however, positive reinforcement is not the only type of operant 
conditioning employed in my field sites. This is consistent with the trend of ‘positive 
training’ which, while far from homogenously practiced, typically combines positive 
reinforcement and negative punishment, with an active eschewal of the other two 
quadrants.  
Among my informants, negative punishment is most often used in conjunction with 
positive reinforcement as in the case of teaching ‘polite’ loose-leash walking. In this 
training task, the goal is for the dog to walk alongside the human without pulling on the 
leash that is attached, at one end, to the dog’s collar and held onto at the other by the 
handler. For example, when Jen, a trainer at PVWDC, taught me how to walk dogs in line 
with PVWDC protocol, she demonstrated with Jackson, a four-month-old German 
Shepherd puppy, to show me what I ought to do if Jackson pulls. I joined her for a potty-
walk with Jackson, around the campus on which PVWDC is located. The campus, located 
across the river from the city and adjacent to a waste management station, consists 
primarily of several dilapidated buildings and a bus parking lot: a rather grey and 
uninspiring site in my estimation. Nevertheless, the site provides plenty of interesting 
distractions for a young dog: moving cars and buses, birds flying low, pieces of rubbish 
blowing in the wind, people walking, stray cats, and other dogs.  
As I walked with Jen and Jackson, I observed how each time Jackson pulled on the 
leash, Jen stopped walking and stood still, waiting until Jackson stopped pulling and for 
the slack in the leash to re-emerge. Only when the leash loosened, would she begin walking 
again. In this instance of ‘negative punishment’, walking temporarily ceases (‘negative’), 
Jackson is temporarily prevented from getting what he wants (moving forward) and the 
likelihood of him pulling on the leash (i.e., repeating the undesired behaviour) is reduced 
(‘punishment’). When Jackson is walking ‘politely’ on a loose-leash alongside Jen, she 
offers him verbal praise such as “Good boy!”, “Nice!” and “Yes!” and rewards him with 
small pieces of kibble (positive reinforcement) taken from the treat pouch attached to her 
waist.  
Significantly, I did not observe the use of physical corrections or force that would 
constitute the quadrant of positive punishment (or, by association, negative reinforcement) 
at either site. Thus, in their methods, these organisations explicitly follow the current trend 
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towards positive training that advocates positive reinforcement as the most prized category 
of operant conditioning and steers clear of compulsion techniques.  
 
The abandonment of traditional approaches to dog-training in the move towards heavily 
reward-based training, and the more recent ideological shifts that have altered the 
definition of the human–dog relationship are changes that have been personally 
experienced by several of the older trainers at both MDD and PVWDC. Earlier in their 
dog-training careers with other organisations, and in keeping with the training styles 
advocated by these former workplaces, several of the trainers employed human-centered 
training methods comprised of force and compulsion. Articulating why they used these 
methods that are at such odds with their current training styles that I observed them 
practice, trainers frequently told me that ‘it was just how things were done back then’. For 
example, I spoke to Ed, a trainer at MDD, about his previous workplace, an explosives 
detection business where, as he told me, “Checking leads44, checking collars, and yelling” 
were all commonplace. Ed explained why he had adopted these particular methods at the 
beginning of his dog-training career:  
 
“Going in green [i.e., as a novice dog-trainer], when I was working at 
K9Search45…you don’t see anything outside those boundaries. So, going there and 
seeing bits and parts of it, you do naturally start doing whatever people do ‘cause 
it’s the only way you learn. But moving on, you read, you learn to go to 
conferences, you learn other people’s ideas and you realize it’s not the best way to 
do things.” 
 
Learning through observing others, as Ed mentions, is a fundamental aspect of how dog-
trainers build up a large amount of their tacit knowledge with regards to training and 
handling dogs. Cynthia at PVWDC shared similar sentiments about popular training 
methods of the past, reasoning that “people were doing things because that was what they 
learned from somebody else and that was what they thought was the best. But we didn’t 
really know, and so just getting some data behind it was important.” In the accounts of 
both Ed and Cynthia we see how their sense of response-ability, in relation to the dogs, 
                                                 
44 ‘Checking’ a lead refers to applying a sharp yank on the lead. 
45 Pseudonymn used. 
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has been revised in response to the development of knowledge about dog-training methods 
and the dog’s cognitive capabilities46, highlighting response-ability as a learned and 
unstable practice influenced by dominant cultural discourses.  
 
The current trend for ‘positive training’, as practiced by my informants and outlined in this 
section, depends on an understanding of the dog as a sentient individual. This has 
implications for the way the trainers communicate with the dogs, as examined in the 
following sections. 
 
ii. Listening to What the Dog Tells You 
In this section, it will be shown that rather than treat the dogs as passive animals or ‘black 
boxes’, the trainers’ interactions with the dogs are based on an assumption of the dogs as 
beings who can ‘speak’ to them, if they are willing to make themselves available to listen. 
During an interview with Alexa at MDD, in which she reflects on the attributes that that 
she considers comprise a successful dog-trainer in bio-detection, she emphasizes the 
importance of learning to communicate with the dogs in modes that they, as beings without 
verbal language, can understand. Fundamentally, she laments that trainers have to ‘listen’: 
 
“You have to understand why they’re doing what they’re doing and how to harness 
everything that they have. It’s very much working with them to work out what their 
reason or drive is for doing it, to sort of harness that so you can get the best working 
relationship…Even though they can’t speak English, you still have to 
communicate with them. You still have to sit and listen and work out what it is 
they understand and don’t understand. So, if you’re doing positive training you 
have to learn lots of different ways to listen to a dog, so you can learn different 
ways to communicate to them…If you’re not listening to them and you’re not 
talking to each other you would end up resorting to physical methods because 
                                                 
46 A wealth of data about dog-training methods has been gathered over recent decades, 
supposedly revealing the benefits of positive reinforcement (e.g., Hiby et al. 2004; 
Blackwell et al. 2008). This emergent body of research, combined with the continued 
growth in academic research surrounding the cognitive capabilities of dogs (e.g., Hare et 
al. 2012) have been key to the growing popularity of the trend for positive training.  
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you’re not getting anywhere because you’re not listening to what they’re saying. 
If the dog doesn’t understand how to sit it’s because you’ve not taught it to sit.”47 
 
Implicit in Alexa’s account is her desire to understand the individual dog on his own terms, 
as a being who, despite lacking a shared verbal language with humans, is certainly not 
mute nor unable to respond. Her insistence on the verb of ‘listening’, to describe human–
dog communication is intriguing, given that, as she explicitly recognizes herself, dogs do 
not speak in verbal utterances. Reflecting on this linguistic choice, I consider that this 
might highlight the lack of non-humanistic everyday vocabulary available to dog-trainers: 
a reflection of the deeply ingrained divide between human and animal entrenched in 
western culture, which has arguably led to a deficiency of more appropriate modes of 
speaking about our communication with animals.48 However, while dogs do not speak in 
verbal utterances akin to humans, they are highly communicative in nonverbal ways, as 
Alexa clearly acknowledges. Thus, it is possible for trainers to pay attention, or ‘listen’, to 
what a dog has to say, whether a dog is gesturing with his body, or at other times, through 
the sounds a dog produces. Indeed, dogs are not silent. Some examples will help to give a 
sense of how ‘listening’ to the dogs is performed in practice.  
 
Midway through a training session with a young dog at PVWDC, an intern came into the 
room holding a plastic pot and set it aside on some shelving low to the ground, a couple 
of metres away from where the dog and her trainer Tash were working. After a minute, 
the dog walked over to the item and sniffed at it for a few seconds. Watching the dog, Tash 
asked the intern “Is that dirty?” He confirmed that yes, it was contaminated with the 
                                                 
47 Locating the fault of a dog’s misunderstanding with the human, rather than the dog 
illustrates a reoccurring and significant theme in how my trainer informants conceptualize 
dog-training. For them, it is a practice in which the human partner is obliged to adapt their 
communication to the specificity of a particular dog. Rather than conceptualising the dog 
as being unequipped with the linguistic tools of human communication, it is the human 
who is seen as the species lacking and requiring ongoing self-work. 
48 The notion of ‘listening’ to dogs, who do not speak in verbal utterances, mirrors a 
discrepancy of language used by trainers to describe the dog’s smelling behaviour. For 
instance, trainers often refer to the dog as having ‘seen’ the samples, rather than having 
smelt them. I suggest that this is a consequence of the low status of smell in western 
culture, compared to the sight which has been valorized. See chapter 1 for an outline of 
the shifting status of smell in western culture. 
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training odour used to teach puppies the game of scent-detection. Tash clicked her clicker, 
marking the dog’s behaviour, and rewarded the dog for showing interest in the item. “No 
wonder she’s hitting on it,” Tash said, “you’re not wrong girly!”  
 
Furthermore, experienced trainers who spend extensive periods of time with individual 
dogs learn how to read the nuances of their dogs’ body language in order to grasp 
something more about the details of the particular odours:  
 
When working blind, Ed, at MDD, was able to infer with considerable reliability the 
particular characteristics of the control samples presented to Lola. Ed and Lola were 
training for a study to detect a particular bacterium and their positive samples comprised 
laboratory grown bacteria suspended in a broth, while control samples were a 
combination of pure broth and broth with specific antibiotics. Observing how Lola moved 
her body away from the control samples over numerous training sessions, Ed learnt that 
Lola would typically come away from the sample very quickly, turning her body to the 
right, after sniffing a control of pure broth, whereas when the control contained broth plus 
an antibiotic, Lola would turn the other way.  
 
By carefully ‘listening’ to their dogs by affording attention to the nonverbal, these 
examples illustrate how trainers are able to arguably supplement their own olfactory 
capabilities with those of the dog, thus momentarily expanding the corporeal limits of their 
body. In effect, with the dog acting as a ‘mediator between the human and inhuman worlds 
of nature’ (Pemberton 2013, 74), the trainer may come to share aspects of the environment 
that are generally inaccessible to him beyond his engagements with the dog. At the same 
time, in the process of learning to become affected by odour in novel ways, the dog 
engages with new possibilities for shared meaning-making with his trainer. 
 
With individual quirks such as Lola’s, offered in response to the different samples, it is 
imperative that trainers refine their ability to read the bodies of their individual dogs in 
order to correctly interpret the particular dog’s response to each odour sample. Although 
dogs are typically trained to sit in response to their target odour, this ‘alert response’ is 
variable both between dogs and within the individual.   
For instance, during a training session at MDD, Lola offered some ambiguous 
search behaviour that Ed was obliged to make sense of. Lola represents an unusual case at 
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MDD, as she is (at the time of my observations) the only dog trained to search a one-stand 
system. The trainers explained to me that in theory, the one-stand system should elicit one 
of two responses from Lola: either she stays at the stand to indicate a positive sample, or 
she turns and returns to her trainer to indicate a control sample. Having observed Lola 
work and listened to those who routinely handle and observe her, I quickly learnt that Lola 
is known to sometimes raise her paw when interrogating samples, most often when the 
sample is a target, but sometimes also out of supposed frustration after a run of consecutive 
blanks.49 As a result, her behaviour can be rather unclear to the untrained eye and requires 
the skill and experience of her trainer to interpret. To illustrate this, in the following 
example, the vignette begins as Lola is searching a target sample, though her trainer, Ed, 
is unaware of the sample’s contents.  
 
Sniffing the sample, Lola raises her paw to the arm and expresses a high-pitched 
vocalization. She then turns away from the stand and walks back to Ed’s side, behind the 
screen. [As noted above, leaving the sample and returning to the trainer’s side would, in 
theory, be a trained response to a control sample]. Ed comments to Kelly, operating the 
laptop, that he is not confident in making a call of indication or no indication, based on 
Lola’s behaviour, and he elects to send Lola to search the sample again. This pass is 
recorded by Kelly as a ‘hesitation’ and she notes in the comments space on the laptop 
screen that Lola raised her paw before leaving the stand, causing uncertainty for the 
trainer. 
“Seek seek,” Ed calls out, sending Lola to search again. On this pass, Lola raises 
her paw again but then sits, offering her trained alert response. This time, Ed calls out 
“indication,” and is informed by Kelly that this is correct. He clicks his clicker and 
rewards Lola at the stand. Ed and Lola then leave the room whilst I put out a different 
sample on the stand: a control.  
Sample in place, I call out “ready” to Ed. He opens the door and says “come” to 
Lola, who walks into the room and sits at the screen, her starting position, waiting to be 
instructed to search. This time, as she investigates the sample, Lola raises her paw towards 
the stand, begins to bend her legs and move her bottom towards the floor, but before 
committing to a full sit she comes away from the stand and returns to Ed’s side behind the 
screen. Ed calls “clear.” After telling him this is correct, Kelly asks, “How did you know 
                                                 
49 See note 43.  
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not to call [indication] on that?”. Ed replies, “There wasn’t all the huffing and puffing. 
It’s not something I can really explain, it was just different. With some dogs, you just 
know.” 
 
In the first run detailed above, Ed was proven correct in his suspicion that Lola had offered 
an incorrect response to the sample, as on her second pass she correctly indicated that the 
target was there. At MDD, if trainers are not confident in making a call of ‘indication’ or 
‘no interest’, they are permitted to task their dogs to search the lineup again. This example 
illustrates that, as behaving beings, dogs do not always respond in predictable and clear 
ways. Thus, in order for a trainer to make accurate judgments, trainer skill and experience 
in reading dogs, as well as a strong relationship between trainer and dog are necessary 
conditions of this work. Ed displayed his skill as a trainer again on the subsequent run 
presented above (the control sample), where Lola raised her paw in a similar manner to 
the way she had done on the previous target sample. With a working relationship with Lola 
spanning several years, Ed was able to pick up on the fact that in Lola’s subsequent run, 
among other things, she was less noisy than she had been previously.  
Ed’s account of Lola’s behaviour illustrates that although much ‘listening’ is 
focused on a reading of the dog’s body as it is observed, the dogs’ bodies are also listened 
to in the literal sense: with particular attention afforded to the sounds produced by the 
dog’s nose and mouth.50 Given the primacy of the dog’s olfactory capacity in the context 
of bio-detection, these aspects of the dog’s body are afforded special attention due to their 
association with sniffing behaviour. This focus is regularly explicit in the dialogue 
between trainers during training sessions. For instance, “Did you hear that?” referring to a 
dog’s inhalation or exhalation of breath, or, “She just cleared her nose, that’s good.” 
Comments such as this were commonplace in the training spaces.  
For the trainers, the sounds dogs make when searching are not only a functional 
matter, informing their understanding of a dogs’ engagement with his environment. More 
than this, they can also evoke an emotional response in the trainers, highlighting the 
affective dimension of this work. For example, during a presentation about his work that 
he gave to the staff and interns at PVWDC, a visiting arson detection dog handler 
professed, “There’s not a better sound in the world to me than to hear the dog. You can 
                                                 
50 Dogs have a second nose at the back of their throat called the vomeronasal organ, or the 
Jacobson’s organ, mainly used to detect pheromones. 
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hear the [he sniffs in and out, exaggerating the sounds that this produces]. It sounds like 
an old coal train getting ready to take off. You can hear that inhaling, exhaling.” 
The sounds associated with olfaction, combined with their readings of the dogs’ 
bodies, provide the trainers with information about a dog’s search that they are able to 
interpret, highlighting one aspect of the ‘skilled bodily craft’ (Cassidy 2002, 106) that is 
essential to successful dog-training. Referring to the production of racehorses, Rebecca 
Cassidy (Ibid.) proposes the notion of skilled bodily craft to describe the stable staff’s skill 
involved in understanding horse behaviour and in communicating with these animals, 
without which racehorses simply could not be ‘produced’. Furthermore, the dog-trainers’ 
ability to interpret their dogs’ behaviours, despite its occasional ambiguity as in the above 
example of Lola and Ed, highlights their dependence on a tacit mode of knowledge that 
largely defies linguistic representation. Ed’s difficulty verbally articulating quite how he 
knew not to call ‘indication’ on the second run, despite Lola continuing to display some 
hesitant behaviours at the odour sample, resembles the way Cassidy (Ibid.) describes 
skilled bodily craft in the case of horse-riding. In this context, Cassidy notes that riding, 
as a skilled bodily craft, ‘provide[s] a structure for experience in which linguistic 
explanations for action are excluded by the immediacy of physical involvement’ (Ibid.). 
 
Whilst paying attention to the animal’s body to gain a more sophisticated understanding 
of the individual’s experience is increasingly popular in approaches towards training 
animals more broadly, as well as engaging with them in research (Greenhough and Roe 
2011), I argue that this takes on an even greater significance in the particular context of 
human disease detection. This is owing to the enigmatic and assumed inconsistency of the 
odours that are being presented to the dogs. For instance, Simon is explicit in linking the 
trainers’ ambiguity surrounding the odour of human disease, and the requisite as a trainer 
to listen to ‘what the dog is telling you’: 
 
“When we’re talking about odour, we’re always trying to surmise what a dog is 
smelling, what a dog is indicating. And we’re always trying to second guess what 
the next step is for a dog. The only one that can tell us, whether that guess is right, 
is the dog. So if the dog is transitioning through the training, i.e., we introduce it 
to stage one cancers because we think that’s the best way to do it, and the dog is 
completely erratic in its detection, we say ‘Oh well then we can’t be thinking the 
 109 
right thing’. The dog is telling us that stage one isn’t the easiest thing to do…Well 
that is in itself an answer. The dog is telling us that something’s not stable.” 
 
Here, Simon explains how the trainers depend on feedback from the dogs to help 
them understand if they are making reasonable decisions with regards to how to best 
introduce the samples, in order to facilitate a dog’s learning. Specifically, he is referring 
to their need to develop an understanding of whether is it easier for the dog to learn to 
discriminate ‘diseased’ from ‘healthy’ samples by categorizing and presenting them 
according to tumour size, Gleason score, or something else that they have not yet 
considered meaningful. Evolving their knowledge and methods based on what the dogs 
‘tell’ them, the trainers thus express a desire to know what matters most to the dog: the 
species with the superior olfactory capabilities. 
 
This notion outlined above, of listening to ‘what the dog tells you’ in order to gain a better 
understanding of how to present odours that are largely enigmatic and unavailable to 
human perception, was regularly alluded to by my trainer informants at MDD. For 
instance, during a team meeting one afternoon, doctoral researcher and dog-trainer Gemma 
was outlining, to her colleagues, her method for selecting the order in which to present 
particular samples to a dog, in order to help them learn the odour of the particular disease. 
She listed logistical factors, such as: sample availability; biographical issues, including the 
particular dog’s performance in the previous weeks; and the goal of the session, for 
instance, introducing the dog to a new target sample. However, concluding her reflections 
about this process, she echoed Simon’s sentiments, asserting that “The only way you can 
choose samples is by what the dog tells you.” Thus, while various other factors come into 
play, the dog’s perspective is ultimately prioritized here, in part due to the uncertainty that 
surrounds the odour of human disease. Emergent here then is a sense of the agency the 
dogs have in shaping the material reality of this work. 
 
Explicit in this everyday practice of listening and responding to dogs are some of the 
trainers’ perceptions about what separates humans and dogs, as well as their assumptions 
about how the species boundary might be navigated through their practices. While overtly 
recognizing physiological fundamental elements that distinguish the capabilities of each 
species—the differences in olfactory capability and the unequal capacity for verbal 
communication—they simultaneously profess both a desire and ability to harness 
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something of the dog’s perspective through training practices that demand response-able 
relations. As Simon explained: 
 
“They’ve got a far superior capability of olfaction, so why should we say that 
they’re wrong when they know more about what they’re sniffing than what we do? 
So they will tell you, or try to communicate with you. What you’re trying to do is 
empower the dog in a certain way, to say ‘we are as equal’ in this: ‘I am able to 
tell you when you’re right, or when I think you’re right, and you’re able to tell me 
whether I’m thinking right’. Somewhere along the line we’ll come to an agreement 
about it.” 
 
Readily acknowledging the dog’s ‘superior capability of olfaction’ in relation to 
(hu)man, and describing the training process as a means towards developing interspecies 
‘agreement’, Simon’s account presents a challenge to notions of ‘human exceptionalism’ 
(Haraway 2008) that pervade western cultures.  
 
While the work of bio-detection dogs is based on a fundamental separation between the 
capacities of human and dog, the training practices through which such work is achieved 
both supports and obliges the navigation and overcoming of such a separation between the 
species, promoting the development of a specific human–dog connectedness. By listening 
to the dogs and prioritising their experience, the trainers and dogs work together to 
cultivate what Ed described to me as a ‘dialogue, not a monologue’: the phrase he regularly 
used to describe his understanding of best training practice.51 In encounters based on 
interspecies dialogue, it becomes possible for the assumed limits of the human body to be 
expanded, with the dog as a mediator of the olfactory and the human momentarily 
supplementing his olfactory capabilities with those of the dog. 
 
Whilst this section has illustrated how trainers become attuned to the bodies of their dogs, 
in the following discussion I turn to consider how the dogs are simultaneously affected by 
their trainers’ actions and what a recognition of this means for the trainers’ practices. 
                                                 
51 This phrase is borrowed from Susan Friedman, an American psychology professor who 
introduced the application of Applied Behavioural Analysis—a method with roots in 
human learning—to captive and companion animals. 
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iii. Looking and Being Looked At: Affect in Training Encounters 
 
[L]earning how to address the creatures being studied is not the result of scientific 
theoretical understanding, it is the condition of this understanding. (Despret 2004, 
131) 
 
Although the discussion has, until now, focused on how trainers observe the dogs, it is 
also the case that the dogs watch the trainers. Acknowledging this obliges the trainers to 
perform specific acts of bodywork in order to monitor and manage the affective potential 
of their own bodies. Here, I consider how these practices shape a particular human–dog 
connectedness that supports training in this context.  
 
While the role of smell cannot be underestimated, with regards to dogs’ engagement with 
their environment, dogs know and communicate with humans not only through smell and 
touch but also through watching us; in particular, following our gaze and our bodily 
movements (Horowitz 2010). When not working, exercising or napping, the dogs in my 
field sites constantly watch every move of the bodies (human and canine) visible to them. 
At MDD, during training sessions, dogs often watch through the wall of glass that 
separates the training room from the viewing gallery, observing the flow of interactions 




Figure 4. At MDD, bio-detection dogs watch, through a glass wall, as another dog and 
his trainer (to the left, out of shot) participate in a training session using pots on the floor. 
 
The importance of visual cues for dogs’ interaction with the world is supported by a 
growing body of ‘dog cognition’ research that explores dogs’ cognitive and sensory 
abilities, illustrating in particular the significance of eye contact, or ‘looking’, between 
humans and dogs for interspecies communication. Studies have found, for instance, that 
dogs are highly skilled at following visual cues such as human pointing or human gaze 
(Miklosi, et al. 1998).  
With regards to facial recognition, when looking at photographs of human and dog 
faces, dogs can discriminate between faces of familiar or unfamiliar humans and dogs, 
even when only shown a part of the face (Racca, et al. 2010). Furthermore, research 
suggests that dogs can recognize human emotions, telling the difference between happy 
and angry human faces (Müller, et al. 2015). Building on this finding, a more recent study 
(Albuquerque, Guo, Wilkinson et al. 2016) demonstrates that dogs are able to go further 
than simply recognizing facial cues. Pairing images of faces and sounds, the results of this 
study suggest that dogs must form abstract mental representations of positive and negative 
emotional states: in short, they have the capacity for the perception of emotion, in both 
humans and dogs. This is the first time this ability has been recognized in animals beyond 
humans. Indeed, so apt are dogs thought to be at reading humans, Horowitz (2010, 161) 
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describes them as ‘canine anthropologists’ and notes that ‘we are known by our dogs—
probably far better than we know them’. 
Aware of the dog’s dependence on visual cues and their capacity to recognize 
subtle changes in human bodies, in certain situations, the trainers draw on an important 
element of their toolkit: their own bodies. I observed how the trainers routinely adjust their 
own bodies in particular ways to affect the dog who they are training. Affecting each other 
somatically, the human–dog dyad thus overcomes the potential challenges associated with 
the absence of a shared verbal language. The following observation taken from a training 
session at MDD, with Cocker Spaniel Zak, illustrates how physiological cues are, at 
certain times, intentionally offered by trainers, with the goal to shape how a dog moves 
his body, or acts, in certain situations. 
 
Between runs, Zak’s trainer Alexa discusses with her colleague, Ed, the excessive speed 
with which Zak is searching the positions of the carousel. They are both concerned 
because in their experience of training, searching with such speed can reduce detection 
accuracy. Alexa wants Zak to slow himself down and after rewarding him for his 
subsequent successful search, I watch her adjust the movement of her own body to achieve 
this. Making eye contact with Zak, she says, “You need to calm yourself, mister.” The pair 
then walk back across the room towards their starting position. As she walks, Alexa 
exaggerates each step, taking more time to make every small move. This style is quickly 
mirrored by Zak. As they walk side by side in synchrony, she offers him reassuring verbal 
feedback, “Good boy… nice,” delivered in a soft, calm tone that matches the slow pace of 
her movement. 
 
Thus, we see how the dog has learnt to be affected (Latour 2004): affect that, in 
this case, is mediated by the subtleties in the movements of the human body and the dog’s 
aptitude in reading and responding to this human body language. Despret’s (2004) 
understanding of affect, as a dynamic process taking place at the meeting of a diversity of 
bodies, can help to theorize this training encounter and recognize the operation of 
nonhuman agency here. As Despret insists, it is not only human bodies that can be made 
to move and be affected, but also the bodies of the animals themselves that can cause 
human bodies to be affected. In this encounter, Zak, the dog, ‘could make human bodies 
move and be affected’ (Ibid., 113). In Alexa’s desire for Zak to slow down, and in her  
broader aim to help him become a reliable detection dog, she adjusted the movement of 
 114 
her own body to affect Zak. In effect, in this training moment, the bodies of dog and human 
became ‘attuned’ (Despret 2004) to one another. 
 
Aware that dogs ‘look back’ (Haraway 2008, 21), dog-trainers extend a curiosity about the 
dogs, that is not a ubiquitous feature of human–animal relationships, particularly in 
contexts of scientific practice. Especially in a western tradition of philosophical and 
scientific thought, humans have largely failed to extend their curiosity to animals, tending 
instead to think of them as part of the background, as symbols or as raw material for human 
consumption (e.g., Evans-Pritchard 1950; Geertz 1973; Levi-Strauss 1963). For Haraway 
(2008) however, curiosity about the nonhumans with whom we interact is a critical 
component of her ‘companion species’ rubric. 
Haraway (Ibid., 19-27) illustrates the variability of how curiosity figures in 
human–animal relationships and representations of animals, by fruitfully contrasting two 
distinct experiences of human–animal encounter. First, she turns to the philosopher 
Jacques Derrida who, in his 1997 lecture ‘The Animal That Therefore I Am (More to 
Follow)’, describes an encounter between himself, stood naked in his bathroom, and his 
cat. Derrida notices that the cat was looking at him and he raises a question that Haraway 
considers key: that is, ‘not whether the cat could ‘speak’ but whether it is possible to know 
what respond means and how to distinguish a response from a reaction, for human beings 
as well as for anyone else’ (Haraway 2008, 20). However, whilst Derrida clearly 
understands that animals do look back at humans, Haraway criticizes him for falling short 
of a basic obligation of companion species: she writes that ‘he did not become curious 
about what the cat might actually be doing, feeling, thinking, or perhaps making available 
to him in looking back at him that morning’ (Ibid.).  
However, it is also possible to observe alternative modes of experiencing 
researcher–animal relationships, whereby researchers actively ‘make themselves 
available’ (Haraway 2008, 20) to the animals of study. In order to clarify what it might 
look like—and what potential opportunities might become available—when one becomes 
curious about the animals with whom one encounters, Haraway juxtaposes Derrida’s 
account of his encounter with his cat with the work of Smuts (2001), a primatologist who 
has studied baboons in Kenya since the mid-1970s. According to Haraway, and in 
distinction from Derrida, Smuts is someone who ‘did learn to look back, as well as to 
recognize that she was looked at, as a core work-practice for doing her science’ (Ibid., 23). 
Trained in the traditional practices of ‘objective’ science, in which a process of 
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“habituation” of the animals to the presence of the humans has long been considered 
fundamental, Smuts entered the field with the intention to be as neutral as possible. 
However, Smuts quickly called this approach into question as she noticed that the baboons 
did not seem to be impressed by her attempt to render herself invisible. Furthermore, she 
was struck by how frequently they looked at her, with her efforts to ignore their looks only 
seeming to increase their dissatisfaction with her. Smuts was learning the importance, to 
the baboons, of responding to social cues. With this recognition, she altered her behaviour 
in order to respond, to acknowledge, to look back. She explains that in doing so, her own 
being was transformed:  
 
I…in the process of gaining their trust, changed almost everything about me, 
including the way I walked and sat, the way I held my body, and the way I used 
my eyes and voice. I was learning a whole new way of being in the world—the 
way of the baboon…I was responding to the cues the baboons used to indicate their 
emotions, motivations and intentions to one another, and I was gradually learning 
to send such signals back to them. As a result, instead of avoiding me when I got 
too close, they started giving me very deliberate dirty looks, which made me move 
away. This may sound like a small shift, but in fact it signalled a profound change 
from being treated like an object that elicited a unilateral response (avoidable), to 
being recognized as a subject with whom they could communicate. (2001, 295) 
 
To develop a mutual acknowledgment that would permit both herself and the baboons to 
conduct their daily business, Smuts recognized that she had to consider not only what she 
was looking at, but also how the baboons were looking at and responding to her. As 
Haraway (2008, 25) writes, ‘Smuts had to enter into, not shun, a responsive relationship’. 
Smuts’ approach can help us to understand the curiosity that characterizes the relationships 
between trainers and bio-detection dogs. Within my field sites, the trainers constantly look 
at the dogs and acknowledge that the dogs look back at them. This is explicit in some of 
the routine remarks made between trainers during training sessions. For instance, “He’s 
looking to you for help,” Neil commented, referring to a dog who had paused mid-search 
and turned his head to look back to his trainer. Especially during the early stages of a dog’s 
training process, I routinely heard comments along these lines.  
The fact that the trainers acknowledge that dogs look back at them has implications 
for training practices that extend beyond the temporality of the particular training session. 
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For example, midway through a training session with trainer Kelly and Shadow, a Fox 
Red Labrador, Kelly disappeared momentarily into the charity’s operations office, 
adjacent to the bio-detection department. She had gone to ask some of the staff from the 
fundraising team if they were free for ten minutes to come through to the bio-detection 
viewing area and watch Shadow work. Among the trainers, Shadow is known to be 
particularly sensitive to changes in his environment and Kelly knows that during the trial 
phase for the project Shadow is working on, there will be novel people (i.e., external 
collaborators) on site watching the dogs work. Thus, Kelly is keen to get him used to 
searching in front of an audience of people who he is less familiar with. Thus, more than 
merely acknowledge that dogs look at the humans in their environment, the trainers are 
clearly acutely aware that human bodies have potential to affect the bodies of the dogs: for 
instance, altering their disposition and, by association, their detection reliability.  
However, whilst Smuts (2001, 295) explains that she felt obliged to learn ‘a whole 
new way of being in the world’ in order to gain the trust of the baboons, the dog-trainers 
who I spent time with did not reflect on their bodily adjustments in such radical terms. 
When I asked them to reflect on how they communicate with the dogs, they often explained 
it as an ability that comes instinctively to them. For instance, Alexa at MDD told me, “I 
don’t know why, I just clearly understand dog.” 
Some trainers suggested that their childhood experiences might have helped them 
develop the ability to communicate with dogs with ease. As Sue at PVWDC mused during 
an interview, “Some people naturally communicate with dogs, I don’t know if it’s ‘cause 
I’ve grown up with dogs I find it so easy and I find it so effective.” For the trainers and 
dogs in the context of bio-detection, it seems that mutual trust and acknowledgment is 
achieved without explicitly learning a whole new way of being in the world. As the earlier 
example of Alexa and Zak shows, ostensibly instinctive and subtle modes of bodywork 
(Wolkowitz 2006) are often sufficient in providing communicative cues that the dog is 
able to make sense of and to elicit the response desired by the trainer. The relative ease 
with which many humans and dogs make themselves available to each other is arguably, 
at least in part, a consequence of the shared evolutionary history between these species, 
spanning tens of thousands of years.52 Acknowledging this historical perspective helps us 
to understand why working and communicating with dogs might not require such a radical 
                                                 
52 The exact date and location of dog domestication remains a controversial topic among 
scientists. See chapter 1 for an outline of the main theories of dog domestication. 
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process of self-modification, as might be required when a human learns to live alongside 
a group of baboons. 
 
Paying attention, in this analysis, not only to how the dogs respond to the humans in 
training encounters, but also to how the humans respond to the dogs, helps to make clear 
that affect occurs at the interface of bodies (Massumi 2002, 25) and that multiple bodies 
are capable of being affected in a given encounter (Despret 2004). Thus, whilst the humans 
teach the dogs to become affected, it might also be suggested that dogs teach, or train, 
humans to become affected in certain ways. 
It is affective encounters, Despret argues, that come to constitute the beings who 
meet each other. As Haraway (2008, 17) suggests with regards to her concept of 
‘companion species’, ‘The partners do not precede their relating’. Following Haraway, in 
this ongoing practice of ‘becoming with’ (Ibid.), training might be conceptualized not as 
a one-way endeavor in which the human exclusively compels the dog to act in a certain 
way, but as an activity that modifies both members of the training relationship. Despret 
(2003, 122) re-frames this practice of ‘domestication’ with the notion of ‘anthropo-zoo-
genetic practices’ in which humans and dogs mutually constitute their relationships. In this 
process, novel identities and ways to behave are available to both partners. 
Certainly, my interlocutors themselves expressed an understanding of their training 
relationships with the dogs as more mutually negotiated, rather than exclusively human-
dominated, with a recognition that the dogs have the capacity to influence the humans in 
the training process. During an interview in her office, Cynthia described this to me in 
terms of a teacher–student relationship in which both individuals of the dyad adopt each 
of these roles at certain times. She told me that, in addition to learning and gaining skills 
taught by their trainer, part of the dog’s ‘job’ at PVWDC is to “teach us what we’re doing 
wrong or what we could do better.” 
Also challenging an assumption of these human–dog relationships as characterized 
by a unilateral flow of knowledge between beings structured by hierarchical ranks between 
human and animal, Simon reiterated the dog’s superior olfactory capability relative to 
humans: “It’s not even an instructor and a pupil [relationship]. Because if it was a true 
instructor and a pupil then we would know more about what they’re doing and what they 
do. They have more knowledge than us of what they’re doing.” 
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Whilst I have illustrated that relations of collaborative engagement—that promote the 
capacity of bodies to affect each other—are at times desired in the training process, in 
other moments of training, a more detached mode of human–dog relating is necessitated 
in order to manage the effect of human influence, in keeping with good scientific practice. 
 
iv. Monitoring and Managing Engagement in Human–Dog Relations 
Mindful of the dog’s propensity to look and be affected by their trainer’s physiological 
cues, tools are employed by the trainers to momentarily deny dogs the possibility to ‘look 
back’ (Haraway 2008, 21). Particularly key in this regard is the screen inside the training 
room at MDD (Figure 5). Fitted with a tinted window, the screen allows the trainer to 
watch a dog search, whilst simultaneously preventing the dog from seeing his trainer’s 
bodily cues, should he turn and attempt to look to his trainer. The screen is used during 
the more advanced stages of training (i.e., with dogs who are at a stage in which they know 
both the game and their target odour), and always when conducting formal testing trials. 
When the trainer stands behind the screen, the dog is prevented from being able to ‘look 
back’ and thus be affected by the physiological cues of his trainer; even, or indeed 
especially, those that are unconscious. One morning, during a training session, I asked 
Alexa about the use of the screen that Simon was standing behind and watching through, 
as Jess searched the stands. She explained, “They [the senior training staff] don’t want Jess 
to rely on handler feedback. They want her to be confident enough on her own.” Thus, 
implicit in the use of the screen is an assumption about the kinds of dogs they hope to 




Figure 5. The author and Labrador Charlie stood behind the screen at MDD. The screen 
is composed of a tinted Perspex window that enables the trainer to watch the dog search, 
but precludes the dog from being able to see the trainer. 
 
At PVWDC too, in the spaces where bio-detection training occurs, aspects of the materials 
and objects are also oriented towards managing the visibility of certain bodies. As referred 
to in the previous chapter, the room adjacent to the bio-detection training space serves as 
a viewing area fitted with a one-way tinted window. This window enables those spectating 
to see in but not to be seen by the dog working.53 In addition, the video camera directed 
on the training space is linked up to the laptop belonging to Sebastian, the Postdoctoral 
Fellow, enabling him and others present to watch a dog work without their physical 
presence at the carousel.  
In theorizing the use of such tools—the one-way screen, window, and the real-time 
video set-up—one might observe that their function, during a search, is to enable the 
constant observation of the dog whilst simultaneously precluding the dog from seeing his 
                                                 
53 Of course, simply because a dog cannot see a human body watching through the 
window, is not to deny that the dog is likely aware that a human(s) is there. Dogs can smell 
and hear the people in the viewing room and often watch interns and volunteers go into 
this room before their training session formally begins.  
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trainer. With the capacity for visibility between the human and dog thus imbalanced, one 
might be tempted to apply Foucault’s (1975) notion of the ‘unequal gaze’: the constant 
possibility of observation. This concept is grounded largely in Foucault’s analysis of the 
design of the modern prison, known as the ‘Panopticon’, through which he explored the 
relationship between power and visibility. According to Foucault, it is the threat of 
constant surveillance that governs the body, as one can never be fully certain whether or 
not one is being watched.  
However, applying Foucault’s work to consider power relations beyond an 
exclusively human context is problematic due to the significant differences between the 
governance of human subjects and the monitoring and training of dogs in this case. 
Nevertheless, whilst Foucault himself never explicitly addressed human–animal relations, 
his ideas have been applied to consider how relations between humans and animals, 
particularly in an agricultural context, might be theorized as examples of disciplinary 
power (Thierman 2010), pastoral power (Cole 2011), or biopower (Holloway 2007). 
Beyond the spaces of farming, Kirk (2017) considers the challenge that is entailed in 
utilizing Foucault’s concepts to think through the power relationships between humans 
and animals in the context of the laboratory. For Kirk, a fundamental question tied to the 
viability of employing a Foucaultian analysis to consider how animals are entangled within 
biopower in this context, is whether animals meet Foucault’s twofold notion of ‘subjects’ 
(Foucault 1994): the products and processes of power, according to Foucault’s 
understanding of power as relational and productive. Whilst, as Kirk (2017, 101) argues, 
animals satisfy Foucault’s first sense of ‘subject’, as being ‘subject to someone else by 
control or dependence’ (Foucault 1994, 331), their capacity to act in Foucault’s second 
sense of subject, being ‘tied to his own identity by a conscience or self-knowledge’, is less 
clear.  
Certainly, it has been illustrated in studies of dog-cognition that dogs are sensitive 
to the attentional activity of humans and that this influences their own behaviour, 
suggesting a quality of awareness of self and other. For instance, dogs are four times more 
likely to disobey a human’s instruction not to take food when a room is dark compared to 
when it is lit (Kaminski, Pitsch and Tomasello 2012). This suggests that they can 
understand something of the human’s perspective. Other studies reveal the significance of 
human eyes as a signal influencing a dog’s behaviour (Call, Bräueur, Kaminski and 
Tomasello 2003). However, whilst these studies suggest that dogs have some sensitivity 
to cues related to attention, it remains uncertain whether this constitutes a flexible 
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understanding of seeing rather than a hardwired behaviour or a learned response. Thus, 
although studies in dog-cognition demonstrate that dogs are sensitive to the attentional 
activity of humans and that this shapes their behaviour, I remain cautious with regards to 
the notion that dogs might internalize governance in the same way as Foucault describes 
of prisoners—aware that their actions could be being watched at any instant.  
 
What the use of the screen and other tools undoubtedly does illustrate however, is a 
fundamental aspect of how dogs are perceived by the humans working with them: as 
responsive, intelligent beings who are highly capable of reading and, more significantly, 
being affected by human communicative cues. Notions of ‘good’ scientific data and how 
human influence, or affective encounters, might negatively affect this are also implicit in 
these practices. Therefore, that what dogs can see as they conduct their searches must be 
monitored and managed in order to produce ‘good’ bio-detection dogs, research subjects 
and scientific practice. As Matei Candea (2013) notes, it is commonplace among 
researchers to warn of the dangers of human influence in scientific practice. One of the 
classic stories recounted to illustrate the potential peril of human influence is that of 
‘Clever Hans’, the horse who people believed could count, but who was in fact picking up 
on subtle physiological cues to the correct answer in the body of whoever was asking the 
question.  
However, I note that among my informants, the concern regarding human influence 
runs deeper than a worry that the trainer might give the location of the target away through 
their bodily gestures; it also relates to their concern that dogs might pick up on and be 
affected by the emotional state of humans. Indeed, the risk of ‘giving away the answer’, 
as it were, is already explicitly acknowledged and mitigated by methods of training 
double-blind during more advanced stages of training (and always during testing phases), 
meaning that the trainers do not know which sample is which. Rather, the further matter 
of concern in this particular context is tied to an understanding of the deep human–dog 
bonds and affective relations that develop in these training relationships. Sam, a trainer at 
MDD, alerted me to this during a discussion about trainer-dog relationships, telling me 
that, “Science-y people want studies to be double-blind because your perception of the dog 
will change if they keep getting it wrong. You get disheartened if the dog is making lots 
of mistakes. Then the dog picks up on this.” Thus, the screen arguably acts as a barrier to 
prevent human feelings and moods that might, albeit unintentionally, through their bodily 
comportment, affect the disposition of the dog and thus jeopardize his detection accuracy. 
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In short, to ensure the production of reliable detection dogs and robust scientific practice, 
the affective potential of human–dog encounters must be constantly monitored and 
managed.  
By precluding the dog from reading human bodily cues during a search, the screen 
also helps to ensure that, as aforementioned in Alexa’s explanation, the dog is making 
decisions about the samples independently, without being guided by communicative cues-
—intentional or otherwise—from their trainers. It is thus clear that the trainers do not only 
want bio-detection dogs to simply follow commands, but crucially to have the confidence 
to make their own decisions.  
 
Whilst the visual technologies of the screen and one-way windows are an important 
element in the monitoring and management of affect at the interface of (human and canine) 
bodies, it is notable that human bodies are not only monitored and managed in relation to 
the visual, but also the auditory. As the trainers listen to the dogs—quite literally—so too 
do the dogs listen to the trainers. Because sounds are understood to communicate, among 
other things, emotional information that dogs are able to perceive (Albuquerque et al. 
2016), human sounds—including, but not restricted to, spoken voice—in conjunction with 
body language, must be effectively managed by the trainers in their encounters with the 
dogs. In keeping with bodily movements, sounds can be considered either advantageous 
or detrimental to the dog’s work, depending on the type of sound, the context of encounter, 
and the individual dog’s temperament. 
 Sometimes, the sounds produced by trainers are expressed without intent. It is these 
sounds that tend to be the most concerning to trainers. For instance, during a training 
session with Rolo—a session in which Alexa, working nonblind, knew where the target 
was in the lineup—I watched Alexa, stood behind the screen, dip her hand into her pocket 
as she observed Rolo approaching the target sample. Her action caused a rustling sound. 
Rolo sat down immediately at the sample. Alexa clicked and rewarded him, but walking 
back to the screen, with Rolo by her side, she scowled her face in frustration and said to 
herself, “Stop putting your hand in your pocket Alexa!” To prevent premature fidgeting 
and the associated bodily and auditory cues, many trainers watch their dogs work with 
their hands crossed over behind their backs. 
On other occasions, the unintended sounds trainers produce convey emotional 
information. For instance, during a warm-up run on the morning of a day of double-blind 
testing at MDD, Shadow failed to indicate a target sample, incorrectly giving the ‘all-clear’ 
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indication to his trainer Kelly by returning to her at the screen after searching. Managing 
the computer in the training room that day, it was my job to give Kelly the news that 
Shadow had given an incorrect answer. Kelly, who I knew was feeling nervous about the 
day, pursed her lips and huffed in visible and audible disappointment. A few moments 
later, Claire, who had been watching through the window from the adjacent office, opened 
the door to the training room and advised Kelly not to huff again if Shadow gives another 
incorrect answer. She explained that she had noticed Shadow ‘drop’54 when Kelly huffed. 
Looking at Shadow, I noticed his tail hanging low and stationary as he stood, unanimated, 
waiting for direction from Kelly. 
However, rather than attempting to eliminate the influence of human voice from 
all moments of dog-training, on the contrary I regularly observed the trainers actively 
utilising their voice as a training tool to support canine learning. Sue, the Training Manager 
at PVWDC explained to me why she considers it essential to talk to dogs in training:  
 
“I like to talk when I dog train. If you watch really good dog-trainers, they all have 
dialogues with their dogs. They’re not dead silent, they talk. And they have tones 
that they use and speeds that they say things and sounds, ‘cause it makes it 
interesting.” 
 
 The most common and routine example of the use of one’s voice as a training tool 
is in praise commands. When a dog makes a correct decision during a search, either 
alerting at the target odour or giving an ‘all clear’ behaviour in response to a ‘blank’ run, 
praise is communicated from the trainer with phrases such as: ‘Good boy!’, ‘Clever girly!’, 
‘Yes!’ and ‘Great job!’. Both the pitch and volume of voice used to communicate these 
phrases are much higher than that of everyday conversation and notably closer to the 
communicative characteristics adults often use in interactions with children (Sanders and 
                                                 
54 I heard this description, of a dog having ‘dropped’, on a number of occasions at MDD 
during training sessions and it also came up in interviews when discussing human–dog 
communication. The term, as it is used by these trainers, refers to a dog who is uncertain 
or lacking in confidence. Such an interpretation of the dog’s inner state is thus believed to 
be visible in the minutiae of the dog’s body language. When a dog is considered to have 
‘dropped’, their body language tends to include a combination of a low tail carriage, low 
head, arched back and a lower hind end. 
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Arluke 1996). Studies in dog cognition support this emphasis on the human voice in 
communication with dogs, suggesting that both what we say and how we say it matters to 
dogs. For example, in a recent study conducted by ethologists in Hungary (Andics, et al. 
2016), it was found that the reward pathway in the dog’s brains lit up when they heard 
both praising words and an approving intonation, but not when they heard random words 
spoken in a praising tone or praise words spoken in a flat tone.  
 
This discussion has illuminated the trainers’ oscillation between practices of both 
attachment and detachment in their encounters with the dogs. To make sense of this, I 
draw on Candea’s (2010) proposal to consider practices of attachment and detachment not 
as incompatibly opposing, but as interwoven practices. For Candea, based on ethnographic 
fieldwork focusing on meerkats and ethologists in the Kalahari Desert, detachment 
emerges as a specific mode of engagement: a cultivated distance that is not merely a case 
of standing back to observe animals. Candea details how the researchers balanced ‘the 
pragmatic need to approach the animals’ with ‘distancing measures to minimize human 
interference in the animals’ behaviour’ (Ibid., 245). For instance, although meerkats were 
free to climb on to the shoulders of a researcher, researchers refrained from instigating any 
physical contact with the meerkats. 
Among my informants, a temporary relation of detached observation is promoted 
through the implementation of a material separation (e.g., the screen at MDD) between the 
trainer and the dog. Thus, in the case of bio-detection dogs, it is an interspecies engagement 
that accommodates space for moments of both collaboration between human and dog, and 
at other times, relations of cultivated and manageable distance that promote successful 
training practices as well as good research participants, trainers-come-researchers and 
data. In emphasizing the partial connections and divisions that comprise the relationships 
between trainers and bio-detection dogs, these relationships might be understood with 
Joanna Latimer’s (2013) notion of ‘being alongside’: a way of thinking about our dwelling 
with other kinds that ‘emphasizes switches in ground, and expresses the limits and the 
partialness of any connection and of any sense of mutuality’ (Latimer and Miele 2013, 
16). Whilst some anthropologists, notably Ingold (2000: 13-16), have contrasted the 
detached “Western” scientific knowledge of animals to the engaged and relational 
knowledge of “non-Western” Others (Candea 2010, 250), for my informants it is a 
capacity to oscillate between both distant and relational modes of knowledge that enables 
the production of bio-detection dogs and the associated knowledge that is generated. On 
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one hand, a physical boundary (the screen) imposes a material and conceptual distance 
between the human and dog; reinforcing a separation between observer and observed, 
consistent with the ideals of ‘objective’ science, or modern knowledge practices that work 
to separate the social from the natural (Latour 1993). This distance is productively engaged 
with by the trainers in their attempts to create bio-detection dogs that embody 
independency in their working behaviour. However, the enforced separation is born out of 
a recognition that the dogs and trainers are entangled in mutually affective and 
intersubjective relations that are also essential to the performance of this human-dog 
detector team; the reliability of this dyad depends on the trainer’s capacity to interpret an 
individual dog’s behaviour. In effect, the pragmatic need to engage with the dogs during 
some aspects of training must be balanced by distancing techniques to prevent human 
interference in the dogs’ behaviour. 
 
The intertwinement of attachment and detachment that characterizes the shape of human–
dog connectedness among my informants may be partly understood in relation to the dual 
perspective from which the trainers perceive the dogs. In addition to the role of dog-
trainers, my human informants also adopt the responsibility of researchers: both in a 
formal sense as they collect data during each training session, and informally as they strive 
to make sense of the dog’s behaviours. Like Smuts (2006), who in addition to baboons, 
studies social relationships between dogs—with Smuts’ personal dogs participating in the 
research—many of the dog-trainers have close personal relationships with the dogs who 
they both train and observe in the pursuit of scientific knowledge. For instance, several of 
the trainers at both organisations have provided both temporary and long-term foster 
homes to some of the dogs with whom they also work. Smuts describes her job as putting 
her in ‘the unusual position of experiencing [her] subjects in two very different ways: from 
the ‘outside, objective’ perspective of a scientist, and the ‘inside, subjective’ perspective 
of a human interacting daily with beloved companions’ (Ibid., 116). This dual kind of 
perspective has been observed among researchers investigating dogs as many as seven 
decades ago, as Amy Nelson (2017) illuminates how researchers studying dogs involved 
in the Soviet space programme experienced a tension between their ‘stance as a neutral 
scientist investigating natural material and his involved, even sentimental, attachment to 




This chapter has argued that the recent shift in approaches towards dog-training, and the 
simultaneous change in how trainers conceive of the dog’s position within the training 
relationship, has promoted an obligation among trainers to become attentive to the 
subjective experiences of their dogs. Such a duty on the part of trainers reflects their 
assumption of the dog as a sentient being rather than a generic black-box, in addition to 
the notion that the dog has a greater sensitivity to the odour of human disease than their 
human partners. 
The recognition, shared by my trainer informants, that dogs both look and speak 
back to them has implications for training practices that have been illustrated in this 
chapter. In particular, I have argued that, through the intertwinement of practices of both 
attachment and detachment, the dogs can become good participants for the research aspect 
of this work, their trainers can become good researchers, and good data can be produced. 
The next chapter takes the focus beyond the trainers’ practices of merely listening 
to and acknowledging the specific experience of their dogs to consider how the trainers 
subsequently respond to the dogs, incorporating something of the dog’s perspective into 




Chapter 5. Care-Full Training and Research 
 
Following on from the discussions presented in the previous chapter, which highlighted 
the trainers’ active curiosity about the dogs’ perspective and obligation to incorporate this 
into their modes of training and communication, this chapter explores how the trainers’ 
understandings of the dogs’ subjective experience shape their everyday encounters. Here, 
influenced by the work of Despret (2004) and Haraway (2008), I conceptualize the 
trainers’ attentiveness to the dog’s desires and needs as a practice of care. This chapter 
charts the particular shape of care as it is enacted in my field sites. 
 
i. Locating Care in Scientific Practice 
 
Animal use and animal care are not separated but connected through capacities to 
recognize and respond to the suffering of another. (Davies et al. 2018) 
 
In the pursuit of scientific knowledge, even where invasive and undoubtedly painful 
experiments on animals constitute the research process, scholars have observed that 
practices of care form an essential part of the researcher’s labour (Friese 2013; Haraway 
2008; Holmberg 2011; Pemberton 2004). As Haraway (2008, 70) states, ‘Using a model 
organism in an experiment is a common necessity in research. The necessity and 
justifications, no matter how strong, do not obviate the obligations of care and sharing 
pain’. From an ethical standpoint, care practices can be considered actions that enable 
research subjects to ‘speak back’ (Giraud and Hollin 2006; Stengers 1997) and that oblige 
researchers to respond to the needs and demands of those being studied.  
For example, exploring the role of care practices in the process of transforming a 
dog into a research subject for the study of haemophilia, Stephen Pemberton (2004) 
highlights how care and science go hand-in-hand when animals are used as model 
organisms in the laboratory. Pemberton argues that the production of ‘good’ canine 
research subjects in the laboratory requires that the humans first and foremost care for the 
animals. Specifically, Pemberton explores the ‘creation’ of an experimental organism, or 
technology, for studying a human disease and the origins of the canine hemophiliac as 
‘patient’, beginning in the late 1940s in the United States. The study of these dogs directly 
contributed to the development of the first widely marketed pharmaceutical for hemophilia 
in humans, transforming it into a manageable disease. Significantly, however, the dogs did 
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not originate as ready-made models for the production of human medicine. Rather, 
Pemberton describes how the ‘canine hemophiliac’ was produced through—among other 
things—breeding and selection, and dog care practices. The biggest challenge the team of 
researchers faced was keeping the bleeder puppies alive. Therefore, before becoming 
models and technologies, the dogs had to become patients. Simultaneously, before 
functioning as researchers the laboratory staff had to function as caregivers:  
 
Significantly, then, scientists’ manipulations of their subjects were preceded by 
a necessity to care. The hemophilic dogs were not only treated ‘humanely’ but 
also framed as patients in this setting. Or, to put this differently, the story of 
Brinkhous [the lead researcher] and his hemophilic dogs suggests that a moral 
imperative is operative in the passage between laboratory and clinic…this 
imperative means that we cannot understand how scientists discipline their 
experimental organisms without understanding how these organisms also 
discipline scientists, forcing them to care. (Ibid., 205, emphasis added) 
 
Thus, Pemberton argues that the researchers cultivated a space in which dogs were 
conceptualized not only as technologies, but also as organisms with agency and care needs 
to which the researchers responded. 
 
In the context of bio-detection training and research as it is conducted by my informants, 
the everyday practices of care are arguably less ostensibly remarkable than of those 
performed in the aforementioned laboratory-based work Pemberton (2004) considers, in 
which specialized care is necessary to keep an animal alive. However, despite their 
mundane appearance, I maintain that such acts are nevertheless fundamental in the 
training, or cultivation, of bio-detection dogs: the beings about (and with) whom scientific 
data is ultimately sought in this context.  
At PVWDC, many of the mundane care practices towards the dogs—such as 
grooming and potty-walking—are completed by the center’s voluntary workforce. Before 
being ‘cleared’ to conduct these practices on one’s own, without the presence of a trainer 
or a more experienced volunteer, a volunteer is obliged to first watch and learn for many 
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hours. Keen to become authorized to groom, one morning I buddied up with intern Jason, 
to watch as he completed Labrador Kira’s ‘husbandry’ routine.55 
 
Jason is a twenty-one-year-old Psychology major student at a nearby university, 
completing a six-month internship at PVWDC as part of his degree’s ‘co-op’ programme. 
I join him as he walks over to Kira’s kennel. On the ‘activity sheet’ attached to a clipboard 
which is fastened on to the front of Kira’s kennel, Jason makes some inscriptions in the 
box referring to today. Looking at the time on his phone, he notes the time, 10:04, the 
activity descriptor ‘PE’, shorthand for ‘Physical Examination’, and his initials, ‘J.S.’.56 
Then, he takes out a leash from the box fixed to the kennel door and turns his focus onto 
Kira who is stood up inside the kennel. The pair lock eyes and after a momentary stand-
off, Kira moves herself into a seated position. Jason opens the kennel door, clips the leash 
onto Kira’s collar, says “yes,” and Kira responds by stepping out of the kennel. Before 
making their way into the room used for husbandry, Jason walks Kira outside the 
parameter of the building “to see if she needs to pee.” Once inside the husbandry area—
a former locker room within the center’s facility that is a former gymnasium—Jason 
removes the leash from Kira’s collar and kneels down on the floor next to her. The tiled 
floor of the room is partially covered with foam mats: non-slip, easy to clean and 
comfortable for human knees to rest on.  
Jason talks me through the session, telling me that husbandry is performed both to 
keep on top of the dog’s grooming and to help desensitize the dogs to certain objects and 
situations that they might encounter during a real physical examination. Jason begins by 
taking a hairbrush from the ‘husbandry box’: a plastic box containing various items of 
equipment used for this practice. He holds the object in his hand and raises it in line with 
Kira’s eyes, around one foot from her face. “I show the object first,” he tells me. Kira 
                                                 
55 ‘Husbandry’ is the term used at PVWDC that encapsulates grooming activities. 
56 At PVWDC, activity sheets are fixed to every dog’s kennel and are used to keep track 
of the daily activities of each dog. Every time a dog is taken out of his kennel, the handler 
is required to make a note of the exact time a dog leaves and returns to his kennel, the 
handler’s initials and the nature of the activity. Activities include: ‘PW’ for potty-walking; 
‘T’ for training; and ‘FT’ for free time, which can include playing ball or socializing with 
other dogs; ‘A’ for agility, and; ‘PE’ for physical examination, which includes both 
veterinary checks and grooming practices. The data gathered from these sheets is analyzed 
and used to inform the center’s knowledge about how each dog’s time is spent when they 
are on site. 
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appears unfazed by the object and Jason slowly moves the brush towards her, gently 
touching it against her side. “Good girl,” he assures. He brushes her side and she 
continues to remain still, gazing into his eyes. “Yes!” Jason exclaims, offering her a kibble 
treat from a pouch attached to his waist belt. “The slower you take it, the more likely you 
are to get a positive result,” he explains, adding, “This can take as long as you want it 
to.”  
After a few minutes of brushing, Jason moves the focus on to Kira’s nails. Whilst 
the interns are not permitted to perform the actual practice of nail clipping, the husbandry 
routine includes desensitizing the dog to the clippers used for this. Jason asks Kira to sit, 
which she does. Concerning the dog’s bodily position during this practice, Jason explains, 
“It’s easiest to do from a sit or a down, whatever’s more comfortable for the dog.” “Paw,” 
Jason says, before he touches one of Kira’s front feet, resting his hand on her foot for a 
few seconds. Kira remains sat and tolerates Jason’s touch. Before removing his hand, he 
says “yes” and rewards her with a piece of kibble. He repeats the exercise on the other 
front foot. He then returns to the first foot, this time gently stroking his fingers on the areas 
in between the nails, commenting, “You want the duration to be longer and longer each 
time.” He takes a set of black nail clippers from the box and places them against Kira’s 
foot. She moves away from him by a few inches. He reassures her by putting the clippers 
aside and adjusts his position on the floor. She returns to a seated position next to him, 
but moves away again when the clippers are re-presented. Jason asks me if I can pass him 
the orange clippers instead because, he muses, “she might be more familiar with those.” 
These prove a little more successful as Kira permits Jason to present the clippers at her 
feet for a moment or two, before he treats her. He ends the attention on her nails shortly 
after, explaining, “I don’t want to push her if she isn’t comfortable.” 
Next, Jason moves on to focus on Kira’s teeth. Whilst retrieving the toothpaste 
from the box, Kira has moved to the other side of the room, sniffing the gaps around a 
doorframe, the other side of which contains the center’s dog food store. “Come here 
sweetie,” he says. With Kira in front of him, he says “muzzle,” and then cups his right 
hand over her snout, holding it for a few seconds before releasing and treating her. Next, 
he says “teeth,” and gently pulls up her lip on one side, followed by a treat. After repeating 
on the other side, he tells me, “you can work in with the toothbrush gradually.” He does 
not use the toothbrush today. Instead, he puts some dog-safe toothpaste (vanilla mint 
flavor) on his finger. Kira moves away when Jason presents his finger to her mouth. After 
 131 
getting the same response twice, he instead holds his finger down and away from her 
mouth and allows her to simply lick the paste from his finger. 
He wipes his finger on his jeans and moves on to Kira’s ears. “Sit. Ears.” With 
Kira sat in front of him, Jason gently lifts and strokes each ear in turn. “That’s an easy 
one,” he smiles and feeds Kira some kibble. 
Finally, Jason focuses on Kira’s eyes. He says “eyes,” before using his fingers to 
apply gentle pressure to the area beneath each eye and looks directly into her eyes. Their 
mutual gaze is interrupted however, as we hear barking from the kennel area that is 
situated on the other side of this room. Kira is looking towards the door and Jason 
comments, “I wish this room was more soundproof.” 
 
In the grooming encounter between Jason and Kira, we are able to observe the 
simultaneous disciplining of two bodies. As Jason attempts to shape Kira into a particular 
being—one who is tolerant of human touch and corporeal investigation—Kira forces Jason 
to become attentive to her preferences and aversions. Here, we can apply Greenhough and 
Roe’s (2011) illustration of the association between attention to somatic sensibilities and 
the development of more care-full practices of animal caretakers in the context of animal 
experimentation. Rendering himself available to Kira’s desires and enabling the dog to 
‘speak back’ regarding her situation, this example highlights how care is fundamentally 
entangled with the question of canine agency.  
While this discussion has focused on an instance of care practices outside the bio-
detection training room, below I focus an assessment of the character of care within the 
more formal spaces of training and scientific practice. 
 
ii. Tinkering 
In addition to the more obvious practices of care such as grooming, acts of care can also 
be observed during the training sessions, specifically in the relation between a trainer, dog 
and the training equipment. To illustrate this, I draw on the concept of ‘tinkering’ as it has 
been extended beyond the realm of scientific practice and into discussions focused on the 
character of care in clinics and other healthcare settings by Mol and colleagues (2010). For 
these scholars, tinkering offers a novel way of thinking about the character of care, 
particularly in medical contexts, as a process of dynamic arrangement through which novel 
possibilities, identities, and emotions emerge for both the caregiver and the cared-for. In 
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clinics and other settings, tinkering involves making small adjustments to equipment, 
pharmaceuticals, spatial arrangements and modes of monitoring and documenting 
(Manderson, Cartwright, and Hardon 2016, 175). According to Myriam Winance (2006; 
2010), whose work explores how wheelchairs are adapted to their users, caring is not 
simply a case of giving something to others who may then passively receive it. Rather, to 
care is to carefully consider, test, feel, adapt, acknowledge details and make adjustments, 
until an appropriate arrangement (material, emotional and relational) is realized. In the 
process, Winance argues that it is not just the wheelchair that is adapted, but also the 
multiple people involved in its use.   
By drawing on Winance’s analysis of the tinkering character of care with regards 
to the adaptation of wheelchairs to their users, and extending it out of this clinical context, 
I note that the tinkering of care can be illustrated in the distinct spaces of the detection-
dog training rooms. Here, in everyday training sessions, the training apparatus is routinely 
adjusted to meet the needs of an individual dog. For instance, at MDD, before a dog is 
tasked to search, the height of the stands or carousel arms are adjusted by his trainer or 
another person helping, so that the dog’s nose may meet the odour sample with ease. As 
the dog searches, his trainer, watching how the dog’s body is moving, might infer that he 
is having difficulty rigorously investigating the odour due to the height or angle of the 
stands. Between runs, in response to the dog’s performance, the angle and height might 
then be further tinkered with by the trainer or an assistant. The angle and position of the 
screen is sometimes adjusted too. For instance, whenever a dog ‘skipped’ (i.e., failed to 
search) the first position, I often observed trainers move the position of the screen back 
slightly, trying to ensure that the first position is visible to the dog and less avoidable as 
he approaches the stands or carousel. The adjustability of the screen and stands—the 
screen featuring wheels, and the stands with pins and holes—enables tinkering practices 
to be incorporated into the character of training with ease. In short, the trainer’s ‘toolkit’ 
is designed to be tinkered with.  
The routine practices of tinkering that take place in training sessions highlight the 
dynamic shape of care practices as they are performed when working with dogs. 
Continuously reading the dogs’ bodies, the trainers acquire a tacit knowledge about the 
behaviour of dogs, both generally and individually, that guides their actions. Moreover, 
the tinkering of samples and equipment highlights the processual shape of learning that 
these trainers undergo as they become increasingly skilled and capable. Knowing how to 
respond in the moment of a given training session is an embodied kind of knowledge 
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acquired through practice and personal experience, rather than a knowledge that is given 
or can be readily taught outside the embodied encounter between trainer and dog. The 
significance of this tacit knowledge among the trainers was made clear in a comment made 
by Simon to Neil, regarding the performance of a dog: “You’ll know when you see her…It’s 
easier for me to show you than tell you. I can’t explain it.” 
 
As well as the everyday tinkering of adjustable equipment, there is also a commitment 
towards developing the design of the equipment itself so that it is better-suited to the bodies 
of the dogs. For example, one afternoon at MDD, the bio-detection department welcomed 
a group of designers into the training room. With them, the design team had brought in 
some equipment prototypes, including a cone-shaped attachment for the sample arms and 
a stand with greater scope for adjustability. These prototypes had been designed based on 
information offered from the trainers about how the dogs search. To get a better sense of 
this, the designers had also visited previously, watched the dogs work and discussed with 
the trainers what kind of issues they felt the equipment caused them. Central to the creation 
of the cone-shaped design is a recognition of the dog’s olfactory system and, in particular, 
the long nose characteristic of this animal.57 The hope invested in the design is centered 
around the notion that if a dog inserts his snout into the cone he ought to be able to inhale 
a more concentrated sample of the odour, helping him to increase his chance of accurately 
assessing the odour. Within ten minutes of the design team arriving, Simon suggested that 
they try out the new cone attachment with some of the dogs to see how they respond. At 
the back of the room, I stood and watched alongside the trainers and designers. 
 After working well in his morning training session, Kelly brings Labrador Leo in 
the room to try the cone attachment. Meanwhile, Ed had attached the cones onto the sample 
arms of the first two stands in a lineup of four. The positive sample—in this case, an 
artificial training odour—was then placed in position two by Ed. Leo walked along the 
stands with a slower pace than I had seen him search during his earlier training session 
and he did not put his nose into the cone of either position one or two. Simon comments, 
“It’s so interesting to see the change in dynamic,” before pointing out that one of his 
                                                 
57 While brachycephalic dogs (dogs with short noses and flat faces), such as Pugs and 
Chihuahuas are increasingly popular as pets, the olfactory system of these dogs is 
compromised (i.e., they have fewer olfactory receptor cells). No brachycephalic dogs are 
enrolled at MDD or PVWDC. 
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concerns about the cone was whether all the dogs will be able to fit their noses into it: “the 
spaniel can get his nose in it, but with his [pointing to Leo] fat muzzle I wonder if he can 
get it in there.” Leo is tasked to search the stands again and whilst he appears to scan over 
the cones, Kelly insists “he didn’t put his nose in.” “Come on then,” she says, as Leo turns 
to walk back towards her. However, on his way back towards Kelly who is by now stood 
at the screen, he moves towards stand two and puts his nose into the cone, nudging at it 
whilst stood still, as is customary for his trained alert. Kelly clicks and, in unison, both her 
and Simon call out “good boy!” 
Each dog responded in a slightly different way: some showed hesitation about the 
novel piece of equipment, standing back from it and turning to their trainer, while others 
displayed more curiosity, investigating the cone with interest. The cones obliged the dogs 
to behave in new ways; closing their mouths shut as they sniffed. At the same time, if the 
cones were to become fully operational the trainers would be impelled to learn slightly 
new ways of reading the dogs’ search behaviour, given that the cone would conceal the 
dog’s nose and mouth. In this instance, we can see how the dog’s species-specific 
perspective and physiology is incorporated into designs through a process of tinkering that 
can be considered, following Winance (2006; 2010), a case of caring. 
 
Thus, the relationships between the researchers, animals, and equipment I have detailed 
are distinct from sites of traditional scientific practices with animals, such as the 
laboratory, whereby it has been observed that the ‘work must be fitted into the demands 
of the technology’ (Birke 2007 [1994], 329). In Birke’s research, for instance, one animal 
technician revealed that she had been required to dispose of all rats that did not meet a 
certain size criteria (inevitably including almost all the females), as only those rats 
(predominantly males) exceeding a certain size would fit the apparatus used to keep the 
head still during the experimental surgery. Such a practice is at considerable odds with the 
shape of interaction between the equipment and animals in these sites of detection-dog-
training and research, where, on the contrary, the equipment is designed to suit the 
demands of the dogs and is adaptable to the physiology of the individual animals. Here, 
through the tinkering practices of care and the establishment of a human–dog dialogue that 
enables the trainer-come-researcher to develop a more nuanced understanding of a dog’s 
perspective and needs, space is simultaneously created for the dogs to inform the shape of 
their environment and the direction of their work. 
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iii. Enabling Individuality 
The precise character of care towards individual animals and the potential for the 
enactment or preclusion of care in a given context varies and is dependent, in part, on the 
particular sets of working practices and conditions that comprise each setting. More 
specifically, diverse cultures, technologies, economies and rationalities across different 
spaces of animal care impact the particular approaches towards the treatment of animals 
(Greenhough and Roe 2018).  
Exploring the spaces and discourses that comprise the American slaughterhouse, 
the critical animal studies scholar, Stephen Thierman (2010), argues that care and concern 
(for both the humans and animals) are virtually unable to develop in this environment that 
is characterized by practices that ontologically reduce the individual. Describing how the 
individuality of pigs is reduced in the slaughterhouse, Thierman notes: 
 
Their reduction—begun in the various locations where they have been reared to 
slaughter weight—continues with the killing of the individual pigs when they enter 
this establishment. They become ‘shoulders’ that are segmented into different 
‘cuts’ as they travel down the line and are packaged for distribution. To echo Linda 
Birke (2003), whom Acampora (2006) quotes, I would say that in the production 
of meat at the slaughterhouse, the living, breathing animals who ate, slept and 
interacted—often in atrocious conditions—literally disappear. In the 
slaughterhouse, their individuality is completely elided as they become inert 
commodities for human consumption. (Ibid., 107) 
 
In explaining the absence of care in the slaughterhouse, Thierman draws attention 
to the various material and immaterial elements that structure this particular environment, 
including: its architectural form, laws, philosophical propositions and scientific theories. 
Taken together, he argues that these aspects comprise the particular ‘apparatus of 
animality’, or environment, of the slaughterhouse.58 With these aspects recognized, it then 
becomes possible to ask questions about the kinds of relations between these elements, 
such as: ‘What types of understandings of other animals are promoted at particular 
junctions; how are particular animals treated in specific locations; and, how are human 
actors invited/forced to act in various situations?’ (Ibid., 93).  
                                                 
58 Thierman invokes Foucault’s (1978) notion of the ‘apparatus of sexuality’. 
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To understand the presence and particular shape of care practices among my 
informants, following Thierman, we can attend to the relations between the various 
elements that comprise my field sites. Already, in the previous chapter, I have outlined 
one significant aspect of the ‘apparatus of animality’ operating in my field sites: the 
specific pedagogical approach to dog-training employed by my informants. Another 
element that structures care practices in these spaces are the adjustable pieces of training 
equipment, detailed in the above section. Now, I turn to briefly consider how the spatial 
organisation of the facilities, combined with the bio-detection research methodology, 
emerges as highly significant for the particular shape of care within these environments, 
whereby canine individuality—and a perception of the dog as a subject rather than a 
passive object—is maintained by the trainers.  
 
The trainers work within the training spaces with individual dogs for around an hour each 
day, between three and five days per week. At MDD, when they are not formally working, 
the dogs dwell in the office space alongside their trainers—sleeping on dog beds scattered 
throughout the office they share, or underneath desks. This spatial organisation, mandated 
by the charity’s ‘no-kennel’ policy, promotes the development of interspecies 
relationships that extend beyond the boundaries of the formalized work practices of both 
species. The frequent, mundane encounters—negotiating access to a chair for instance—
offers the trainers and dogs the potential to acquire tacit knowledge about the needs of the 
other. Here, somatic sensibilities between the species are amplified and consequentially, 
the trainers develop an understanding of the dogs in which these animals are more than 
merely ‘the right tool for the job’ (Clarke and Fujimura 1992). As Kelly, a trainer at MDD, 
explained, “We have more of a relationship with them than that [than if they were purely 
tools]. If we didn’t interact with them in any way other than to work with them they might 
be perceived of as tools. But they’re around [the office].” 
By contrast, due to the architectural design and research protocol of a conventional 
laboratory, significant numbers of animals in these settings are typically housed in large 
spaces, often totally separate from the researchers and only coming into contact with the 
researcher in the moments of experimentation (Birke 2012). Before moving into dog-
training, Kelly had herself previously worked with laboratory animals and, during a 
conversation with me, she made an association between the shape of everyday human–
animal interactions—tied to an organisation’s spatial structure and the material quantity 
of the animals—and the kind of human–animal relationships that are rendered possible or 
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hindered. In particular, Kelly reflects on how she has experienced her own relationships 
with animals as differing depending on the quantity of animals under her care. Speaking 
about working in a laboratory, Kelly explains: 
 
“You don’t have an interaction like you do [with the dogs here], you don’t build a 
bond with those animals. There’s too many. You’re not handling like you are 
everyday here. Like, there’s potentially a million mice in our facility at any one 
time…There is no relationship with those mice…you don’t bond with them.” 
 
Simon added, “That can come down to time constraints.” Nodding her head in agreement, 
Kelly replied, “Exactly. And I think if you only had ten mice to deal with every day for a 
week you’d probably build individual relationships.” 
 
Among bio-detection dogs, there is less standardization in comparison with the highly 
standardized model organisms Kelly worked with in her previous role. While the trainers 
are able to build individual bonds with the dogs whom they dwell and work alongside in 
their professional lives, the standardization of laboratory animals is arguably a significant 
factor in explaining why, ‘[a]t least to the untrained eye, one white rat looks much like 
another. They therefore lose individuality’ (Birke (2007 [1994]), 331).59 Drawing on the 
work of Ralph Acampora (2006), Thierman (2010) also associates standardization with 
the reduction of the animal’s individuality, suggesting that laboratories have ‘emptying 
effects’ (Ibid., 106) that downgrade the animal’s body from a ‘somatic’ or living body to 
one that is merely ‘corporeal’ (Acampora 2006, 99).  
On the contrary, the spatial organisation and research protocol of the detection-dog 
workplace—that promote repeat, routine encounters between humans and dogs—helps 
                                                 
59 However, it must certainly be acknowledged that emotional relationships can and do 
develop between researchers and laboratory animals. This is observed even where the 
animal’s sacrifice is an inevitable component of the work. For instance, Simone Dennis 
(2013) reports how Brenda, one of Dennis’ neuroscientist informants, expressed feelings 
of loss when the six rats with whom she interacted with on a daily basis were terminated. 
She associates Brenda’s grief with the relations that were established between the scientist 
and rats through their daily interactions: interactions that demanded human–animal 
negotiation, intersubjectivity and established a kind of kinship between the species. 
However, having only six rats to oversee in this instance arguably helped to facilitate such 
attentive relationships between Brenda and the rats.  
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enable trainer-come-researchers to develop relationships and understandings of the 
experiences of individual animals. Certainly, working with dogs who are learning to 
respond in particular ways to specific odours requires one-on-one interactions and 
empathetic engagement with the experiences and perspectives of the animal other.  
Furthermore, an acknowledgment of animal individuality is apparent even before 
dogs enter these spaces of scientific practice, as illustrated in the selection of dogs for this 
work. Dogs of various shapes and sizes are enrolled in the respective training programmes 
of both MDD and PVWDC. This is not without restrictions however, as the dogs are not 
greatly varied in terms of breeds. Bar a few exceptions, at MDD, the dogs are 
predominantly varieties of Labradors, Retrievers and Spaniels, and at PVWDC the 
majority of the dogs are either Labrador, Retriever or Shepherd types. Multiple factors 
drive the selection of these certain breeds including the working history of particular 
breeds, as well as public perceptions towards certain breeds. More specifically with 
regards to individual dogs, factors in dog-selection include: the working history of the 
dog’s ancestors; the requirement that dogs are manageable for foster families; and the need 
for dogs to be content in the presence of other dogs at ‘work’, especially at MDD where 
dogs are not kennelled. However, compared to the iconic animals of scientific research—
specifically, laboratory rodents—the variety in appearances among these canine cohorts is 
vast and standardization, in terms of size and physiology, is of far less concern.  
 
In sum, I have suggested that an understanding of the dogs as individuals, further 
supported by the co-habiting spatial arrangement of human and dog and their frequent 
interaction, promotes practices of care shown towards the dogs.  
 
iv. The Possibility for Resistance  
As beings who are afforded the capacity to shape the very practices through which they 
are constituted, bio-detection dogs are also observed as being able to resist their enrolment 
and treatment in the training and research process. For instance, at MDD, only those dogs 
who are perceived as ‘wanting’ to take part in the work required are recruited to join the 
bio-detection department. While most dogs that come through the department’s doors 
appear keen to engage in the scent-detection tasks, occasionally, dogs do not demonstrate 
an obvious desire to participate.  
During my time in the field this happened once, with a small Cocker Spaniel who 
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spent much of his—fleeting—time in the training room either sat or lying down, seemingly 
uninterested in playing scent games. Although his tail wagged and he did not appear to be 
particularly uncomfortable in the environment, he was seemingly apathetic towards the 
pot containing a training odour, cupped by Ed’s hand. Despite Ed’s best efforts to engage 
the dog in the pot—tapping it with his fingers, moving his own nose towards it, and 
adjusting the position of his body—the dog remained disinclined. After a few more 
sessions without any change in the dog’s behaviour towards the pot game, the decision 
was made that this dog was simply unsuited to this kind of work and a permanent home 
was found for him to live as a pet. Through the trainers’ attentiveness to the dog’s bodily 
comportment, the dogs are thus enabled to say ‘no’. 
Furthermore, once a dog is enrolled in the training programme, his willingness to 
participate is not taken for granted but is instead continuously monitored and responded 
to. Through the detailed reading and interpretation of canine bodies, trainers assess 
whether a dog’s current mental state deems them suitable for the task at hand. The dog 
must be calm enough to search with focus, yet motivated enough to want to actively 
participate. The following example illustrates how a trainer considered a particular dog, 
not to be balanced enough to work during a training session. 
 
Stood in the corner of the room by the computer desk, I watch on as Rolo searches the 
positions on the carousel at a very fast pace. He moves with such speed around the 
carousel that he fails to search several of the samples; ‘skipping positions’ as Simon, his 
trainer, puts it. In addition, he is being highly vocal between runs, panting with his mouth 
agape and occasionally barking too. According to Simon, Rolo is making a much greater 
amount of noise compared to usual. After only three runs (dogs usually work between 
fifteen and thirty runs per session), Simon elects to terminate the session, commenting, 
“I’ve never seen him this crazy. I want to leave him there, I don’t want to try a blank with 
him. I think he’ll miss [position] eight.” 
 
Working with individual dogs over repeat encounters, trainers like Simon build up 
knowledge about a particular dog’s usual demeanor and know the ‘mood’—inferred from 
nonverbal gestures—in which a dog performs best (i.e., with the greatest accuracy). By 
incorporating a sense of the animal’s emotional state, the trainers can thus choose the most 
appropriate moments to conduct or cease work.  
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Relating the emotional states of animals to the question of animal agency in the 
scientific process, Michael Lynch (1988) details how he observed a researcher obtain 
compliance from his ant subjects. In the behavioural studies Lynch refers to, of ants that 
were required to navigate mazes, he describes how the researcher ‘learned to interpret 
whether or not his subjects were agitated or ‘calm’ enough to undergo maze tests by 
examining the position and movements of their antennae’ (Ibid., 280). Notably, Lynch 
describes this ability to attend to the animal’s bodily sensibilities as something that must 
be learned by the researcher, rather than an innate capacity. For the trainers interacting 
with dogs, although many express an instinctive ability to communicate with dogs, 
developing an understanding of the ‘normal’ somatic sensibilities for an individual dog 
and how to respond appropriately to a dog’s behaviour is a learned skill.  
While dogs are the focus of this thesis, Lynch’s work reminds us that the capacity 
for animal agency is not limited to dogs. Rather, it can be argued that a whole variety of 
animals—or nonhumans more broadly (e.g., the atoms or cells explored in Stengers’ 
(1997) work)—are capable of exercising agency in research settings, provided that the 
conditions and care practices that underpin the work afford sufficient space for the 
nonhuman to ‘speak back’ and simultaneously enable the researcher to pay attention to 
these nonverbal cues and respond to them. 
 
The mode through which I have demonstrated that dogs become research participants in 
detection studies—as individuals with agency—resembles the methods used by Berns and 
colleagues (2012; Berns and Cook 2016) in training dogs to ‘cooperatively participate’ 
(Ibid.) in fMRI studies without restraint or sedation. The team used training techniques of 
positive reinforcement to shape an extended ‘down-stay’ (i.e., the dog lying still on his 
front) and to train the dogs to wear earplugs to protect their ears. Significantly, Berns and 
his team employed an ethical protocol for dogs as research participants that is usually 
reserved for human subjects, giving them the opportunity to withdraw their participation 
should they wish. As a consequence, Berns and Cook (Ibid., 364) note that, of the animals 
used in their study, ‘dogs can be treated as voluntary participants. Because they are 
unrestrained, if a dog does not want to be in the MRI scanner, she can simply leave’. 
It is possible to consider the methodology employed by Berns and Cook (Ibid.) as 
well as that of my informants, as one in which a kind of nonverbal consent from the dog 
is attained somatically. The negotiation of consent here is associated with the dog’s 
capacity to resist, or refuse, to participate in the study by having the ability to remove his 
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body from the situation. In their comparison of ethical guidelines and practices between 
scientific researchers and their subjects (human and animal alike) Greenhough and Roe 
(2011) focus on the ability of an individual to somatically respond to an experimental 
environment. Although their discussion refers specifically to animals enrolled in 
experimental research, thus differing in significant ways from the practices of research 
that bio-detection dogs participate in, their arguments remain useful for this analysis. 
Greenhough and Roe argue that in order to reconsider the ethics of experimental research 
(with either human or animal research subjects), the focus ought to move away from the 
differences between human and animal subjects (i.e., an emphasis on verbal consent), and 
move instead towards acknowledging what human and animal subjects share. What is 
shared, they note, is a ‘capacity to respond, in nonverbal ways, to both the experimental 
process and the wider laboratory environment’ (Ibid., 57). When restraint and sedation are 
absent, both human and animal subjects can, with their bodies, either join in with the 
experiment or task, or refuse to participate. Thereby, the authors extend the capacity to 
consent, ‘or at least to refuse participation’ (58) to animal subjects.  
I follow both Berns (2012) and Greenhough and Roe (2011) in suggesting that the 
dogs in my field sites participate in a process of ongoing assent or dissent that is 
communicated somatically and attended to in the affective encounters between human and 
dog. Consequentially, I argue that the relationships between human and dog here are 
reciprocally shaped, as are the conditions of the dog’s participation. 
 
While there is, undoubtedly, ethical value in accommodating space for the animal to 
respond or resist in scientific practices, the way animals are treated, or cared for, has 
epistemological value too. The notion that the emotional experiences of animals influences 
the data of scientific study has been widely recognized by scientists since the late 
nineteenth century, with Otniel Dror (1999, 205) noting that in order to prevent the 
contamination of their results, Anglo-American physiologists set about ‘recording, 
reporting, managing, and controlling the emotions of laboratory animals during 
physiological encounters’. As a result, it has been argued, ‘the practice of knowing’ 
becomes ‘a practice of caring’ (Despret 2004, 130). 
As Carrie Friese (2013) notes, among her scientist informants working with model 
animals, ‘poor care for animals is believed to result in inadequate scientific findings’ (129). 
The promotion of caring encounters, on the other hand, is said to facilitate ‘more 
responsive relationships between researchers and research-subjects…making it difficult to 
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manipulate subjects into merely conforming with pre-established assumptions (Stengers 
1997; 2010; 2011)’ (Giraud and Hollin 2016, 2). From this perspective, care has been 
considered as facilitating research subjects to ‘speak back’: the practice that, for 
philosopher Isabelle Stengers (1997), distinguishes ‘good’ from ‘bad’ science. According 
to Stengers, if the object under study is prevented from ‘speaking back’, scientific practice 
is threatened because ‘the research has been done with the ulterior motive of imposing an 
answer on it’ (McClintock in Stengers 1997, 126). 
 Whereas Stengers focuses on what it means for research objects like atoms or cells 
to ‘speak back’, Candea (2013) points out that animals (including humans) ‘are more 
easily affected by “obligations” (rules and constraints imposed by experimenters) and may 
find it harder to impose their own “requirements” on the scientist’ (109). Thus, when 
studying animals, it can be harder to afford the space Stengers insists is necessary to 
‘ensure that the object has been given every chance to “object” to the theories and 
assumptions of the scientists’ (Candea 2013, 109). In such circumstances, care is depicted 
as especially imperative, given that practices of care foster a richer understanding of the 
needs of one’s research subjects and enable researchers to respond appropriately (Davies 
2012; Greenhough and Roe 2011). 
 
In addition to the epistemological value of care, from this critical standpoint we can also 
consider care’s productive value. Such reflection is required, given that my informants 
often made explicit an association between their care for the dog’s subjective experience 
and the issue of productivity. For example, the notion that ‘happy dogs work harder’ was 
often professed by trainers at both organisations.60 While highlighting the productive value 
of care, I do not propose that the trainers do not, simultaneously, have altruistic concerns 
for the welfare and wellbeing of the dogs. Although the dogs’ labour is arguably 
commodified by the humans who task them to work in the processes of training and testing, 
these animals are not reduced to mere commodities for human exploitation. Rather, we 
can observe how care is often ambivalent in practice.  
To help illustrate this argument, I draw on Eva Giraud and Gregory Hollin’s (2016) 
analysis of the ambivalent role of care within the first large-scale experimental beagle 
colony at the University of California, Davis, which took place between 1951 and 1986. 
                                                 
60 Within the scientific literature on animal behaviour, there are proven links between dog 
welfare and working ability. See Rooney et al. 2005; 2007; 2008. 
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Of this research process, the authors argue that although care practices shown towards the 
dogs permeated the experiments, with space for the dogs to ‘object’ and reshape the 
environment, ‘care was ultimately utilized to meet predetermined experimental goals’ 
(Ibid., 7). Thus, rather than simply attending to the affective qualities of the dogs, they 
argue that the researchers placated the objections and desires of the dogs ‘so that they 
could not threaten experimental goals’ (Ibid., 10). In short, the researchers were ‘learning 
from them in order to actively manipulate these qualities, moulding the animals into 
“experimental dogs”’ (Ibid., 13).  
Certainly, in attending to the needs and desires of the dogs, my informants seek to 
incorporate the knowledge they acquire about the dogs—both at the level of the species 
and the individual—into their practices; subsequently shaping and promoting the 
emergence of particular kinds of dogs (i.e., reliable detection dogs and good research 
subjects), people (i.e., response-able trainers-come-researchers) and data.  
 
v. Conclusion 
Following an understanding of care as a methodological means of paying attention to the 
feelings and needs of another, this chapter has detailed how accommodating space for the 
dogs to respond or resist in training practices can promote more care-full training and 
research practices. The insights developed here arguably reflect the increasingly 
significant role of ‘cultures of care’ in animal research (Davies et al. 2018), where the 
cultivation of a good culture of care is argued to be an ongoing, relational process between 
the caretaker and the cared for (Greenhough and Roe 2018). 
This discussion has engaged with the ethical, epistemological and productive 
values of accommodating care practices into bio-detection dog-training and research, 
revealing that even mundane practices of care are entangled with questions of nonhuman 
agency. The capacity of the dogs to express their agency, as beings who can speak back, 
has been demonstrated to be enabled with practices and material equipment that are 
amenable to tinkering in relation to the individual dog, and through the formation of 
relations between trainer-come-researcher and bio-detection dog whereby the trainer ‘risks 
being touched/affected by what matters for the animal he/she observes’ (Despret 2013, 
57). These relationships are further supported by a research protocol that promotes the 
frequent encounter of individual humans and dogs. Therefore, rather than passive black-
boxes or animals merely instrumentally moulded into pre-determined and fixed 
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experimental objects, I have argued that the particular approaches and methods of training 
adopted by my human informants enable the dogs themselves to jointly constitute the 
material reality of everyday activities. 
 In the following chapter I will consider how the agency of the dogs shapes not only 
the course of events within a single training session, but how this might be understood to 
be involved in the shaping of the dogs’ labour more broadly, conceptualized in terms of 
‘careers’. Notions of care will remain implicit as I turn to consider how attempts to 
incorporate the dog’s perspective and desires into decisions about their daily occupation 
supports the dogs to flourish as individuals. 
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Chapter 6. Careers, Flourishing and Interspecies Responsibility 
 
In this chapter, I unpack the terminology used by the organisations to frame the dog’s 
relationships with their labour. First, I consider the notion shared among my informants, 
that the dogs have an element of choice, both in their everyday training activities and in 
selecting their career specialty. Understood as ‘co-workers’, I assess how personhood is 
projected onto them. Then, I illustrate and reflect on the trainers’ shared desire to offer the 
dogs meaningful lives and support them to reach their potential. 
 
i. A Dog’s Choice? 
In this section, the dog’s agency—both as it is constructed and represented by the humans, 
and how it is observed to be displayed by the dogs themselves—is explored further, 
through an analysis of my informants’ framing of the dog’s work in terminology that 
emphasizes ‘choice’. The emphasis on choice here, as an indicator of agency, reflects the 
assertion by Sarah McFarland and Ryan Hediger (2009, 18) that ‘choice is part of what 
defines agency’ among animals. 
The conceptualization of these dogs as beings for whom choices are available is 
fundamentally tied to ideas about the consequences of the training methods used. For 
instance, reflecting on how she perceives the dog’s subjectivity as differing, depending on 
whether their training is based on traditional force-based methods or contemporary 
methods of positive reinforcement, Jen stressed: 
 
“There’s a completely different component to the way dogs work with force versus 
positive reinforcement, because you have a dog that’s motivated here [at PVWDC] 
with positive reinforcement. There’s food, there’s toys, there’s tugs, there’s tactile 
touch. Whatever motivates the dog, that’s what we utilise to train them. Whereas, 
with this other method [of force and punishment, imposed by her previous 
employer], there really was no reward for the dog to work. So, the dog’s 
demeanour, their performance and their body language was a lot different for sure. 




According to Jen, when methods of force characterize training, dogs work because they 
have to. However, when force is absent, the conditions of the relationship are altered and 
dogs do not ‘have’ to work in the same way in which they do under physical restraint (or 
the threat of). Instead, working becomes more of a ‘choice’ on the part of the dog, who, if 
he partakes in this work elects to not because of a threat of punishment should he not 
cooperate, but because he wants to gain the reward: a particular food or toy that is 
considered desirable to the dog.  
Taking this position a step further, Edminster (2011b, 41) notes that the staff, 
volunteers, and clients working with assistance dogs in the United States not only assert 
that the dogs want to do this work, but in addition ‘they have to want to do this 
work…independent motivation, action, and desire on the part of the dogs are absolutely 
essential’. Certainly, where human force is omitted from any kind of animal training, in 
order to succeed the willing cooperation of the animal is necessary. However, the specific, 
often life-saving labour that assistance dogs are tasked with, places significant emphasis 
on the will of the dog to perform his duties. For instance, the assistance dogs trained by 
the organisation Edminster worked with are trained to assist individuals with a range of 
health issues, from diabetes to hearing-loss, that make the client highly vulnerable to 
navigating everyday life and mean that their health and safety is dependent on the 
independent desire of their dogs to consistently and repeatedly perform their trained duties.  
As aforementioned in chapter 3, the labour of bio-detection dogs is distinct from 
that of assistance dogs in important ways: a recognition that helps us to account for the 
particular understanding of choice in Edminster’s context. However, consistent with the 
desired disposition of an assistance dog as described by Edminster’s informants, my trainer 
interlocutors too can be understood as seeking to enroll and work with dogs who are 
characterized by ‘independent motivation, action, and desire’ (Ibid.) to work. At MDD, 
the dogs’ ‘independent desire’ to work is routinely said to be illustrated by the often-
present gaggle of dogs sat at the door of the training room, watching through the window 
that runs down the length of the door while another dog is in a training session. Whenever 
a trainer opens the door to let a dog in for training, others often attempt to sneak in.  
However, whilst independent motivation, action, and desire are considered 
important attributes of bio-detection dogs, their labour must be understood as predicated 
on a relationship of interdependence between the dog and his trainer. While working 
independently on their respective species-specific tasks—the dog sniffing and responding 
to odours, and the human interpreting the dog’s behaviour and providing him with 
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feedback—their work is a mutually constituted practice in which the pair can also be 
understood to work in tandem. Thus, whilst the dogs can be considered agents, their 
actions are fundamentally entangled with those of their human training partners, and vice 
versa, demanding an ethnographic engagement with both partners in order to acquire an 
understanding of how the dogs exercise their agency in practice.  
 The previous chapter detailed how, through an attentiveness to the dog’s body, 
trainers attempt to acquire what we might call the dog’s ‘active cooperation’ (Haraway 
2008, 55): a sensibility that is subject to ongoing renegotiation in their repeat encounters. 
What I want to highlight in this section however, is that when dogs are considered to be 
willing participants, trainers consider it their responsibility to respond to the dog in a 
manner that supports the dog’s ability to achieve his potential. To do so, they offer the dog 
motivation that they consider appropriate—to both the dog as a species and to the 
particular dog as an individual.  
Speaking to a group of visiting high school students on a morning tour of PVWDC, 
Sue explained why she considers the practice of motivating dogs to be so essential to her 
role as a trainer; likening the necessity of instilling motivation in dogs to the students’ own 
motivation to attend school and their teacher’s motivation to do their job: 
 
“If I took away your grades and said, ‘Just study and you know, good luck getting 
into college,’ would you wanna keep studying? Or if I said, ‘Hey you’re gonna 
earn grades, you’re gonna earn college, you’re gonna earn scholarship money,’ 
then you have a reason to study. Or, just because learning is a great thing to do. 
But if I take away teacher’s pay checks and say, ‘Keep coming to work,’ their 
motivation drops. So if we don’t motivate dogs, they’re just like us. What 
motivates them to do something? Value in rewards is really important, just like if 
I give you a really hard job and only pay you a dollar. Or it’s a really hard job and 
I’m gonna pay you one hundred dollars, you’re gonna be more motivated to do that 
job. So there’s value in treats too. Kibble, like the regular dog food that they get 
every day is kind of low. And then maybe for each dog it’s different, maybe a dog 
loves cheese or chicken.” 
 
As Sue notes, the reward that motivates one dog to want to work is not necessarily the 
same for another dog. Therefore, a further associated element of the trainer’s role is to get 
to know the specific preferences of the individual dogs under their supervision, in order to 
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find out what kind of reward motivates each dog enough to choose to work. This involves 
spending periods of time with an individual dog, over repeat encounters, and paying 
attention to his responses to the environment in order to build up an understanding of his 
motivators and aversions. This knowledge subsequently shapes the reward system for that 
individual dog. For instance, during one of Sandy’s first ‘runaway’61 training sessions at 
PVWDC, I observed Jen, her trainer, offer the dog the opportunity to exercise agency with 
regards to the kind of reward that would be used for the session. 
 
Up on the eerily cold and dilapidated first floor of ‘227’—the abandoned former paint-
factory that shares PVWDC’s campus and in which they conduct some of their training 
searches—I am stood holding on to the end of a leash. At the other end of the leash is 
Sandy, a five-month-old petite yellow Labrador, with whom we are preparing to practice 
some runaways. Jen throws several toys—rope tugs, balls on string and plush teddies—
onto the ground down the corridor. She tells me to let Sandy loose. As I let go of the leash, 
dropping it to the floor, Sandy runs towards the toys. Jen calls out to Sandy, “Pick a toy!” 
After exploring a few of the toys with her mouth, Sandy becomes very interested in a 
squeaky, fluffy toy; persistently biting it. Watching her, Jen comments, “Ooh it’s a 
squeaker, you like that one?” Sandy hops back over to Jen with the toy dangling from her 
mouth. With Sandy’s reward now established, we are ready to begin the runaway. Jen asks 
Sandy to drop the toy, which she then picks up and passes to the intern who has volunteered 
to play the ‘runaway’. He takes this with him as he goes off to hide in a room down the 
corridor and uses it to reward Sandy when she finds him. 
 
Acknowledging the individuality of the dogs, the trainers attempt to afford space 
for the dog to make choices with regards to the training rewards. Although Sandy, the dog 
in the above example, is not a dog in training for medical detection per se, similar practices 
of reward choice occur throughout the search specialties at PVWDC. Whilst dogs 
                                                 
61 During training of puppy ‘runaways’, a person acting as a ‘runaway’—usually an intern 
or volunteer—shows the dog a toy before running away, down the corridor and hiding, 
typically in a cupboard within a room. Once the runaway is out of sight, the trainer then 
releases the leash from the dog’s harness and tasks him to ‘Go find’. Prior to commencing 
the runaway, the dog’s trainer tells the hider how many barks to wait for before opening 
the cupboard, revealing themselves to the dog and rewarding the dog for finding them with 
toy play. 
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conducting the task of disease detection, at both organisations, are typically rewarded with 
food for each correct response62, a particular, ‘favourite,’ toy of the dog is often brought 
out at the end of a session to facilitate play.  
 
ii. Careers and Personhood 
In order to reveal further the particular shape of canine agency among bio-detection dogs, 
in this section I explore how the practices and discourses surrounding the dog’s labour are 
conceived and represented with regards to a terminology of ‘careers’. In doing so, I 
highlight a distinction between the U.K. and U.S. field sites. This discussion also illustrates 
a case through which evolving ideas of human responsibility towards dogs emerge as key. 
 
Both organisations portray the dogs’ relationships with their own labour in terms of 
‘careers’ and their labour is understood as something the dogs have actively chosen, and 
continue to choose, to do. However, the emphasis on the careers of detection dogs is 
especially marked at PVWDC, where each dog in the training programme eventually 
graduates as a specialist in a particular field of scent-detection. This is referred to by the 
staff as a dog’s ‘major’, mirroring the American university system whereby students get 
the chance to focus on something they themselves want to study. Thus, especially at 
PVWDC, where dogs eventually become specialists in one area, it is considered that dogs 
are active agents in determining their career path. Speaking to members of the public 
during a tour of the center, Training Director Angela explains: 
 
“No major is declared until they’re older. It’s kind of like, we train them and see 
what areas they work the best in and then we put them in those areas: search and 
rescue, live find, human remains, police work, explosives, narcotics, bed bugs, 
cancer.”  
 
In order to assess what area a dog is most-suited to, the trainers constantly consider 
whether, for instance, a dog demonstrates confidence and enjoyment searching for hidden 
people on the uneven surface of the rubble yard, or if he excels instead at searching 
samples on the carousel inside the training room. Career decisions are thus arguably 
shaped by the actions, performances and preferences of the dogs themselves who, under 
                                                 
62 See note 42 for an explanation of reward variation across the search specialties. 
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the conditions of the style of positive-training adopted by the trainers, are supported to 
exercise agency and have their preferences attended to by the humans.  
 
The notion that the individual dogs have an element of choice, or are afforded the capacity 
to influence decisions, with regards to the particular area in which they will eventually 
specialize is a matter of pride for PVWDC.63 It is something that they recognize sets them 
apart from other dog-training organisations, such as The Seeing Eye,64 where the future 
career of a dog is pre-determined from the outset. Cynthia even attributes this personalized 
aspect of their training methodology with the center’s extremely high success rate of dog 
graduates: 
 
“Right now, 93% of our graduates have jobs. That is in comparison to the usual 
service dog programmes where it’s about 50% of the dogs end up in the careers 
that were selected originally for them. In the original TSA [Transportation Security 
Administration] breeding programme, only 30% of those puppies actually made it 
into the TSA. At the end of their ten-year plan they were up to about 70%, which 
is a good number but still not close to what we’re talking about when we’re looking 
at 93%.” 
 
Cynthia goes on to suggests that this element of ‘choice’ on the part of the 
individual dog ought to be factored in by the individuals and state organisations (e.g., the 
                                                 
63 Implicit in the practice of matching dogs to roles they are perceived to desire is an 
assumption that dogs want to work in the first place. In addition to the previous chapter’s 
discussion regarding the somatically-assessed expression of a dog’s will to work, I suggest 
that this supposition must also be understood in relation to the specific selection and 
breeding process adopted by PVWDC. The dogs at PVWDC are bred from ‘working 
lines’, meaning that they have been selectively bred to participate in high-energy work 
such as hunting and retrieving. This breeding practice distinguishes working dogs from 
other dogs who are bred from ‘show lines’ to confirm to the aesthetics of a breed standard. 
It is with a recognition of this biopolitical understanding of the breeding of these dogs, as 
beings with desirable behavioural traits that have been selected for by humans—in other 
words, animals that have literally been brought into this world to work for and with 
humans—that Cynthia’s perception of the dogs as inherently wanting to work must be 
understood.  
64 The Seeing Eye is a charity in the USA and the oldest dog school in the world training 
guide dogs to live with and assist blind people. 
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U.S. Department of Defense) who are working to develop a national detection dog 
breeding programme. Giving a ‘Lunch n Learn’ presentation65 at the center one day, she 
also associates the individualization of careers with welfare issues: 
 
“Our dogs can have any career they want. So our success rate is based on fitting 
the dog to a career that works for it. So we can put as many dogs into careers as 
possible. And I think that if we limit ourselves and say we’re only gonna do bomb 
dogs, we’d actually end up doing a dis-service because we’d end up having dogs 
that don’t fit and then we’re gonna have a welfare issue that we’re producing an 
excessive number of dogs and we don’t have jobs for them.” 
 
Cynthia’s articulation of the organisation’s goal to match each dog to a career that 
works for the individual dog reflects a moral standpoint widely shared by my trainer 
informants regarding their obligations towards the dogs. Namely, this is that it is their 
responsibility to ensure these dogs have the opportunity to engage their innate desire to 
work, and to do so under conditions that respond to the individual dog’s needs and desires 
in work that is meaningful to the dog. 
 
This desire to place dogs in careers based on what the individual dog is perceived to enjoy 
doing is explicitly connected to a notion of the dog’s ‘happiness’: an element of canine 
subjectivity that the trainers believe they can, and ought, as responsible trainers, to nurture. 
Happiness is clearly considered by my informants to be associated with the dog’s 
perceived agency in the training process. Recall Jen’s comment about her previous 
experience training with methods of force: “They just weren’t happy working dogs. They 
worked because they had to.” Thus, both choice and happiness are understood as aspects 
of a dog’s subjectivity that, whilst largely elided through methods of force, are, on the 
                                                 
65 ‘Lunch n learn’ is a weekly hour-long slot of presentations given by trainers, interns and 
vet-externs across a variety of topics. For instance, I saw trainers give practical 
demonstrations of canine stretching exercises, interns give presentations on the data-
collection projects they’ve been involved with and vet-externs talk on topics including 
canine vision and canine behavioural medications. This event fosters the sharing of 
knowledge and expertise throughout the PVWDC community. Everybody who is on site 
that day, including Cynthia, typically attends, eating their packed lunches whilst listening 
to the presenter.  
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contrary, acknowledged and encouraged through an emphasis on positive, dog-centered 
training methods.  
Implicit in Jen’s comment is an illustration of the recent shift in approaches to dog-
training, whereby today, especially in the context of canine obedience sports that Justyna 
Wlodarczyk (2017) considers, ‘It is expected that dogs interacting with humans should 
look like they are enjoying themselves’ (41). Also in the context of dog sports, Leena 
Koski and Pia Bäcklund (2017) suggest that among dog-trainers, the dog’s happiness 
during a performance is tied to a sense that the task is ‘internally’ desirable to the dog. 
Thus, it becomes the trainer’s responsibility to provide the conditions under which 
dogs are enabled to flourish. Here, the happiness, or joy, of dogs—inferred via attention 
to somatic sensibilities—is a significant indicator through which flourishing can be 
evaluated. It is notable that this emphasis on canine happiness has emerged at a time when 
popular and academic interest in human happiness has peaked in the west (Walker and 
Kavedžija 2015). 
 
Even under the conditions of positive-training whereby dogs can ‘speak back’, their 
happiness is not considered fixed but subject to change dependent on various factors, 
including the dog’s personal biography. This points to another significant way in which 
the dogs’ careers are understood by these organisations, with regard to their temporality: 
the dog’s career is not understood as fixed but changeable over time. For instance, several 
of the dogs at MDD are described by the charity as ‘career-change’ dogs. One such dog, 
Jazz, a prostate-cancer detection dog, was bred by a British guide dog charity. After several 
months of training in the guide dog programme however, she was assessed and determined 
to be too inquisitive about odour to make a suitable guide dog. Her keen nose helped to 
make her a suitable candidate for detection work instead. Additionally, several of the dogs 
working in the bio-detection department at MDD are ‘career-change’ dogs within the 
charity, having transitioned from the medical alert assistance side of the charity. The 
reasons most commonly expressed, for dogs undergoing this kind of shift in career, 
pertained to problems with the dog’s ‘public access’ suitability.66 
                                                 
66 All assistance dogs accredited with Assistance Dogs International must undergo a public 
access test to ensure the dog can work safely and behave appropriately in public settings. 
The general areas covered by the test include the dog’s ability to walk to heel, display 
obedience to his handler’s commands, and not respond with aggression or fear to 
environmental distractions. 
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Even within the bio-detection department itself, certain adjustments can be made 
for individual cases to ensure a dog’s happiness in his career. Ed clarified his ethos of 
finding ‘the right job for the right dog’ with the example of Ellie, a dog who had recently 
been assigned a new role within the bio-detection department that requires her to search 
for odour outside of the bio-detection training room. Ed explains the reasoning behind this 
shift in Ellie’s job description, referring to his perception of Ellie’s degree of enjoyment 
in her work:  
 
“Ellie felt constricted and sort-of confined working the stand system in that bio-
room. But take Ellie outside, and you probably saw a little bit last week she really 
excelled and her tail was going: she loved it. I think finding the right job for the 
right dog is important and I think they do enjoy it.” 
 
Here we see another illustration of how an attention to the dog’s somatic 
sensibilities promotes care-full (Greenhough and Roe 2011) practices, in this case 
regarding the details of a dog’s ‘career’. While the previous chapter illustrated the capacity 
of the bio-detection dog to say ‘no’ in response to their situation, the example of Ellie’s 
subtler workplace adjustment is a case in which her trainer has responded to a dog who 
has said ‘no but’ (Kirk 2017, 218). 
 
While the animals used in scientific research have, up until recently, been regularly 
conceived of as the researchers’ ‘tools of the trade’ (Birke 2012, 13) and their development 
described as creating the ‘right tools for the job’ (Clarke and Fujimura 2002), it is clear 
that bio-detection dogs—as beings assumed as occupying careers which they themselves 
help to determine—are, on the contrary, understood and treated by the people working 
alongside them as co-workers with agency and personhood. Ed explained his perception 
of the dogs to me during an interview:  
 
“For me, they’re not tools. They’re probably co-workers. They’re not a piece of 
equipment with no personality. They all have their personality. And you don’t have 
to adapt the way you use a tool. You have to adapt the way you work a dog. So, 




Thus, explicitly challenging perceptions of animals as passive automata or generic 
tools, my informants’ understandings of bio-detection dogs are consistent with the 
increasing recognition that many animals are more self-aware and conscious than had 
previously been thought possible through a lens of human exceptionalism (Birke et al. 
2004, 174). More than two decades ago, in 1994, the historian of science, Robert Kohler, 
hinted at a challenge to the conventionally-assumed binary between scientist and research 
subject in his fleeting description of fruit flies in the lab: animals he described not only as 
lab tools but also as the scientist’s ‘co-worker’. Although Kohler does not expand further 
on this theme in his work, scholars have illustrated that, in keeping with my own 
observations, many researchers do not consider or handle their animal subjects as mere 
tools or instruments (e.g., Dror 1999). 
As Kendra Coulter (2016, 70) notes, in her monograph Animals, Work, and the 
Promise of Interspecies Solidarity, ‘We cannot simply dismiss animals’ roles as passive 
or see animals as mere instruments for human’s work’. Having studied the work done by, 
with, and for various species of animals, Coulter argues that animals spanning an 
exhaustive list of working categories (including law enforcement, military, health care, 
sport and agriculture) should be identified as workers, building her argument by following 
Ingold’s (1986, 88) contention, that ‘the domestic animal in the service of man constitutes 
labour itself rather than its instrument, and hence that the relationship between man and 
animal is in this case not a technical but a social one’.  
Regarding laboratory animals used in clinical trials, Jonathon Clark (2014) makes 
the case for acknowledging their identity as workers. In developing his argument, he draws 
analogies with work exploring the role of humans in experimental research. In particular, 
he builds on Melinda Cooper’s (2008) notion of ‘experimental or clinical labourers’, which 
she uses to refer to the group of human ‘guinea pigs’ partaking in clinical trials and often 
lacking labour rights. This notion is extended by Clark to account for the subjectivity of 
actual guinea pigs (and other animals). Whilst advancing such an argument however, Clark 
remains mindful of the human–animal relations of production that these animals find 
themselves in: a factor that is regularly used by critical animal studies scholars to challenge 
attempts to extend the category of labour to animals. Indeed, while recognizing that 
animals might exercise agency in some ways—for instance, cows on the way to slaughter 
being reluctant to follow the herd—Thierman (2010) suggests that this kind of resistance 
is limited and related to the fact that ‘many animals find themselves within human systems 
that are constructed so as to ensure a kind of perpetual domination’ (98).  
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However, other scholars remain wholly critical about the notion of animals as 
workers, or even as individuals capable of exercising some kind of agency. Notably, 
Zipporah Weisberg (2009) claims that, ‘[i]n reality, animals in labs are not workers—not 
even alienated workers—but worked-on objects, slaves by any other name’ (36). Weisberg 
adds, ‘To call them anything else is to gloss over the brutal reality of the total denial of 
their ability to act in any meaningful way—namely, as self-determining subjects’ (Ibid., 
39). For Haraway (2008) however, the suggestion that animals are not their own ‘self-
directed’ beings does not warrant their preclusion from the category of ‘worker’. 
Considering the case of working sheepdogs, while acknowledging the sheepdog’s lack of 
self-direction, Haraway (Ibid., 55) notes that in fulfilling their roles it is essential that the 
dogs’ ‘active cooperation’ is enlisted by the human directing the work. Thus, Haraway 
readily identifies these animals as workers, ‘who produce surplus value by giving more 
than they get in a market-driven economic system’ (Ibid.). Nevertheless, Haraway 
considers dogs neither within the category of ‘human slaves’ nor ‘wage labourers’ and 
argues that their labour should not be theorized within such frameworks: ‘They are paws, 
not hands’ (Ibid., 56). For Haraway, the difficulty in analysing these matters relates to the 
categories for subjects that are expressed in humanist terms (Ibid., 67). Thus, whilst 
simultaneously emphasizing the status of many dogs as workers and rejecting the 
analogies of wage labour and slavery, Haraway highlights the lack of suitable nonhumanist 
conceptual tools and terms with which to analyse these matters.  
 
Understood by their trainers as co-workers engaged in meaningful careers, notions of 
personhood are projected onto the dogs at both organisations. However, I observe that this 
is in some ways more pronounced at my American field site, and effected in a way that 
places greater emphasis on the notion of personhood as being tied to the value of 
individuality. Indeed, in many ways, PVWDC is a highly individualizing environment for 
the dogs. This is readily observable, for instance, in the ‘veterinary infrastructure’ (Irvine 
2016) of the individual kennels in which the dogs are kept whilst on-site. Posters are fixed, 
either on the wall besides, or attached to each kennel with cable-ties, giving a biographic 
outline of each dog: information that is especially helpful for incoming volunteers who are 
unfamiliar with the dogs. As well as including a photograph, the dog’s name, date of birth, 
breed, and potential career, the posters detail the dog’s requirements, preferences and 
aversions with regards to diet, toys, and other dogs. There are also specific handling 
instructions such as harness requirements. 
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At PVWDC, paper technologies such as these posters are not only used to give 
individualizing information that help construct canine personhood, but also to obtain data 
that is used to inform understandings of the individual. Various sheets and charts are used 
to collect data regarding aspects of the dog’s health and wellbeing, for instance their 
weight. Whilst at both organisations, every dog’s weight is monitored, this is less routine 
at MDD in contrast to PVWDC where it is a daily practice, as referred to in chapter 3. This 
frequent monitoring of the individual dogs here also extends to their toilet activities. At 
PVWDC, each dog’s toilet activity during the day is recorded via a ‘potty chart’ located 
on a desk in the kennel area. When returning back from taking a dog outside, the handler 
is required to note the time the dog went outside and whether the dog urinated or defecated. 
As a visual tool, the chart helps staff to prioritize dogs who need to be taken out. In addition 
to ensuring the dogs’ basic needs are met, these charts, combined with the activity sheets 
described in chapter 5, can be interpreted as technologies of surveillance that enable the 
organisation’s monitoring of individual dogs, as well as comparison against other 
individuals. 
The entanglement of individuality and personhood is illustrated at PVWDC in 
other ways still. For example, when dogs complete their training and are sold on to a 
handler, for instance within the police, a graduation ceremony is held at the center to mark 
the dog’s transition and a certificate is awarded to the handler and dog team, inscribed with 
the names of both. Beyond the walls of the center too, it is possible to observe the 
projection of dog personhood. For instance, in 2016, Cynthia testified in front of the Senate 
Homeland Security Committee about how to address the country’s shortage of ‘home-
grown’ dogs capable of supporting matters of national security.67 Rather than talk about 
the work of detection dogs in their absence, Cynthia brought along Zach, the drugs 
detection dog in-training referred to in chapter 3. As Cynthia gave her testament, Zach sat 
next to her and was identified with his own nameplate on the desk. 
At MDD, although the dogs are certainly recognized as individuals with 
personhood, and aspects of their health and training exercises are also recorded and 
compared, these individualizing practices are conducted to a considerably lesser degree 
                                                 
67 The majority of the nation’s service dogs (i.e., military and law enforcement) are 
currently sourced from Eastern Europe. While the USA did previously have a national 
breeding programme, operated by the TSA for ten years, this was closed in 2012 due to 
budgetary constraints (Cusack 2017).  
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than I observed at PVWDC. This might be explained in part by the American emphasis on 
individualism which is more extreme than in any other culture (Lasch 1978; Shore 1996). 
Thus, at PVWDC, personal choice, as a fundamental element of American individualism, 
is arguably being projected onto the dogs. 
 
In this discussion, rather than a dogs’ specialty, or ‘career’, being framed as a result of the 
sole agency of either human or dog alone, I have proposed an analysis of canine career 
choice as a practice that is mutually negotiated by both, as trainers’ decisions are informed 
by the knowledge acquired in the affective encounters in which the parties routinely and 
repeatedly meet. Furthermore, this discussion has revealed the trainers’ sense of obligation 
they feel towards enabling the dogs to pursue careers that are enjoyable to them as 
individuals. The following section of this chapter reflects further on this notion of trainer 
responsibility. 
 
iii. Supporting Bio-Detection Dogs to Flourish 
On several occasions during training sessions at MDD, I observed as Neil completely re-
organized the formation of the four stands from a straight line into a curve, responding to 
dogs who were searching the lineup very quickly. He regularly explained adjustments like 
this, or acts of tinkering as I have proposed, in terms of him helping to ‘set the dog up for 
success’—a phrase that he borrows from renowned American dog-trainer Grisha Stewart. 
Neil clearly considers it a part of his role as a trainer to give the dogs the best chance 
possible to make ‘good’ choices in their work 
The manner in which the relationship between the dogs and their labour are framed 
by my informants—namely, in terms of ‘setting the dog up for success’, canine choice and 
happiness—reflects an emergent perspective associated with the shift in training 
philosophy outlined in the previous chapter. Specifically, my analysis follows 
Wlodarczyk’s (2017; 2018) observation that the shift towards dog-centered training 
approaches has promoted the development of an ethical impulse among dog-trainers, 
whereby there is an increasing desire to ‘incorporate an appreciation of animal alterity into 
training practices’ (2017, 41). One element of this ethical impulse, that I have illustrated 
in the practices of my human informants, is an attentiveness to what the individual dogs 
might themselves want or need to do, or what is recognized as most meaningful to them 
in order to support their flourishing—both as a species and as individuals. 
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As Wlodarczyk (2017) suggests, the accommodation of the dog’s alterity has been 
promoted alongside the move towards force-free, dog-centered training methods. This 
argument resonates with the experiences of many of my informants, for example Jen at 
PVWDC. Prior to working at PVWDC, Jen had worked for a dog-training business 
directed by a man with ‘old school’ methods, in her words. Clarifying what she meant by 
this description, she explained that tools such as choke chains and electronic collars were 
routinely advocated by her boss. Reflecting on the differences between this kind of training 
versus the force-free style she adopts now at PVWDC, Jen points out what she sees as 
most problematic about the methods prescribed by her previous employer: 
 
“We didn’t tailor our training to meet the dog’s needs. The training was tailored to 
meet the owner’s needs, business needs: this was a business, it really wasn’t 
tailored around research. It wasn’t tailored around what made the dogs better dogs, 
happier dogs, more motivated dogs. It was strictly tailored around making 
money…And he’s successful, in his eyes, he’s being a successful trainer because 
his business is thriving so why should he change or do anything differently, 
because he’s getting out of it what he needs out of it. The dogs might not be getting 
what they need, but he is.” 
 
Following a human-centered approach to training in her previous role, Jen was not 
required to get to know the dogs as individuals. She makes explicit her belief that this 
organisation was not oriented towards meeting the needs of the dogs but only the capitalist 
concerns of the business-owner. Such human-centered methods of enforced discipline and 
punishment arguably inhibit the potential for response-able relations to emerge as no 
accommodations are made for the dog to speak back nor, significantly, to be listened to. 
Meanwhile, when methods of force are omitted from the training protocol and the training 
approach is more dog-centered—fundamentally dependent on understanding what a dog 
wants the most—the success of training arguably depends on the ‘response-ability’ 
(Haraway 2008) of the two parties. Being response-able in their encounters, as I have 
illustrated in both this and the previous chapters, the trainers demonstrate what Paul 
McGreevy and colleagues (2017) refer to as ‘good dogmanship’. This quality is defined 
as being ‘all about reading dog behaviour and responding appropriately, meeting dogs’ 
behavioural needs and allowing them to reach their full potential in a training setting’ (2).  
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The ethical orientation of incorporating the needs and desires of the dogs into the 
training practices in order to offer the dog a meaningful life might be considered using 
what the philosopher Martha Nussbaum (2006) calls the ‘capabilities approach’. 
Nussbaum argues that each animal, with regards to both the species of the animal and the 
animal as an individual being, has a particular set of capabilities, or capacities for 
functioning. These capacities include life, bodily health, play, sense/imagination/thought, 
emotion, etc. In order for the animal to flourish, Nussbaum claims that those fundamental 
capacities require support from the animal’s material and social environment. In keeping 
with the analysis developed in this thesis, Nussbaum’s approach rejects a conception of 
animals as somehow isolated from their environment. 
The capabilities approach considers the capabilities of the animal with regards to 
its species’ basic capacities, while also paying attention to the capacities and personality 
of the individual. Following Nussbaum, I have observed how many of the dogs’ 
fundamental capacities are supported through the provision of both species-specific and 
individual care. For instance, I have shown that dogs are understood to have a species-
specific engagement with the world, grounded predominantly in their olfactory 
capabilities. Throughout the ethnographic examples I have presented, it is possible to 
observe how the dog’s capacities for bodily health, play, thought and emotion are attended 
to. 
More than a general knowledge of the dog as a species however, I have also pointed 
to the specificity with which my informants communicate with specific dogs as 
individuals, accounting for their personalities and individual preferences when considering 
a dog’s career trajectory. Furthermore, in tinkering with equipment and attending to 
somatic sensibilities through affective encounters that help to ‘set the dog up for success’, 
the trainers demonstrate a perceived obligation to support the dog to achieve his potential 
in tasks and with rewards that are meaningful to the individual dog. 
Nussbaum’s argument has also been used to consider approaches to animal welfare 
(Keulartz and Swart 2012, 132). To this end, I argue that the practice of bio-detection, 
which offers the dogs an opportunity to engage with and display their olfactory 
capability—arguably a capacity in jeopardy under the conditions of contemporary pet-
keeping, whereby some dogs are deprived of opportunities to utilize their olfactory 
systems to their potential—represents an instance in which a ‘less natural and more 




More than simply affecting the material reality of particular moments, this chapter has 
demonstrated that dogs are able to exercise agency surrounding the status of their 
livelihoods more broadly, conceptualized by their trainers in terms of ‘careers’. 
Considered as beings with choices and careers in their own right—fundamental aspects of 
life in a Euro-American context that are typically reserved for humans—I have argued that 
the dogs emerge as co-conversationalists in the shaping of their careers. 
Furthermore, in this chapter, I have explored how my informants’ response-ability 
shown towards their dogs’ labour illustrates their ethical impulse to offer the dogs 
meaningful lives: an obligation they endeavor to accomplish through a prioritization of the 
dog’s species-specific and personal subjectivity and capabilities within their training 
practices. Considering this analysis beyond the spaces of bio-detection dog training, it 
might be suggested that this ethical impulse reflects a broader shift in sensibilities about 
human responsibility towards other life forms on this planet, provoked by recent discourse 
on the anthropocene (e.g., Colombi 2009; Fuentes 2010; Vitebsky 2005).  
Additionally, in both their objectives and methodology, parallels can be drawn 
between my dog-trainer informants and the multispecies ethnographers ‘writing in the 
anthropocene’ (Rose 2009, 87) who are concerned with entanglements ‘of the host of 
organisms whose lives and deaths are linked to human social worlds’ (Kirksey and 
Helmreich 2010, 545). For instance, both dog-trainers and multispecies ethnographers are 
fundamentally concerned with developing a knowledge of the nonhuman and our 
interconnectedness. With regards to methodology, both maintain an emphasis on sustained 
interactions with the nonhuman other, with one’s body prized as a valuable tool for 
developing interspecies understanding. Finally, both are committed to a practice of 
reflexive examination with regards to one’s interpretations of the species that they 
represent. 
 
The discussion presented in this chapter, regarding the provision of opportunities for the 
dogs to fulfil their individual potential and desires, has alluded to the significance of trainer 
interpretations about the dog’s behaviour and feelings. In the next chapter, I turn the focus 
to the production and translation of such interpretations, with a specific emphasis towards 
understanding how these interpretations become scientific knowledge and how they 
inform representations of bio-detection dogs.  
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Chapter 7. Producing and Communicating Knowledge: Interpretations and 
Representations 
 
This chapter explores how the information offered by a detection dog becomes 
transformed into evidence that is meaningful among humans within and beyond the 
scientific arena. The chapter begins by detailing how, while a dog investigates odour 
samples and gives certain responses to them, his trainer attempts to make sense of, or 
interpret, the dogs’ behaviour, employing practices of reading and listening to the dog’s 
body, as outlined in previous chapters. Building on this however, I will illustrate how these 
interpretations are key to the production of data about a dog’s search, via their 
transformation into ‘inscriptions’ (Latour and Woolgar 1979). Considering the role of the 
dog in this process, I illustrate how, during training sessions—which are dynamic and 
responsive encounters, in contrast to the process of formal testing that is governed by strict 
conditions—the interpretations trainers make about the dog’s behaviour directly affect the 
course of events in that session. Furthermore, I examine the novel modes of speaking about 
dogs that are enabled by the inscriptions produced, highlighting the co-existence of 
multiple diverse modes of representation. Finally, this chapter presents a discussion 
concerning the efficacy of anthropomorphism as a concept for thinking about the 
intersubjective practices of interpretation performed by my dog-trainer informants. 
 
To preface the discussions of this chapter, it is worth noting that the data produced in these 
settings can be broadly divided into two categories: training and research. Firstly, from 
every training session data is produced which helps to inform trainer’s everyday 
knowledge about their dogs’ performance and progress. This is the most common type of 
data produced, as research trials tend to last only several weeks, whilst training for these 
trials can span six months or longer. It is however the data produced during phases of 
formal research trials that informs the findings presented in scientific publications. In each 
of the examples presented in this chapter I make explicit whether I am referring to 
encounters during training or trial stage 
 
i. Making Interpretations and Producing Inscriptions 
On Alexa’s command of “Seek seek,” Bertie hurries over to the first position on the 
carousel and pauses with his nose over the pot for what feels to me like less than a second, 
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before moving on to search the second, third and fourth positions in the same manner. He 
weaves his agile body around the carousel arms, with his nose leading the way as he 
searches each pot in succession before arriving at position five. When sniffing this pot, 
with his nose still hovering over the steel lid, he drops his bottom to the floor, and his eyes 
glance up towards the screen behind which Alexa, his trainer, is stood watching. Alexa 
calls out “indication,” to which Ed, sat at the computer desk in the corner of the room, 
responds “correct.” Alexa presses down on her clicker, causing it to exert a short, sharp 
‘click’ sound that lets Bertie know he has made the correct decision and that his reward 
is imminent. Alexa walks over to where Bertie is sat, his eyes fixed on her but his nose still 
hovering over the pot. He licks his lips as she gets within a few feet of him. Feeding him 
some kibble treats from her hand, Alexa tells Bertie he is a “good boy” as he chews.  
 Meanwhile, at the desk in the corner of the room, Ed taps away on the laptop, 
entering the data for this ‘run’.68 For positions one through four, he selects the option ‘no 
interest’ to describe Bertie’s responses to these samples. He records position number five 
as ‘indication’ and for positions six to eight he chooses the option ‘not searched’. He then 
saves this run on the laptop and gets up to set up the carousel for Bertie’s next search, 
switching the position of samples and replacing some with novel ones. 
 
During every training session at MDD, like the above, data is collected pertaining to the 
dog’s performance. For every sample available to a dog during a search, the trainer must 
choose one of the following entry codes to describe the dog’s behaviour: ‘indication’, 
‘hesitation’, ‘interest’, ‘clicked straight away’, ‘no interest’ or ‘not searched’. While the 
data categories available to record a dog’s search performance are thus limited, in practice 
a single category might be recorded to account for a variety of contextual circumstances 
in which the behaviour occurred.  
For instance, the category ‘not searched’ applies to any sample that a dog has not 
searched during a given pass. For example, imagine a target sample is in position 2, in a 
lineup of 4 stands. If the dog searches the samples in the successive order in which the 
samples are presented, successfully indicating at position 2 when he gets there, he is 
rewarded at this position by his trainer and not tasked to carry on searching the remaining 
positions 3 and 4. In this case, the dog has made the correct decision by searching the 
samples in order and stopping at the target. Positions 3 and 4 would be recorded as ‘not 
                                                 
68 A ‘run’ is the term used to refer to each novel lineup of samples.  
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searched’, but in this instance the absence of a search is not problematic as the dog has 
done his job correctly. Sometimes, however, the reason for recording a sample as ‘not 
searched’ is not because the dog has already found the target. Indeed, there is not always 
a target to find when dogs are trained to clear ‘blank’ lineups.69 
Furthermore, given that dogs are not passive tools but behaving creatures, their 
behaviour is often more nuanced than is reflected in the generation of inscriptions (Latour 
and Woolgar 1979) about their searches. For instance, an ‘indication’ is called by the 
trainer when a dog offers his ‘trained alert response’, or the behaviour—commonly, but 
not always, a ‘sit’70—that he has been trained to perform when he smells and recognizes 
his target odour. However, sitting on the identification a particular odour is not typically 
the response a dog is inclined to spontaneously offer, and thus requires training. Achieving 
a ‘clear’ and consistent alert response when the odour itself is subject to variation can be 
challenging, with the precise response offered by dogs differing subtly between them. 
Thus, the trainer’s interpretation is required to make sense of the dog’s behaviour. 
Additionally, individual dogs often respond in slightly different ways to 
differences in odours. Recall, for instance, the training session between Ed and Lola 
detailed in chapter 4, whereby Lola moved her body away from control samples in 
different ways depending on the particular contents of the control. Thus, the nuances of 
dog’s indications, and search behaviour more generally, are an important aspect of the dog 
that the trainer must learn about in order to make ‘correct’ interpretations. However, when 
the dog’s search behaviour is recorded, these more nuanced characteristics are essentially 
banished from the resultant data. This disparity was explicitly recognized by Simon at 
MDD, who mused, whilst looking over data pertaining to the searches of a particular dog 
on a computer spreadsheet, “When you look at the data, you don’t see how the dogs 
performed. You see the results, but not how they’ve performed.” 
                                                 
69 See note 43 for a description of blank lineups. 
70 When I asked trainers at MDD about their thoughts on trained alert responses, for 
instance why they train a dog to sit at the target instead of a different behaviour, they told 
me that, in principle, they do not mind what behaviour a dog uses to alert with, so long as 
it is ‘consistent’ and ‘clear’. Following instruction from the charity’s CEO however, there 
is an inclination towards ‘sit’ alerts, as this is considered to be a much less ambiguous 
behaviour than a standing alert. A dog in a seated position is also a clear visual response 
for those groups of people outside this niche field of training and research—including 
academic research collaborators and members of the public—to observe.  
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For the trainers, understanding how the dogs are performing is dependent on their 
own skilled bodily craft in listening and responding to the dogs. During training sessions, 
their interpretations about the behaviour of a dog are routinely used to shape the training 
session, highlighting the agency of the dog in this process. To illustrate how interpretations 
can be observed to inform the training, I draw on an example from a training session with 
Dougie at MDD that ties together many of the topics discussed in this thesis. In this 
session, the four stands are currently blank, comprised of control samples. Alexa, Dougie’s 
trainer, is working unblinded, meaning that she is aware of the composition of samples. 
The following excerpt begins ten minutes in to the training session. 
 
Dougie searches positions 1, 2 and 3, successively, showing ‘no interest’ in any of these 
samples. Before reaching position 4 however, he turns away from the line of stands and 
walks back to Alexa, his trainer, stood towards the beginning of the lineup. The data 
category recorded for position 4 of this pass is thus ‘not searched’. All four samples are 
controls, but to receive a reward, Dougie is required to search all positions and only then 
return to his trainer to indicate that no target is present. Dougie has failed to search all 
four, thus not correctly performing his search, and Alexa does not reward him. She and 
Ed try to make sense of Dougie’s actions: 
Alexa: “He knows, doesn’t he?” [That it is a blank lineup]. 
Ed: “He’s memorized the set. Is he being clever or trying to shortchange you?” 
Alexa and Dougie leave the room for a minute or so and wait on the other side of the door 
whilst Ed takes a target sample from the side and places it in position 4, removing the 
control sample from this stand. He explains to me that his plan is to teach Dougie that 
even when it appears as though the lineup is looking likely to be blank, it is always worth 
searching every position.  
Hearing Ed call out ‘ready’, Alexa and Dougie come back into the room. From the 
starting position, behind the screen, Alexa tasks Dougie to search. On this pass, after 
searching stands 1, 2 and 3, he returns to Alexa’s side, skipping position 4 again. Alexa 
asks him to sit, which he does. After a three second pause, she sends him to search the line 
again. On this second pass, he searches each sample in turn until he gets to position 4, 
which he sniffs and correctly indicates by moving his bottom to the floor.  




This example illustrates how, during training, a trainer’s interpretations directly shape the 
course of events. In this case, Dougie’s behaviour clearly affected Ed, as Ed’s 
interpretations of Dougie’s actions, as a case of second-guessing the lineup, demonstrably 
shaped Ed’s decisions with regards to the composition of the subsequent lineup. 
Specifically, Ed was forced to reflect on how Dougie was working and, consequentially, 
what Ed could do to best teach him, or as his colleague Neil would often put it, to ‘set the 
dog up for success’. 
Ed and Alexa’s interpretation of Dougie’s behaviour as guesswork is associated 
with the notion, often expressed to me by trainers, that many of the dogs are thought to be 
able to memorize the set of samples used during a given session. Due to limitations of 
sample availability that affected both of my field sites during my time in the field, usually 
a single set of samples was used during a training session, meaning that a dog will sniff 
many of the same samples several times during one session. The composition of each run 
within a session is kept distinct however, as sample positions are typically changed 
between runs and some novel samples are usually introduced throughout the session. 
However, being exposed to the same samples on more than one occasion, it is thought that 
dogs are able to memorize the sets of samples and can thus begin to anticipate the lineup 
composition before having searched all positions. Furthermore, as a result of working on 
the same ‘game’, with the same trainers and helpers—and hence, the same human bias—
several days per week, the dogs are also thought to be able to learn to pre-empt when a 
‘blank’ lineup might be coming up. To reduce human bias during training sessions, 
computer-based random number generators are sometimes used to randomly decide the 
lineup of samples, in particular when working with dogs in the more advanced stages of 
training.  
Trainers talk about this capability in somatic terms, describing dogs who they 
interpret to be engaged in guesswork as ‘depending on their head’ rather than their nose. 
For instance, commenting on the search behaviour of a dog with whom he had just worked, 
Simon remarked, “What he’s doing is fine, as long as he’s using his nose and not his 
[Simon points his finger to his own head] or that [points his finger to his eyes].” Among 
my informants, ‘head’ is used synonymously with mind or brain, and too great a reliance 
on one’s head is often thought to come at the expense of the dog’s methodical investigation 
of the odour which ought to be directed by his nose. As Kelly referred to a dog she was 
training, “I think at the moment she’s working on memory and behaviour, rather than 
odour. She expected it [the target] to be there.” 
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However, this is not to say that the trainers do not consider the dog’s mental 
capacity important in his search. Discussing Lola’s search behaviour between runs one 
day, Ed commented, “She’s just got to be in the right frame of mind. And at the minute 
she’s not…it’s ‘cause she’s not engaging her brain at [positions] 1 or 2.” Thus, a dog’s 
mental capacity is clearly considered an essential element of a detection dog, but it is also 
understood to be a potential hindrance if the dog’s behaviour is not being fundamentally 
guided by his nose. Ideally, therefore, trainers want dogs to use a balanced combination of 
their ‘nose’ and ‘head’ during a search. Whilst they want the dog to offer a particular 
trained bodily response to the target odour, they want the more spontaneous odour-
recognition to be the driving force behind this response. It might thus be said that, as 
detailed in chapter 4, trainers want the dogs to be affected by the target odour.  
Attending to how a dog communicates his capacity to memorize, or his ‘frame of 
mind’ in a given moment brings into focus the individual dog’s subjective experience of 
the world and recognizing their state of being is a practice dependent on the cultivation of 
response-able relationships (Haraway 2008, 71) between trainer and dog. Kirk (2013) 
makes a comparable argument in his reference to mine-detector dog handlers’ 
acknowledgment of their dogs’ ‘boredom’ in performing work that is extremely repetitive. 
For Haraway, response-ability is vital if interspecies relationships are to move beyond 
oppression or objectification. Her argument is informed by Despret’s (2006) insistence on 
the role of ‘interest’ in shaping how we pose questions of animals. The basic principle of 
STS, that methods and their practices do not merely help to describe reality but also help 
to produce the reality that they seek to understand (Law 2015), is extended by Despret into 
the realm of animal studies in her 2006 essay ‘Sheep do have opinions’. Using the example 
of the ethologist Thelma Rowell’s practice of giving her flock of sheep an extra bowl of 
food at meal times, Despret illustrates that the manner in which questions are posed to 
animals is not detached from the responses given. The reason for providing the group of 
22 sheep with 23 bowls of food: it offered grounds for new possibilities. By providing the 
sheep with an extra bowl, Rowell had offered sheep the opportunity to do something other 
than merely compete over resources. 
For the handlers of mine-detector dogs, Kirk observes that acknowledging the 
mine-dog’s boredom presented them with a level of flexibility with regards to interpreting 
the dog’s behaviour, as well as altering material practice through the introduction of 
variety to the dog’s everyday work environment. In a similar way, I have demonstrated 
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that ascribing the practice or memorization to bio-detection dogs leads to dynamic 
adjustments in the material practice of training. 
Whilst a dog’s memory and the associated practice of anticipatory guesswork 
might sometimes be thought to contribute to their decisions during training, the potential 
to draw on these capacities is eliminated when the stage of double-blind testing is reached. 
In formal testing, a dog only ever investigates each sample once, thereby ensuring that the 
scientific data relates only to the dog’s first exposure to each sample. Although the trainers 
expressed a desire to train in this way in the everyday, thus mirroring the strict conditions 
of testing, sample limitations often make this impossible. Exceptions are made, however, 
for the sessions in the week or two prior to testing, for which extra samples are put aside 
in order to get everybody—humans and dogs—practiced for the ‘real thing’. In their 
everyday training sessions too, the trainers adopt other practices in an attempt to reduce 
the potential for dog guesswork: in addition to the use of random number generators, two 
distinct sample sets are sometimes intermittently switched between over the course of one 
training session. 
 
In the process of training, therefore, rather than simply observing and reporting from afar, 
the trainers’ interpretations help to construct an understanding of why a dog might be 
working in a particular way and how they can help guide that dog towards the refinement 
of his search practices. Via the categories used to record the dog’s actions however, for 
instance in the above example, the trainer’s subjective interpretations of the dog’s 
behaviour, tied to his assumption of the dog’s guesswork and use of memory, are omitted. 
Thus, whilst the practice of interspecies intersubjectivity is integral to the interpretations 
made by the trainers and training decisions, the rich detail of these affective encounters is 
substantially collapsed in the simultaneous production of inscriptions—in the form of data 
categories—and the subsequent ‘written traces’ (e.g., statistics, graphs and tables) that 
reduce a dog’s performance to a combination of statistical units. Following Latour and 
Woolgar (1979), one might argue that the computer, as an inscription device with its 
prescribed categories, removes the data from its original context, and via the ‘written 
traces’ produced, the data appears as ‘raw nature’. The result is that a dog’s behavior, or 
performance, is standardized according to a fixed set of categories.  
According to Birke (2007 [1994], 328) it is the inscriptions ‘that create ‘data’, the 
facts of the scientific experiment, and help to create an air of authority about those data’. 
In the process, she claims, the animal under study shifts ‘from a behaving being to 
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becoming data’ (Birke 2012, 5). Birke’s argument builds on the earlier work of Lynch 
(1988), who, in his ethnographic research about neuroscientists studying rats, observes a 
contrast between, in his terms, everyday notions of the ‘naturalistic animal’ and the 
‘analytic animal’. For Lynch, the naturalistic animal refers to ‘the animal in ordinary 
perception and interaction; the animal of common sense, the animal as it is viewed and 
acted upon in the world of everyday life’ (Ibid., 267). It is the naturalistic animal that the 
neuroscientists in his study set out with and continually returned to in everyday 
conversation. Meanwhile, the analytic animal, is ‘ostensibly an artefact; a product of 
human intervention’ (Ibid., 270).  
Lynch notes how various ‘rendering practices’ enable the transformation of the 
living animal into the cultural object, ‘data’. In the context of the laboratory, this involves 
the ‘sacrifice’ of the animal71: ‘a pivotal moment in the rendering process’ (Lynch 1988, 
274). Through the sacrifice—a significant ritual in the case of the rats Lynch observes 
involved in neurological experimentation—the animal’s body is literally carved up and 
presented as biological material on a slide. Lynch compares this rendering process in 
laboratory work to the transformations of animals inside the slaughterhouse, where the 
domestic animal is transformed into the cultural object, ‘meat’ (Ibid., 273). Through these 
processes, he suggests that the naturalistic animal is transformed into an analytic object of 
research: a ‘ritual’ object with a ‘capacity to synthesize and circulate meanings from many 
domains and specific situation contexts’ (Ibid., 273).72 However, while Lynch assumes 
that naturalistic animals reside in the laboratory and are transformed into analytic beings 
in their deaths, Simone Dennis (2011; 2013) offers a more complex analysis of the 
relationships between rodents and scientists in the laboratory, based on her ethnographic 
research conducted in the USA. In particular, Dennis (2013) argues that ‘animals in the 
lab are analytic well prior to their arrival in the lab’ and that ‘naturalistic animals also 
emerge at the point of sacrifice’ (511). 
Of course, in the scent-detection studies conducted by my informants, dogs are not 
physically sacrificed in the pursuit of data, or in the associated production of an analytic 
animal. Whilst the practice of sacrifice is an inevitable feature of much research involving 
                                                 
71 See also Svendsen and Koch (2013) who explore the sacrificial practice of piglets 
involved in experimental neonatal research. 
72 Lynch quotes Munn, N. (1973) ‘Symbolism in ritual context: aspects of symbolic 
action.’ In J. Honigmann (Ed.), Handbook of Social and Cultural Anthropology. P. 580. 
Chicago, IL: Rand McNally. 
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animals studied under controlled conditions, Lynch acknowledges that it is not always a 
feature of the rendering process of scientific practice. Indeed, the particular kind of 
scientific enquiry my informants are engaged in is concerned with a certain aspect of the 
dog’s physiological capacity—the olfactory system—as well as his ability to communicate 
information about what he smells, thus fundamentally requiring the animal to be alive and 
permitted with the capacity to respond, throughout both the training and formal testing 
processes. Instead of sacrifice as the rendering practice through which the dogs might be 
said to move towards what Birke (2007 [1994], 328) terms ‘becoming data’, I identify the 
rendering practices involved here as the training practices, detailed throughout this thesis, 
through which dogs learn to be affected (Latour 2004) by subtle contrasts in odour.  
Here, in the rendering practices of bio-detection dog-training which enable the 
dogs to become beings with73 whom data can be yielded, the dog’s capacity to respond 
(i.e., the very ability that is inevitably destroyed through practices of sacrifice) remains 
fundamental. In other words, it is only as a consequence of these practices, in which the 
dog is considered a sentient individual, capable of responding and shaping the training 
practices, that dogs can become beings who can be treated analytically. Thus, I argue bio-
detection dogs can be understood as simultaneously occupying both categories of 
naturalistic and analytic animal.  
  
As bio-detection dogs are not required to undergo a practice of sacrifice, it might be 
assumed that these animals evade a radical corporeal transformation in the rendering 
processes, when compared with the rodent subjects of laboratory experimentation or those 
animals slaughtered for meat under conditions of factory farming. However, through the 
‘subject-changing’ nature of the training process (Haraway 2008, 57), I have demonstrated 
that these dogs nevertheless undergo a transformation that offers the dogs new possibilities 
of being and behaving. 
To consider what makes distinct the process through which bio-detection dogs, as 
animals of scientific study, become beings who can be treated analytically, from the 
rendering practices of other areas of interspecies scientific enquiry, we can return briefly 
to consider the status of the animal’s individuality, discussed in detail in chapter 5. 
                                                 
73 I eschew ‘bodies’ for ‘beings’ and ‘from’ for ‘whom’ to emphasize that the dogs are 
certainly not understood, nor treated, as mere passive ‘bodies’. Rather, they are agents in 
the training process.  
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According to Lynch (1988), the individuality of an animal—including his ‘subjective’ 
attributes—is widely considered to be abolished as animals move into the analytic 
category. For example, describing the modes in which laboratory rodents are articulated 
as data, Thierman (2010) notes that these animals are ‘reduced to particular gene effects 
of physiological responses. One forgets that these laboratory rodents remain living 
creatures. They come to be identified with their provision of information, disappearing in 
effect, as individual animals’ (106-7).  
On the contrary, I observe that in the trainer’s process of producing interpretations, 
the dogs are not handled as identical cases, but are treated significantly as individuals. I 
have illustrated above that the dog’s capacity to respond in training and research practices 
is facilitated in multiple ways: firstly, by the specific area of scientific enquiry that 
fundamentally necessitates the dog’s response-ability for the generation of a particular 
kind of knowledge and, secondly, through the particular training methods used to 
transform dogs into research participants, in which the dogs are revealed to actively shape 
the course of events. This has been exemplified both in the above example with Dougie 
and also in the discussion of tinkering within training more broadly, in chapter 5. However, 
the dog’s individuality—maintained, as I have argued, in the trainer’s practice of 
generating interpretations—is called into question in the representations of the dog that 
are afforded by the data collected, as discussed in the following section.  
 
ii. ‘Biosensors in Fluffy Coats’: Moving the Bio-Detection Dog Across Social 
Worlds 
In the process of producing written traces, in which the animal ‘becomes data’ (Birke 2007 
[1994]), it has been observed that new ways of talking about animals become possible 
(Ibid.; Lynch 1988). According to Lynch (Ibid.), the ‘analytic animal’ is spoken about in 
distinct ways from the ‘naturalistic animal’. With regards to the rats involved in the 
research he observed, Lynch describes that once the rat’s brain had been sectioned, sliced 
and rendered into material on a slide, scientists were able to talk about the animal in 
distinct ways, making comments such as ‘that was a good animal’. For these scientists, the 
notion of a ‘good animal’, referred to a good set of results from a well-prepared specimen, 
and Lynch suggests that this observation is distinct from our common-sense, or 
naturalistic, thoughts of other species.   
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Certainly, as a result of the inscriptions produced about bio-detection dogs, new 
ways of speaking about these animals emerge. In particular, in formal analyses of the 
data—such as the publications that emerge from the studies—the dogs are represented in 
statistical terms in relation to the odour samples. The contrast between this mode of 
speaking about the dogs and the everyday mode in which dogs are understood and treated 
as living and thinking beings, can be highlighted by returning to the aforementioned 
example involving Dougie. To recap, during Dougie’s training session, he was interpreted 
by the trainers as a minded being who failed to search position 4 because he was 
anticipating a blank. As a consequence of the written traces produced in this session and 
recorded on the computer (i.e., ‘Run 5, Pass 1, Position 4: not searched’) that create the 
‘facts’ of Dougie’s detection accuracy, it becomes possible for Dougie to be spoken about 
in statistical terms that describe a dog’s general search accuracy. For instance, in producing 
a statistical analysis of Dougie’s accuracy, the trainer’s interpretation, that on this 
particular run ‘Dougie skipped a stand because he thought the lineup would be blank’, 
effectively disappears. The outcome, for example, might appear as ‘Dog 1 has a specificity 
of 70%’. Whilst the dog of the naturalistic kind preserves his individuality in the training 
practices that render him available to scientific inquiry, in the shift to analytic animal his 
individuality is diminished in representations such as this.  
In keeping with the conventions of empirical scientific publishing, it is this 
statistical mode of representing dogs that is dominant in scientific publications. As Latour 
(1987) notes, scientific accounts are not guided by an imperative to detail meticulously 
what happened, but rather to inform and respond to particular critics. This novel 
representation of the dogs, enabled by the written traces, can be analyzed here in terms of 
what it does. Specifically, the statistical representations permit comparison: figures and 
statistics regarding the accuracy of detection dogs can be compared against those of current 
‘gold standard’ medical diagnostic tests. For example, the dogs involved in testing are 
discussed in the scientific publications in terms of their rates of sensitivity and specificity74 
which are offered as percentages and presented in graphs. This can then be compared 
                                                 
74 ‘Sensitivity’ refers to the ability of a dog to correctly identify those samples from 
patients with the disease, or the proportion of positive samples the dog indicates. 
‘Specificity’, on the other hand, refers to the ability of a dog to ignore those patients 
without the disease, or the proportion of the dog’s alerts which are correct. Put another 
way, a test with a high specificity produces low rates of false negatives. It is in these terms 
that clinical tests are evaluated within the scientific literature. 
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against the specificity and sensitivity of current ‘gold standard’ tests, such as the prostate 
specific antigen (PSA) blood test used in the prostate cancer screening process, or urine 
cytology that is sometimes employed in the diagnostic process of bladder cancer.  
 
As well as statistical representations, the language used to represent the dogs in scientific 
accounts frequently portrays them in mechanical terms; again, challenging the 
commonsense understanding of them as feeling and thinking beings. For example, in a 
published account of their research findings, one research group (whom I did not observe 
in the field) make several references to the dogs involved in their study as a ‘rigorously 
trained canine olfactory system’ (Taverna et al. 2015, 1382). I also observe other contexts 
beyond the text of published accounts in which it is possible to observe these more 
mechanical portrayals of the dogs. Typically, this kind of representation occurs in attempts 
to communicate the practices of bio-detection dogs to social groups beyond this niche 
field. For instance, listening to Claire explain to visiting members of the public how the 
dog’s olfactory system works, she invokes a systematic notion of the dog, or more 
specifically, a part of the dog—his nose—as a ‘biosensor’: 
 
 “Why would the dog be so good at this? [at detecting the odour of human disease]? 
It’s not too hard to imagine. The dog’s nose is a biosensor provided by nature. This 
is Daisy [a photo of Daisy’s face is projected onto the screen behind Claire]75. 
She’s got her nose on the front of her face. She’s got three hundred million sensory 
receptors dedicated to olfaction and us humans have five million. She’s also got a 
second nose at the back of her throat called the organ of Jacobson and that is 
believed to screen larger, almost pheremonal length volatiles, so long hydrocarbon 
chains. What she does when she goes to sniff, she sniffs once and if she’s 
interested, if you slow it down, she sniffs twice. So she sniffs into her nose and she 
also sniffs up into the back of her throat. She’s got two different parts of the brain 
working out what she’s sniffing. Unlike us with only one part of our brain, she’s 
actually comparing it.” 
 
                                                 
75 Daisy, a fox red Labrador, is Claire’s personally-owned dog who is trained to detect 
bladder cancer 
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Claire’s reference to the dog’s nose as a biosensor, and her description of this system as a 
combination of physiological parts, offers an explicitly mechanical understanding of the 
dog. Representing the dog, or more specifically, the dog’s olfactory system, as a set of 
mechanisms enables her to make comparisons about canine olfaction against that of 
humans, which she also represents as a biological system. Combined with statistical 
representations, this mode of communicating about the bio-detection dog is especially 
significant for this context, given the skepticisim that has surrounded the notion of dogs 
as an adjunct to diagnosis. Talking about bio-detection dogs in statistical and mechanical 
terms, in keeping with the conventions of scientific research, whereby the animals 
involved are commonly depersonalized and de-individualized in their representation 
(Birke 2004), arguably lends a sense of authority to this field. 
In Eileen Crist’s (1999) study of the history of the representation of animal 
behavior, she demonstrates how the language used to represent animal behaviour has 
consequences for the credibility afforded to a particular account. For instance, she notes 
how the use of ‘technical’ language, that enables a portrayal of the animals as ‘natural 
objects’, helped afford the pioneers of ethology credibility to their work and legitimise 
ethology as a subfield of biological science. The language used in scientific accounts of 
bio-detection dogs similarly draws on a technical vocabulary; as sniffing behaviour is 
described with reference to the ‘encoding…of a stimulus’ (Concha et al. 2014). In such 
representations, the possibility of a dog’s inner experiences is pushed aside in favour of a 
more detached portrayal of the animal’s performance. In effect, the dog’s behaviour is 
articulated as the effect of a pre-conscious response to stimuli, rather than the actions of 
minded organisms. 
So too in the representations of the bio-detection dog that are presented to the 
public can we observe the use of technical language. In the aforementioned explanation of 
the bio-detection dog’s sense of smell, Claire employs a degree of technical vocabulary as 
she refers to the dog’s nose, in isolation, as a ‘biosensor.’ However, co-existing alongside 
this mechanical representation of dogs is a perception of the dog as a being with whom 
one can build an intersubjective relationship: implicit in Claire’s references above to the 
dog as being ‘interested’, or ‘comparing’ odours. It is also not by chance that the 
photograph projected onto the screen during this part of Claire’s talk is of Daisy, her own 
dog, rather than another or a nonspecific dog. Indeed, this is the dog whom Claire credits 
with saving her own life with a spontaneous alert to Claire’s breast cancer in 2009. It is 
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through this personal experience that she understands the significance of human–dog 
intersubjectivity in the detection of disease.  
Thus, whilst described akin to biosensors, there remains an accompanying 
emphasis on the sentience and ‘dogness’ of the dog, rather than an illustration of the dog 
as a wholly machine-like entity. This ambivalence was emphasized during another of 
Claire’s talks to visiting members of the public, in which she referred to the dogs as 
‘biosensors in fluffy coats’: a phrase that epitomizes the boundary-crossing that 
characterizes work with bio-detection dogs. 
 
Whilst, in the communication of this scientific field, the dogs are in many ways represented 
as ‘data’, I have argued that these representations exist alongside examples of what Lynch 
(1988, 282) refers to as ‘self-explication’, with regards to the everyday perceptions of dogs 
that are tied to the trainer’s interpretations of their dogs’ actions as well as their 
understanding of the practice of bio-detection dogs more broadly. Here, this self-
explication refers to the lived and experienced relationship between trainer and dog: the 
precise intersubjective relationship from which I have argued data emerges in this context. 
In a publication based on research conducted at MDD (Concha et al. 2014), the 
authors explicitly acknowledge that the accuracy of the detection76 depends not only on 
the dog’s ability but also the skill of the handler in making sense of the dog’s behaviour. 
They write, ‘In detection dogs, the accuracy of the detection depends on both the dog’s 
olfactory capability to identify the target odor and the interpretation of the dog’s behavior 
by a handler’ (Ibid., 752). The notion of detection accuracy as interdependent on the skills 
of both partners is routinely acknowledged by my informants. For instance, during a team 
meeting at MDD, Simon commented, “Alert response varies between dogs and it’s up to 
the interpretation of the dog, as interpreted by the handler who has trained the dog.” In his 
analysis of the creation of mine-dogs in the mid-twentieth century, Kirk (2013, 9) makes 
a similar observation, noting that only the proficient handler, ‘sensitive to the subtle 
working habits of their individual dog, was judged capable of interpreting this behavior 
and thus recognizing when, and when not, to trust the mine-dog’. 
 
In this section, I have identified representations of the dog as, one the one hand, naturalistic 
and, on the other, analytic, as simultaneously engaged with in the communication of 
                                                 
76 Assessed according to the sensitivity and specificity rates of the dogs. 
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scientific knowledge regarding bio-detection dogs. I have suggested that the depictions of 
dogs and their skills as analogous to mechanical devices, or in terms of statistical units, 
are representational practices in keeping with the conventions of scientific publishing. 
Assessing what this representation does, or the consequences of such representation, I 
suggest that its familiarity helps to facilitate the translation of bio-detection dog research 
across the differing social worlds of dog-trainers, scientists and the general public, 
providing an air of authority to this field. However, I have shown that this representation 
co-exists alongside an everyday perception of the dog as a behaving being whose detection 
accuracy is tied to his trainer’s capacity for interpretation and translation across species-
specific sensory worlds. Thus, I propose that the ‘analytic object’ (Lynch 1988) at the 
center of this scientific enquiry ought to be recognized more aptly as the collective human–
dog detection dyad—a team whose members work interdependently to produce knowledge 
about odour, disease and its detection—rather than the dog in isolation. In advancing this 
argument, I do not intend to devalue the dog’s species-specific skill so as to emphasize the 
role of the human. Instead, I offer an analysis that highlights the independent work 
performed by both partners, whilst simultaneously acknowledging their mutual response-
ability, or interdependence, as critical in the joint production of knowledge in this context.   
The notion of an animal being both analytic and naturalistic in the construction of 
scientific knowledge is presented in Daniel Todes’ (1997) work examining the use of dogs, 
in Pavlov’s physiological laboratory work, to study the activity of gastric secretions. Using 
archival materials, including dissertations produced by Pavlov’s co-workers, Todes 
explains how, in one sense, the dogs were certain kinds of ‘machines’; imagined and 
constructed via surgical operations in the laboratory. Some were, for instance, fitted with 
fistulas to enable the collection of gastric secretions. These dogs were thus particularly 
constructed technologies, fabricated to produce something else. However, this 
characterization of, what Todes terms, the ‘dog-as-technology’ is demonstrated to have 
existed in tension with an interpretation of the ‘dog-as-organism’. This latter depiction of 
the dogs is tied to the dog’s status in the experiments as a living and complex organism, 
for Pavlov’s experiments only took place once the animal had recovered from surgery and 
regained its ‘normal’ physiological state. The assessment of such ‘normalcy’ was a task 
assigned to Pavlov’s co-workers who took into consideration a dog’s weight, temperature 
and ‘happiness’—perceived through attention to factors such as a dog’s appetite and 
energy. As a result of the perceptions of each dog as an individual character, Todes 
explains how interpretive flexibility was crucial to the practice of interpreting 
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experimental data. Certainly, the experimental practices and uses to which Pavlov’s dogs 
were put differed to those of bio-detection dogs: in order to become research subjects, the 
bodies of the latter are altered not through physical manipulation, but through training 
practices that affect the dog’s subjective engagement with the world. However, like Todes’ 
analysis of Pavlov’s dogs, the bio-detection dogs are also particular kinds of animals-in-
research under construction in the training centers, with the intent of producing something 
else: scientific data. Whilst utilized as tools, the handlers working the dogs simultaneously 
recognize them as living beings with social relations between animal and human. 
Drawing on Mol’s (2002) discussion of the multiplicity of the medical condition 
atherosclerosis, which she demonstrates is done differently in the spaces of the outpatient 
clinic and in the department of pathology, the bio-detection dog can too be considered a 
‘multiple’ being: described and ‘done’ differently in the various settings of training room, 
scientific publication, public demonstration and foster home.  
 
Furthermore, I have shown that the way the bio-detection dog is represented in relation to 
even a single human social group often entails ambivalences and overlap. Thus, the bio-
detection dog is, at once, some or all of a multiplicity of beings: a co-worker, with agency 
and a career in his own right; a statistical unit; a research participant; a companion; a pet 
or a family member within posthuman families; and a lifesaving hero. I suggest that the 
various meanings co-exist because of the significant boundary-navigating that this work 
entails, challenging traditional categories of ‘research animal’, ‘working dog' and ‘pet’, as 
well as the distinctions between them. However, whilst the bio-detection dog embodies a 
multiplicity of meanings, underpinning them all is, arguably, a concept of ‘dog’ which 
enables the bio-detection dog to function as an interface or ‘boundary object’ (Star and 
Griesemer 1989) between otherwise disparate social worlds. As boundary objects, the bio-
detection dogs are ‘plastic enough to adapt to local needs and constraints of the several 
parties employing them, yet robust enough to maintain a common identity across sites’ 
(Ibid., 393). 
In sum, the analysis developed in this section has highlighted the ambivalences at 
the heart of interpreting and representing bio-detection dogs: contradictions that I have 
suggested are tied to the boundary-crossing nature of this practice. One mode through 
which the boundary between human and animal is arguably challenged is the process of 
anthropomorphism, discussed in the following section. 
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iii. Intersubjectivity: Moving Beyond Anthropomorphism 
In Alexa and Ed’s interpretations of Dougie’s behaviour presented in the first section of 
this chapter, the trainers inferred that Dougie was guessing that this lineup was a ‘blank’: 
thus, explicitly attributing a sense of mindedness to Dougie. The trainers’ routine 
intersubjective practices of forming and expressing interpretations such as this offered me, 
the ethnographer, frequent and unprompted insight into how they make sense of their dogs’ 
actions.  
Interpreting the behaviour of the dogs in this way is clearly premised on an 
assumption that developing an understanding of the subjectivity of others, even animals, 
is possible, despite sometimes being difficult. As Kohn (2007, 7) notes, based on his 
observations of the Amazonian Runa people’s ability to engage in complex intersubjective 
practices with dogs, it is ‘the belief that we can know the intentions, goals and desires of 
other selves’, including animals, that ‘allows us to act in this world’. However, as Kohn 
recognizes for the Runa, engaging in intersubjective practices with nonhumans entails the 
negotiation of boundaries and the blurring of categories. Boundary-crossing is notoriously 
risky business, as Stephen Lyng (1990, 855) argues with his concept of ‘edgework’, which 
he defines as ‘high-risk behaviour involving, most fundamentally, the problem of 
negotiating the boundary between chaos and order’. The risk, for my informants, of 
navigating the boundary between human and animal that is entailed in the process of 
interpreting a dog’s behaviour, is that they stand to be accused of anthropomorphism. 
The charge of anthropomorphism, with regard to scientific accounts of animal 
behaviour has been used in attempts to ‘undermine the credibility, or realist force, of 
accounts that in some way picture animal life and human affairs as permeable to one 
another’ (Crist 1999, 7). Highlighting the connection between the language used and the 
issue of animal mentality, Crist demonstrates that representations of animal behaviour 
have tended to alternate between two quite distinct styles of narrative. Firstly, among the 
work of natural scientists (including Darwin), Crist points out accounts that attempt to 
present an illustration of an animal’s inner life. In this narrative, the animals are 
emphasized as active subjects and there tends to be reference to the presence of the 
observer as an interacting being. An alternative style exists however, whereby the 
researcher attempts to objectify nature from a distance. In this narrative, Crist notes that 
technical terms tend to be used to achieve a separation between the worlds of human and 
animal. For instance, ‘stimulus-response,’ from behaviorism, or ‘innate releasing 
mechanism,’ from classical ethology. For Crist, these distinct styles of writing about 
 178 
similar behaviors highlight the significant role of language in either permitting animals to 
be portrayed as subjects or prohibiting this possibility. In other words, and to use Crist’s 
terms, the language employed can offer alternative ways of ‘seeing’ the animal.  
Attitudes towards animal mentality vary across different cultures and disciplinary 
viewpoints, centered around ideas of the distance or alignment between human and animal 
worlds. Some critics of anthropomorphism, including Thomas Nagel (1974) maintain that 
humans can only ever know a human-perspective of the world, and it is thus impossible 
for humans to know the world through the minds of animal others. 
For the animals themselves, there are potential negative consequences for those 
who are treated under conditions of anthropomorphism: owners may feel rationalized in 
punishing their dog for something they wrongly believe the dog ‘knows it has done’. 
Certainly then, the effects of anthropomorphism can be detrimental to the welfare of 
animals if they’re assigned responsibilities that the animal is both unaware of and unable 
to act accordingly to.  
However, particularly during the last two decades, anthropomorphism has become 
increasingly recognized by some as an instinctive human tendency, given that interactions 
with other animals, especially pets, are not only frequent but also emotionally meaningful 
for people (e.g., Bekoff 2007; Sanders 1999). For instance, Sanders and Arluke (1996) 
explored the routine practice in western cultures of owners ‘speaking for’ their dogs. 
Furthermore, the ability and will of humans to empathize with animals, particularly dogs, 
is thought to be a factor in motivating us to want to care for them, leading cognitive 
archaeologist Steven Mithen (1996) to suggest that the domestication of animals would 
not have occurred without anthropomorphism. Thus, Mithen claims that our ability to 
think like animals, to put ourselves in the place of an animal, was instrumental in our 
ancestor’s ability to succeed the Neanderthals. Mithen (Ibid.) even suggests that 
anthropomorphism is one of the defining characteristics of the brain of Homo sapiens 
sapiens, evolving some 100,000 years ago. These claims have been well-received by other 
scholars of human–animal relations (e.g., Serpell and Paul 2010). 
The recent shift regarding sensibilities towards anthropomorphism is, in part, 
attributable to the emergence of fields including cognitive psychology and ethology that 
have contributed to a rethinking of the perception of animals in the scientific arena (e.g., 
Bekoff 2007; de Waal 2006). As Michal Pregowski (2015) notes, with the insights 
developed in these fields, today it is widely acknowledged that ‘nonhumans have 
intentions and sophisticated emotions’ (533). These developments have shaped recent 
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thinking surrounding anthropomorphism, with a growing recognition of the nuances of 
anthropomorphic approaches. Pregowski explains: 
  
Anthropomorphism ceased to be seen solely as a form of delusion or wishful 
thinking with regard to animal capabilities; instead, it was divided into sentimental 
or naive (the ‘furry little people’ discourse) and critical (embracing the complexity 
of nonhuman animal emotions, while acknowledging the existence of differences 
between nonhumans and humans). (Ibid., emphasis added) 
 
In this discussion, I follow Pregowski’s contention that due to the vast complexity of 
human–dog relationships, they ‘cannot be attributed to sentimental anthropomorphism 
only’ (Ibid., 534). Certainly, in the routine practices of interpreting that I have detailed 
throughout this thesis, the trainers are observed to ‘speak for’ (Sanders and Arluke 1996) 
the dogs, attributing mental states and feelings to them. However, I argue that the trainers 
resist understandings and representations of dogs as mere ‘people in disguise’ (Serpell 
2005) and thus present a challenge to an analysis of their practices that would consider 
them as examples of strict, or sentimental, anthropomorphism. Firstly, I will suggest that 
a sentimental kind of anthropomorphism is challenged by the trainers’ incorporation of the 
dog’s alterity, or species-specific experience of the world, into their interpretations and 
actions. Then, I consider how the trainers’ self-monitoring of their language points to their 
sense of ambivalence that surrounds anthropomorphism. In both discussions, I illustrate 
how the approach and techniques adopted by the trainers help to reassert a boundary 
between human and animal; that which is irrefutably challenged in practices of 
interspecies intersubjectivity.  
 
Acknowledging the Dog’s Umwelt 
The first point I want to illustrate, with regards to the question of how anthropomorphism 
relates to the intersubjective practices conducted at my field sites, is the trainers’ explicit 
recognition of the dogs’ distinct mode of perceiving and engaging with the world. I 
observe that it is with this acknowledgment of species-specificity that the trainers approach 
their intersubjective practices with the dogs. This approach thus aligns the practices of my 
informants with a growing number of researchers who attempt to take seriously an 
animal’s umwelt (Von Uexküll, 1957 [1934]), or ‘self-world’, as a way towards 
overcoming anthropocentrism (Hecht and Horowitz 2014).  
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In particular, given the nature of their work, the trainers are acutely aware that dogs 
experience the world largely through their olfactory system, to a much greater degree than 
the typical human. As a result of this understanding, when reading and interpreting the 
search behaviour of dogs, I have illustrated earlier in this thesis that the trainers focus 
especially on aspects of the dog’s body that they understand to be associated with sniffing 
behaviour. Thus, as detailed in chapter 4, they not only pay attention to what they can see 
of the dog’s body, but also what they can hear; particularly, the sounds produced by the 
dog’s nose.  
The trainers’ recognition of the dog’s distinct umwelt, and specifically an 
acknowledgement of the importance of the olfactory in the dog’s engagement with his 
environment shapes how the trainers work during training. This is expressed by the trainers 
as a desire to ‘think like a dog’; actively incorporating the dog’s umwelt into their own 
perspectives and practices. I was myself encouraged to consider the dog’s umwelt during 
a time at MDD when I was assisting Ed and Neil in Ellie’s training. We were preparing 
for a session in which we would be teaching Ellie to detect her target odour outside of the 
training room and away from pots, stands, or the carousel; instead, the odour would be 
‘hidden’ in or on random objects and surfaces. I had been offered the opportunity to pick 
the location of one of Ellie’s ‘hides’ (in this case, a piece of gauze swab that has been 
‘soaked’ in the training odour) and was told to choose somewhere along a corridor in the 
charity’s main office. After tucking the gauze swab out of sight, on a wall behind the 
bottom corner of a poster, Ed instructed me to wipe my gloved-up hand indiscriminately 
along the wall and surroundings so that my own odour, and that of the glove, would not 
be concentrated around the hide and thus inadvertently direct Ellie straight to this area. 
Implicit in Ed’s guidance is the notion that as a trainer I ought to ‘think like a dog’ by 
incorporating an appreciation of the dog’s perspective into my actions, based on an 
acknowledgment of this animal’s species-specific umwelt in which the olfactory largely 
dominates experience. Ed’s comment is arguably illustrative of my informants’ broader 
desire to become more like the dog in the process of training: an aspiration that, as 
aforementioned, is suggested to be increasingly emergent among contemporary dog-
trainers (Wlodarczyk 2017, 40) who pay greater attention to the dog’s emotions, 
acknowledge the dog’s significant otherness, and recognize the dog as a sentient being 
(Pregowski 2015).  
While the idea of ‘thinking like a dog’ underpins intersubjectivity on the part of 
the trainers in this context, it is with the related notion of ‘becoming other’, that takes place 
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during the occupancy of the umwelts of others, that Kohn (2007) considers the practices 
of transspecies intersubjectivity among the Runa. In particular, he notes that when an 
individual inhabits the different umwelts of others, ‘attributes and dispositions become 
dislodged from the bodies that produce them and ontological boundaries become blurred’ 
(Ibid., 7). As Kohn (Ibid.) explains, this ‘transformative process of blurring’ is a 
‘becoming’ that carries significant risks for the Runa: ‘dangers that emerge when 
ontological boundaries become excessively blurred’. For the Runa, the risk is ‘becoming 
dog’: a transformation they seek to avoid through the mobilization of communicative 
strategies. Whilst the Runa demonstrate the ability to know the dreams, intentions, and 
motivations of their dogs, afforded by their sense that beings of all kinds share a point of 
view77, Kohn insists that the Runa do not wish to become dogs in the process of such 
transspecies interactions and communication. Echoing the Runa’s aversion towards 
becoming dogs, Rane Willerslev (2004) notes how the Yukaghir elk hunters of 
northeastern Siberia use acts of ‘mimesis’ (Taussig 1993) in their ‘attempt to assume the 
point of view of the animal, while in some profound sense remaining the same’ (Willerslev 
2004, 630). Such mimesis points here to the juncture of engagement and reflexivity, an 
experience of both difference and sameness, that is experienced by these hunters in their 
‘seduction’ of the elk they hunt. Willerslev describes this as providing the hunters with a 
‘double perspective’ (648). 
                                                 
77 In his article ‘How Dogs Dream’, Kohn (2007) explains why the Runa interpret their 
own dreams in metaphorical terms, whilst interpreting those of their dogs—deciphered in 
their dog’s sleep behaviours, for instance a bark or a twitching leg—literally. When the 
Runa dream, they see things from the perspective of the spirit masters of animals: 
hierarchically ‘higher’ beings than humans who conceptualize things in an alternate 
manner to humans. For instance, the animal masters see game animals as domestic animals 
and forest vegetation as planted gardens. Entering into the perspective of these powerful 
beings, and identifying a gap between their own mode of perception and that of the spirit 
masters, the Runa must interpret their dreams metaphorically in order to rectify their vision 
and make sense of it. Thus, for the Runa, metaphor guards against ontological blurring. 
Meanwhile, due to the shared mode of perception assumed among humans and dogs, and 
the dog’s ‘lower’ hierarchical status vis-à-vis humans, the Runa interpret the dreams of 
their dogs literally. As Kohn puts it: ‘In dog dream interpretation, the ontological gaps that 
are often assiduously respected collapse, at least for a moment, as dogs and people come 
together as part of a single affective field that transcends their boundaries as a species—
an emergent and highly ephemeral self, distributed over two bodies’ (17). 
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Among my trainer informants, commonalities can be observed between them, the 
Runa and the Yukaghir hunters, as they too navigate ontological boundaries in their 
interactions with the dogs. In particular, it can be observed that, like Willerslev’s analysis 
of the Yukagir hunters, they also attempt to acquire a ‘double perspective’. Making oneself 
sensitive to the umwelt of the dog is what enables the trainers to both successfully train 
dogs to become affected by certain odours and to interpret their dog’s assessments of 
odours by deciphering their dog’s behaviours. At the same time however, their primary 
perspective as humans is maintained, visible in the use of the screen that illustrates a 
physical and conceptual species distinction between dog and human. Thus, the trainers can 
be understood to apply a ‘crucial brake’ (Kohn 2007, 12) on perceived dangers of 
ontological blurring.  
The fundamental separation between the life-worlds of human and dog is also 
explicitly acknowledged in the trainer’s reflections of their work. For instance, as the team 
at MDD enjoyed a glass of champagne in the office to celebrate the end of a week of 
double-blind testing for a bacteria-detection project, Kelly looked down at Shadow who 
was sat on the floor—his gaze meeting hers—and mused:  
 
“I wish they knew what a good job they’ve done. I would just love to say to them 
how proud I am of them. I wish they knew the enormity of what they’ve done. You 
have no idea, do you? You just want me to put my hand in my treat pouch.” 
 
Certainly then, whilst holding an empathetic stance towards the dogs and routinely 
highlighting the porousness of the boundary between human and dog as they develop 
intersubjective relations, the trainers maintain a recognition that significant points of 
difference persist between the umwelt of human and dog. At the same time however, the 
trainers also recognize that there are fundamental aspects of the world that are accessible 
to beings of both human- and dog-kind that make it possible to develop intersubjective 
practices towards an idea of what it might be like to be a dog. This is notable in the 
language used by my informants to interpret their dogs’ behaviour. For example, reflecting 
on the performance of a dog he had worked with earlier in the day, Simon at MDD 
explained to me that Rolo had been sniffing samples of a training odour that had come in 
from a new supply and that he had demonstrated difficulty in recognizing this odour as his 
target. In short, although the odour was, in theory, the same, the new supply has been 
processed at a different place and by novel people, in comparison to the training odour 
 183 
Rolo had been used to detecting over the past few years of his career at MDD. Thinking 
about the impact this might have on the specific composition of Rolo’s target odour, and 
thus Rolo’s difficulty in recognizing this odour as a continuation of his target odour, Simon 
told me, “You can get an idea of what the dog is processing.” In his comment, rather than 
claiming to know with total certainty what Rolo was experiencing, Simon expresses an 
empathetic understanding of Rolo’s engagement with the odour, based on what is known 
about the dog’s species-specific olfactory capability that enables him to detect minute 
differences between odours.  
I also suggest that Simon’s approach towards interpreting Rolo’s behaviour reflects 
the aforementioned impulse shared among the trainers for the dog to ‘tell you’—about the 
odours they are smelling, or the emotional state they are feeling—rather than simply 
projecting pre-determined assumptions onto the dog. Inevitably, the trainer ‘speaks for’ 
the dog, but by creating space for the dog to ‘speak back’ in training encounters as I have 
argued, the dog is himself able to exert agency in this process. 
By taking the dog’s distinct umwelt into consideration, as they endeavour to engage 
intersubjectively with the dogs, the trainers’ interpretations arguably account for what they 
consider to be most meaningful or important to the dog—rather than the human—as he 
searches. Thus, they work towards an understanding of the dog that is less exclusively 
anthropocentric than strict, or ‘sentimental’, anthropomorphism (Pregowski 2015) and 
arguably one that reflects more faithfully the dog’s experience of the world: a stance more 
aligned with an approach of ‘critical anthropomorphism’ (Morton et al. 1990).  
Whilst I have noted that the trainers maintain a distinction between human and 
dog, the empathy that they express towards the dogs during training sessions illustrates an 
understanding that particular aspects of the world are generally available to beings of both 
species. Thus, while they acknowledge that humans cannot smell with the same sensitivity 
as dogs, they do know what it is like to smell. This recognition enables a sense of animality 
that traverses the human/animal divide and affords them with a perspective from which 
they can empathize with dogs. Here, Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s (1964) concept of ‘strange-
kinship’ provides a useful framework. Significantly, strange kinship permits the 
recognition of differences between the specific content of animal and dog worlds, while 
maintaining the species’ shared grounding. As Merleau-Ponty (1995, 176) insists, ‘there 
is no break between the planned animal, the animal that plans, and the animal without 
plan’. Applying the notion of strange kinship in her analysis of the relationships between 
scientists and laboratory rats, Dennis (2014) notes that this term evokes ‘the sense in which 
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the world is shared among and generally available to the species, despite their evident 
differences in the fleshiness of their being’ (46-47). Thus, whilst enabling the 
acknowledgment of species differences, strange kinship does not propose an 
understanding of relations of the human to the animal in terms of hierarchy. 
 
Ambivalence Around Anthropomorphic Language 
Although speaking for dogs in supposedly anthropomorphic terms is arguably inevitable, 
my trainer informants expressed an ambivalence about their self-identified 
anthropomorphic language. In order to manage this ambivalence, when speaking about 
and ‘speaking for’ the dogs, my informants adhere to an informal kind of ‘self-policing’ 
(Candea 2013b, 424) in relation to the vocabulary of supposedly human-like qualities and 
feelings. This is another strategy through which a ‘crucial brake’ (Kohn 2007, 12) is 
imposed in order to reaffirm ontological separation.  
Aware that the language they use to describe the dogs might be considered 
anthropomorphic, and mindful of the largely negative, ‘unscientific’ connotations of such 
language, I often observed the trainers catch themselves and reflect on their vocabulary 
and the constraint they feel about the difficulty of speaking for the dogs in nonhumanist 
terms. For instance, discussing with me the differences in personalities between the 
different dogs at the PVWDC, Sue commented that “some dogs come to us a little nervous, 
a little worried or uncomfortable, or anxious if we’re gonna—I mean, they’re kind of 
behavioural words of humans but I don’t have any other ones.” Here, Sue is ambivalent 
about her dependence on descriptive terms that she considers largely the domain of 
humans, expressing an element of concern in extending such expressions to describe the 
dogs; an apprehension that emerges because, in her articulation of the ‘personalities’ of 
dogs, Sue is navigating the boundary between human and animal. Indeed, the extension of 
personalities beyond humans to nonhumans, is still a relatively recent phenomenon and 
while gaining growing credibility among animal behaviour scientists (Gosling 2008), 
older trainers like Sue (who is in her sixties) have been involved in dog-training for 
decades before such understandings were thought possible. Thus, encultured in a tradition 
of dog-training that perceived the boundary between human and dog as more rigid than is 
widely considered today, Sue maintains a cautious attitude regarding the risks of slipping 
between the categories of human and animal. 
At other times, my informants’ concerns about how to speak about and for dogs 
were more explicitly associated with anthropomorphism, as in Jenna’s comment during an 
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interview: “You know, it’s hard because I could put all these emotions on a dog, like I 
could anthropomorphize everything. Is that the right word?” Whilst pointing to the 
inevitability of speaking for dogs in supposedly humanist, or anthropomorphic terms, Sue 
and Jenna acknowledge an implicit understanding that they ought to remain attentive to a 
distinction between human and dog. 
 
Whilst my informants were apprehensive about speaking about and for the dogs in 
explicitly anthropomorphic terms, I follow Kay Milton’s (2005) suggestion that in many 
situations that are commonly referred to as ‘anthropomorphic,’ no particularly good 
grounds exist for assuming that the human who is attributing certain characteristics to an 
animal is doing so with any reference to humanity or animality. Such cases, Milton urges, 
should more properly be termed ‘egomorphism’: a concept that ‘implies that I understand 
my cat, or a humpback whale, or my human friends, on the basis of my perception that 
they are ‘like me’ rather than ‘humanlike’’ (Ibid., 259). In other words, egomorphism 
refers to the notion that ‘I see something of me in you’, rather than equating a dog with a 
human per se.  
In the following vignette, of a training encounter between Simon and prostate-
cancer detection dog Jess, Milton’s egomorphism might more aptly account for Simon’s 
interpretation, rather than anthropomorphism as he proposes. 
 
Before tasking Jess to search, Simon tells me that the target in this lineup, a urine sample 
from a prostate cancer patient, is ‘weaker’78 than the sample that she alerted to in the 
previous run. I ask Simon if that means he is anticipating that Jess might have difficulty 
identifying it. He nods his head to confirm my assumption. Consecutively searching the 
samples around the carousel, Jess hesitates on the target in position 3, pausing her nose 
over the pot for a second before moving past it. 
Simon: “I should’ve clicked that [i.e., to reinforce Jess’s odour recognition: to 
help her by offering an early click to tell her this is the target, as Simon believes 
                                                 
78 The notion of target samples as being described on a continuum of strength is based on 
factors related to the specific disease details of each individual, such as the patient’s 
tumour size and Gleason score measure, as detailed in the laboratory report that 
accompanies each sample provided to MDD by the hospital that the charity is working in 
collaboration with.  
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this is a weaker sample]. I wasn’t quick enough. And now she’ll pick 5.” [5 is a 
control sample that contains other non-cancerous disease markers] 
As Simon predicts, Jess false indicates on sample 5 before quickly getting up and moving 
on to search the rest of the samples on the carousel. 
Simon: “Now she’s really thinking about it, if you can anthropomorphize it. She’s 
interrogating. It’s like if you were driving to work and the normal road you take 
every day was blocked and you had to go another way. You know the way but you 
have to think about it more.” 
 
Explicating his interpretation, Simon ponders over his attribution of mindedness to 
Jess: “if you can anthropomorphize it.” He then continues to articulate how he perceives 
Jess’s situation, by way of analogy to a specifically human experience. Significantly, I 
note, he precedes this comparison with the comment “It’s like”, suggesting that he 
acknowledges the alterity that makes distinct Jess’s experience from the analogous 
circumstance he then describes. Rather than attributing qualities to Jess that he considers 
to be explicitly ‘human’-like, Simon’s intersubjective endeavors reflect more closely his 
perception that, like him, the dogs too can experience a state of uncertainty, demanding 
greater concentration, when the aspects of their environment they have come to take for 
granted change unexpectedly.  
 
To conclude this assessment of anthropomorphism among my informants, I suggest that 
the trainers’ particular practices of intersubjectivity begins to turn the notion of 
anthropomorphism on its head. Rather than an attempt to simply project human-like 
experience onto the dog, their interpretations and practices reflect their desire to adopt a 
more dog-like perspective of the world. Whilst this could still arguably prompt critiques 
in keeping with Nagel’s (1974) argument about the impossibility of knowing the world 
from the perspective of another species, I note that the trainers actively maintain a 
recognition of the species differences that prevent them from fully adopting a canine 
perspective, whilst simultaneously acknowledging a shared sense of animality between 




In this chapter, I have explored how trainers produce interpretations and representations 
about the dogs. In order to interpret the performances of the dogs with whom they work, I 
have illustrated that it is not enough for trainers to simply have a knowledge of the 
behaviour of dogs as a sum species. Rather, they are required to constantly read the 
individual dog’s body language, to develop an embodied knowledge of the minutiae of 
each dog’s trained response in order to ascertain whether the dog is certain in his decision. 
This specific mode of human–dog relating is what enabled Ed to know not to call 
‘indication’ when Lola raised her paw, to return to the example presented at the beginning 
of this chapter. Thus, a notion of producing ‘good’ bio-detection dogs, proficient trainers 
and data in this context can be considered the ability of the human–dog dyad to mutually 
generate interpretations that evade uncertainty. 
The analysis presented in this chapter illustrates that the knowledge produced in 
bio-detection dog research emerges neither from the dog or human considered as isolated 
entities, but from the interface of their relationship. I have illustrated that what is being 
studied by my informants is a combination of: (1) a dog’s ability to detect an odour, (2) 
his ability to communicate the presence or absence of a salient odour to his trainer and (3) 
his trainer’s ability to interpret the dog’s signals. Therefore, the data and subsequent 
knowledge that is produced in this field, is clearly neither ‘without us’ [the humans] 
(Despret 2004, 131), nor without the dog. As a result, both partners are revealed to be 
necessarily response-able agents in the process of knowledge production. 
 
Furthermore, I have identified multiple representations of the bio-detection dog as 
emergent in the process of knowledge production. They are, on the one hand, represented 
as statistical units or akin to mechanical devices, whilst at the same time there remains a 
recognition that, unlike automata, the dogs require extensive training and care that 
responds to the needs and desires of each individual.  Even when written traces afford the 
representation of the dog in terms of statistical units, the dog as a naturalistic animal—in 
the flesh, not merely in its depictions—is maintained throughout the processes that render 
him into a being with whom scientific knowledge is made available.  
 
Rather than excessively projecting human characteristics and motivations onto the dog, I 
have argued that human–dog attunement, with an emphasis on the dog’s capacity to 
respond and an attention to somatic sensibilities, enables the dog to become an agent who 
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can ‘tell’ you how to interpret his behaviour. Whilst this nevertheless persists as an 
inevitable case of a human speaking for an animal, my argument has emphasized the active 
role played by the dog himself in shaping the human’s interpretation and subsequent 
action. Thus, in keeping with contemporary approaches to dog-training philosophy 
outlined in chapter 4, whereby the dog’s perspective is considered both attainable and 
important in guiding their trainer’s actions, I have illustrated how the trainers seek to 
incorporate something of the dog’s perspective into their interpretations. 
Here it can be observed that the trainer-come-researchers adopt an orientation 
towards their study of the dogs that is, in a significant way, in keeping with the approach 
employed by primatologist Shirley Strum (1987, 30) when working with baboons. As 
Strum explains, ‘I tried to let the baboons themselves ‘tell’ me what was important’. 
However, although overlaps are observable, between the interspecies relationships 
between trainers and bio-detection dogs and those such as Strum’s (Ibid.) and also Smuts’ 
(2001) with the respective groups of baboons they study, the human–dog relationships 
among my informants also stand in distinction from these other cases of interspecies 
relations in scientific practice. This is because I have illustrated that in order to produce 
the scientific data of bio-detection dog research, the trainers and dogs must work 
interdependently towards a shared goal.   
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Chapter 8. Conclusion 
 
Whilst dogs are born with an exceptional olfactory system, this thesis has illustrated that 
recognizing a distinct target odour and offering a clear and consistent bodily indication in 
response to this odour are learned skills that are honed over many months of training. 
Through insights developed during twelve months of ethnographic fieldwork, this thesis 
has explored the practices of training through which bio-detection dogs and knowledge 
about their olfactory capabilities, are produced, suggesting that practices of bio-detection 
dog research fundamentally depend on affective human–dog partnerships. 
The discussions presented in this thesis have illustrated the interdependency of the 
relations between human and dog in the context of bio-detection research, prompting an 
understanding of these human–dog relations as ‘mutually affective’ (Latimer and Miele 
2013, 5) rather than exclusively human dominated or asymmetric. Through the training 
practices in which the human and dog become attuned to the body of the other, the dyad 
become together something novel: a proficient trainer and bio-detection dog team, shown 
to elicit data and produce knowledge collaboratively. Indeed, I have argued that the dog-
trainer cannot become proficient in his skill without the bio-detection dog and, 
simultaneously, the bio-detection dog cannot learn his task or job without the trainer. 
Combined, they form not only a satisfactory but, a ‘productive and thriving partnership’ 
(Licklider 1960, 75).79 Thus, this thesis has illustrated that the detection in this context is 
dependent not solely on the spontaneous actions of the dog but on the highly formalized 
meeting of a ‘collective body’ (Winance 2006), constituted of not only the human and dog, 
but also the samples, training equipment and rewards that, combined, facilitate this work. 
Though the human and dog both work independently, each is also implied and transformed 
in the process. 
 
Responding to the research questions I set out to explore in this thesis, I note the emergence 
of two key themes in particular. Firstly, I have demonstrated that throughout the processes 
by which both bio-detection dogs and knowledge are produced in this area of scientific 
enquiry, the dogs’ capacity to respond is accommodated and recognized as an essential 
element of the human–dog dyad. Secondly, these practices have been revealed to be 
                                                 
79 Licklider uses this description to refer to the relation of interdependency between the 
fig tree and insect. 
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characterized by the navigation of various categorical boundaries. Whilst these two themes 
overlap, for clarity I discuss them below in succession, as I clarify the main points 
developed in this thesis and their implications in relation to the existing literature.  
 
The Mutual Constitution of Knowledge and Nonhuman Agency 
This thesis has illustrated that the success of bio-detection dog training and testing is 
entangled with the capacity of a body to encounter the affects of another body, with this 
affective dimension of bio-detection dog-training constituting both human and dog. In the 
process of training and testing, I have demonstrated the significance of the agency of the 
dogs and, in particular, their capacity to respond and be responded to accordingly. By 
employing training and testing methods that eschew force, in order to ‘recruit’ and train 
canine research subjects, the dog’s ‘active cooperation’ (Haraway 2008, 55) is shown to 
be acquired and, furthermore, required. In this process, attention is focused on somatic 
sensibilities, permitting the dog the capacity to ‘speak back’, shaping the material reality 
of the environment. By illustrating how the dogs affect their trainers, for instance, trainers 
altering the speed of their movements in response to the tempo of a dog, or arranging the 
composition of search samples in response to a dog’s search performance, I have followed 
Despret (2004) in suggesting that the dogs can be considered as themselves training the 
humans how to respond; ‘proposing new ways to behave’ (122). 
Throughout this thesis, Haraway’s (2008) notion of ‘response-ability’ has proved 
a useful concept with which to understand the relationships between trainer and bio-
detection dog. The analysis developed here suggests, however, that not only is it possible 
for dogs to respond to and reshape their environment, but that this kind of interspecies 
response-ability is fundamentally imperative to the production of ‘good’ relationships 
between researchers and research subjects, and, consequently, the production of ‘good’ 
scientific knowledge, based on interpretations that lack ambiguity. These findings are in 
keeping with the literature concerning animal-dependent scientific practices that have 
emphasized the significance of care practices in ensuring a more nuanced understanding 
of the needs of one’s research subjects (e.g., Davies 2012; Greenhough and Roe 2011).  
 
Thus, in response to my research question, ‘how ought we theorize the role of bio-detection 
dogs?’, the analysis presented in this thesis makes clear that it would be a mistake to 
consider these dogs as ‘mere instruments or objects of labour’ (Clark 2014, 159). Whilst 
the dog’s behaviour is clearly shaped by formalized training practices and techniques, in 
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the process, their individuality is not reduced in the same way as it is in the laboratory or 
slaughterhouse. Instead, the unique qualities of each dog are significant and shape both 
their own actions and those of their human caretakers.  
Thus, furthermore, whilst I have emphasized the mutual constitution of trainer and 
bio-detection dog, it is important to acknowledge that the dog’s agency ought not to be 
considered exclusively in relation to the humans with whom they work. My analysis has 
demonstrated that these dogs also have an agency that is related to their qualities as 
individuals: a finding that is consistent with Nelson’s (2017) historical study of canine 
agency in the Soviet space flight programme, in which she argues that the dogs were ‘not 
interchangeable or generic’ (Ibid., 90). 
 
Navigating Boundaries 
An additional theme to emerge from the analysis presented in this thesis is the ongoing 
navigation of boundaries: in particular, the boundary between human and animal that is 
often assumed to be rigid in western culture. In the performance of bio-detection dog-
training and research practices, where ambivalences and uncertainties are prevalent, this 
boundary is illustrated to be both reaffirmed and challenged.  
 
A fundamental finding of this thesis is that the process of training bio-detection dogs has 
been revealed to be informed by a degree of uncertainty and ambivalence. In particular, I 
have illustrated how working with an ambivalent odour heightens the trainers’ sense of 
obligation to becoming attuned to the dog. In becoming attuned however, another 
ambivalence is brought to the fore, as trainers navigate the possibility of knowing an 
animal’s mind whilst also acknowledging the dog’s species-specific capabilities and 
umwelt (von Uexkull 1957 [1934]). 
Rather than consider the development of an understanding of the mind of the 
individual dog an impossibility, my informants’ practices illustrate the permeability of the 
purported species barrier between human and animal, as they routinely interpret the actions 
of their dogs. In particular, I have shown that the practices of bio-detection dog-training 
and knowledge production are achieved with a focus on nonverbal communication. In 
chapter 4, I illustrated how, through training, human and dog learn how to become attuned 
with each other, or to affect each other, through attention to the somatic; reading or 
‘listening’ to the other’s body. By becoming attuned to the dogs, through response-able 
methods of training, the trainers are able to, at least partially, access a part of the world 
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that they are generally unable to experience due to their physiological limitations. In the 
process, the dog’s nose becomes more than just a part of the dog’s body—an instrument 
used by the dog himself to navigate the world and conduct his work—but also a body part 
that becomes an extension of the people who are tasking the dogs with this specific work. 
Thus, the assumed limitations of the human body—in terms of its perceptual capacities—
is an additional boundary that is challenged in this work. I have suggested, therefore that 
bio-detection dogs can be considered as ‘mediators’ (Pemberton 2013, 74) of particular 
kinds of knowledge about the world that are generally elusive to humans. This 
understanding of the role of the dogs is consistent with Kohn’s (2007), in his analysis of 
the Runa practices of talking with dogs, whereby dogs are transformed into shamans 
through a process of hallucinogen consumption. Moreover, across the globe, dogs 
routinely penetrate human life, mediate between worlds and call into question the 
boundary between human and animal. 
Whilst the porousness of the species barrier is rendered visible, as human and dog 
are shown to be ‘co-conversationalists’ (Bolton and Degnen 2010, 11) in the production 
of knowledge that is not only about dogs but fundamentally produced with them, this thesis 
has also recognized the trainers’ simultaneous insistence on a distinction between human 
and dog, with particular regard for the dog’s distinct olfactory capabilities and their 
species-specific umwelts. In chapter 7, I proposed that this recognition of the dog’s 
species-specific mode of engagement with the world—and attempts to incorporate the 
dogs’ alterity into training practices—provides a challenge to a simplistic analysis of the 
trainer’s intersubjective practice of ‘speaking for’ (Sanders 1999) as mere 
anthropomorphism.  
At the same time however, I have shown that the understanding of species 
difference advanced by my trainer informants, exists alongside a recognition of a 
fundamental shared animality that promotes the possibility of mutually constituted human-
dog meaning making. In other words, whilst it is recognized that the dog is superiorly 
endowed in his olfactory capability relative to [hu]man, it is simultaneously acknowledged 
that both human and dog share the capacity of a sense of smell; thus, promoting the 
development of empathetic relations between the species.  
These findings, that emphasize both the preservation of species division and the 
dissolving of such boundaries, are in keeping with Latimer’s (2013) concept of the state 
of ‘being alongside’, as a notion with which to think through human–animal relations. 
Latimer’s work in developing this concept especially complements the analysis presented 
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here, for she highlights the ‘significant otherness’ of human–animal relations ‘in terms of 
interspecies socialities and interdependencies’ (90).  
 
The practice of training dogs to detect the odour of human disease has been informed by 
several changes in approaches to dog-training and scientific understandings of animals and 
the scope of their roles in scientific research: historical and cultural shifts that have been 
traced in this thesis. Today, among an increasing majority of dog–trainers, the relationship 
between human and dog is no longer considered in terms of master-servant, but instead as 
a partnership in which each partner guides the other towards the mutually successful 
completion of a task. This shift is arguably related to recent developments in the scientific 
field of ethology that have led to an increasing recognition of many kinds of animals as 
sentient beings, with greater self-awareness and consciousness than had been possible to 
assume with an approach dominated by human exceptionalism: developments that have 
prompted the emergence of new perceptions among scientists with regards to their 
relations with the animals they study.  
 However, the practice of enrolling bio-detection dogs in scientific study, as 
analyzed here, nevertheless presents challenges to the boundaries that constitute traditional 
scientific practice, whereby research animals are typically distinct from the pets living 
within human homes. In the context of bio-detection dog research, this boundary is 
dissolved, as the research subjects in this case navigate multiple subjectivities including 
research subject, worker and pet. The category of ‘research animal’ thus becomes blurred. 
While scholars (e.g., Birke et al. 2004) have certainly noted the ability of a multitude of 
animals in scientific practice to respond to their conditions and treatment, thus shaping the 
material reality of events, the kinds of choices bio-detection dogs are permitted to help 
make—with regards to their desire to participate in the first instance, or their career 
speciality—demonstrably set these animals apart from those of conventional scientific 
practice. 
 
Taken together, my findings illustrate, through the lens of a previously unexplored space 
of animal-dependent research, the possibility for relations to exist between humans and 
animals that are not based on human domination and animal subservience: thus, this work 
is in keeping with recent scholarship on the notion of ‘posthuman communities’ 
(Cudworth 2017). In advancing such an argument, I do not refute the asymmetric power 
relations between human and dog that are inevitable given the consequence of the dog’s 
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incorporation into the home as dependents (Charles 2016). However, what is illustrated by 
my analysis is the possibility to recognize the porousness of the assumed human/animal 
barrier and the mutually affective relations that can emerge—even in the supposedly rigid 
contexts of scientific practice. Understanding how the spaces and practices of animal-
dependent research are tied to the animal’s flourishing is not only of scholarly interest but 
is vital for policymakers, scientists and animal caretakers in taking action to improve 
animal welfare in these contexts.  
 
Limitations and Recommendations for Future Research 
The scope of the analysis presented in this thesis was restricted by data protection 
regulations that prohibited my access to the population of people who donate samples for 
the training and research of bio-detection dogs. If the practice of using bio-detection dogs 
to detect human disease should move beyond the field of research and become operational 
as an adjunct in the diagnostic process it will be especially important to understand how 
this practice is understood and engaged with by the patients implicated. 
Another way in which this study is limited is with regards to the restricted amount 
of data obtained concerning the lives of the dogs outside the training and research facilities. 
More data concerning the dogs’ ‘home’ lives would strengthen the insights generated in 
this thesis by contributing to a fuller understanding of these dog’s everyday lives.  
 
Several other avenues of further research associated with this study can be identified. 
Firstly, it would be useful to conduct an examination of the potentially shifting shape of 
trainer–dog relationships in the arena of bio-detection as the technology in this field 
evolves. Already, a prototype sensor has been developed by experts in animal-computer 
interaction that is able to record and graphically represent the nuances of a dog’s responses 
(Mancini et al. 2015). Mancini and colleagues (Ibid.) found that dogs spent longer 
investigating positive rather than negative samples and that they placed greater pressure 
on the plate when sniffing a positive sample compared to a negative. Technologies such 
as this render visible the nuances of the dog’s responses that are often invisible to even the 
experienced handler’s naked eye. If this technology becomes operational there may be 
implications for the shape of human–dog interconnectedness, as the dependency on human 
interpretation would, at least partly, shift from interpretation focused on the individual 
dog’s movements, to the interpretation of computer-generated representations. 
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A final area that might be productive for future investigation is the ethnographic 
exploration of a context in which a different species is being trained in disease detection. 
For instance, in Tanzania, African pouched rats are being trained to detect the odour of 
tuberculosis.80 Human relationships to rats are profoundly ambiguous (Birke 2012), with 
rats considered, at various times, either ‘pests, pets or paragons of biomedical research’ 
(4). Understanding how this animal is perceived and treated in the context of disease 
detection would provide a fruitful comparison to the work presented here and highlight 
cultural and species-specific aspects of these practices.  
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